Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

30. Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, April 5, 1985

SUBJECT

• President’s National Space Club Speech

Per your conversation with Norm Clyne on Tuesday,² this memorandum provides my concerns about the treatment of SDI in the President’s speech of last Friday.³

The substantial misgivings that our allies harbor about SDI present us with one of our most significant problems. Many of these misgivings are shared by numerous members of Congress. It is thus important that we take pains in all our public statements about SDI to respond to their concerns. To this end, we should:

— restate our commitment to the four points agreed upon by the President and PM Thatcher at Camp David;⁴

— stress the criteria we will use to judge the feasibility of defensive technologies;

— emphasize our intention that a transition to a more defense-reliant balance be a cooperative endeavor with the Soviets;

— make clear that we do not intend to abandon deterrence but rather to shift the means and objects of deterrence;

— demonstrate that we recognize the need, should nuclear weapons be greatly reduced or eliminated, to deter and counter the threat posed by conventional arms imbalances, through both conventional arms improvements and arms control efforts; and

— point out the need, for the foreseeable future, to continue to rely on the ultimate threat of nuclear retaliation for deterrence, and thus both to maintain modern, flexible, and credible offensive nuclear forces and to strive for radical reductions in destabilizing offensive arms.

The President’s speech touched on some of these points but omitted several others. In addition, it included a few statements that could exacerbate concerns. It alludes to the superior morality of our intentions, a concept which makes the allies, especially the British and French, extremely uncomfortable. This is because such talk tends to denigrate, implicitly or explicitly, deterrence through nuclear retaliation, a policy we must follow for the foreseeable future. It also undermines support for British and French nuclear modernization programs. I think we should take the following approach:

— Our basic aim is to live in peace with freedom. To maintain peace it is necessary to deter those who would wish to gain by war or the threat of war. Deterrence requires that the potential aggressor be faced with the prospect of effective resistance and the risk of unacceptable damage. Deterrence and defense are moral. Otherwise the prospect of maintaining freedom would be extinguished. The defender should, however, strive to deter and defend with the minimum level of violence consistent with that purpose. If there is no available alternative other than the threat of nuclear retaliation, then this is the necessary and moral course. If, through adequate defenses one can deny the potential aggressor any hope of military success and thus deter him from aggression, then that becomes the preferable and the moral course.

The President’s speech also emphasizes boost-phase intercept systems and appears to denigrate atmospheric and mid-course intercept systems. This tends to stress the space aspect of the program, when SDI is exploring ground-based and atmospheric intercept systems as well. Granted, he was speaking to the National Space Club, but in future speeches, I think it wise not to stress the space angle, given the Soviet propaganda focus and the pejorative nature of the “Star Wars” label.

I also think it unwise to place sole emphasis on our ultimate hope—rendering obsolete ballistic missiles, MAD, etc.—or to stress a goal of a leak-proof defense or nuclear shield. We may want to deploy defensive systems even if we cannot meet these standards. After all, even an imperfect defense could create excessive complications for an aggressor contemplating a first strike, thereby strengthening deterrence, while providing incentives for reductions of offensive arms. Similarly, even a balance that retained some ballistic missiles on each side could be safer and more stable than today’s situation.

Finally, I note an apparent discrepancy between the President’s statement that an essential element of SDI research is the eventual ability to defend against both long-range and short-range ballistic missiles and Cap Weinberger’s interview with Le Monde.⁵ Cap said SDI is designed to defend against intermediate-range missiles but not against shorter-range missiles. He went on to specify the SS–21, SS–22, and SS–23 as systems the program is not designed to defend against. We need to get our story straight on this point.

I am mindful of the public diplomacy group on SDI—indeed, this group puts out some good products. However, there seems to be little attention paid to these products by some senior spokesmen and/or their speechwriters. It is imperative that we all sing the same song with the same music. Accordingly, I understand Bud is planning to put out a policy paper that will outline in more detail the themes we should all stress on SDI. Attached are some suggestions as to the possible content of such a paper.⁶

1. Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, March and April 1985. Secret. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Clyne wrote on the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum: “MFR: Given to Linhard by Nitze this date as ‘Informal’ paper. NGC”
2. April 2. No memorandum of conversation was found.
3. March 29. See Document 27.
4. See Document 9.
5. In telegram 13026 from Paris, March 29, the Embassy transmitted Weinberger’s interview that appeared in the March 29 edition of Le Monde. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850216–0817)
6. Attached but not printed is a paper listing bullet points in support of the Strategic Defense Initiative.