324. Telegram From the Embassy in Iceland to the Departments of State and Commerce1
1639. Subject: Whaling Dispute: How Much Damage? What Next?
1. (C—Entire text.)
Summary:
2. Apart from the cod wars, nothing in Iceland’s history as an independent nation has aroused such strong emotion and inflamed nationalism here to the extent that the whaling dispute with the U.S. has. Indeed, in the case of the series of cod wars in 1958, 1972, and 1975, in which the U.K. resisted, unsuccessfully, Iceland’s successive expansions of its exclusive fisheries zone to 200 miles, everyone here recognized that the British, who are also a NATO ally, had a conflicting economic interest of its own at stake. In the case of the whaling dispute, the point has been made by contacts to every officer in this Embassy that Icelanders are outraged by the perception that the U.S. appointed itself as the judge and jury on whaling issues and, in so doing, assumed the authority for telling Iceland how to conduct its scientific whaling program in its own waters and how to market the resulting products. The political impact of this in Iceland is of considerable long-term importance. This is an episode which will be remembered and discussed in political circles for years to come. While Icelanders may differ in their views over how the GOI should have handled this problem and, indeed, whether the scientific whaling program should have been launched in the first place, they are remarkably united across the entire political spectrum in their sense of outrage. It is too early to predict how the nationalistic sentiments which have been unleashed will play out or which political leader will prove most skillful at exploiting this. However, it is clear that there has been a shift in perceptions of the U.S. As a result, we now have to work very hard to ensure that our actions in the future avoid inflaming this nationalism and, to the extent possible, reassure Iceland that we are a reliable friend and ally.
3. To do this we need a coherent policy. Initially, this means a clear explanation of what the USG did and why so that we can begin getting our side of the story across because Icelanders are presently getting a very one-sided account of the whaling dispute. But much more is needed if we are to stem the damage to the U.S. position here. In particular, [Page 906] we must: (A) avoid giving the impression that the U.S. is interfering in any way with Japanese purchases of Icelandic whale products, (B) do our best to avoid a replay of the whaling dispute next year, and (C) convey the view that we are moving as quickly and as forcefully as possible to resolve our other dispute with Iceland over the transportation of military cargo. End summary.
4. The nature and scope of the damage: We have reported on the depth of emotion and nationalism aroused by the whaling dispute. However, there has also been a perceptible shift in positions and views in Iceland as a result of this dispute. For example, PolOff had a revealing conversation with Styrmir Gunnarsson, editor of Morgunbladid, Iceland’s most widely read and influential paper. PolOff has known Styrmir, who is a key figure in the Independence Party (IP), well for a little over a year. In both editorials and personal conversations, Styrmir has been a staunch supporter of Iceland’s defense relationship with the U.S. and repeatedly opposed the notion that the GOI should link the U.S.-manned NATO base at Keflavik to other issues and use the leverage to get its way in disputes. This appears to have changed. In an August 13 conversation, after describing at length the very high level of emotions and nationalism inflamed by this issue, which are “like nothing experienced here in recent years,” he went on to say that if the USG continues to treat Iceland the way it has in the whaling dispute, Iceland would have to use the presence and strategic importance of the base for leverage. When PolOff expressed his dismay at this statement in view of his past position and clear understanding of the base’s importance, he simply replied that U.S. behavior made it impossible for Iceland to deal with the U.S. “without using this card.”
5. The point has also been made to a number of us that the military cargo dispute,2 which remains unresolved despite over two years of diplomatic effort, worked in a pernicious way throughout the whaling dispute to intensify Icelandic frustrations. There is a widely held view here that “Washington” has been unwilling to come to grips with the military cargo issue because the IP, which has always advocated a close defense relationship with the U.S. and opposed linking the base to other issues, is unwilling to play Iceland’s strongest card, the base. This view has made many in the IP very nervous, especially since there [Page 907] is about a fifty-fifty chance of parliamentary elections this year. This, in turn, seems to be an important factor in the shift in position by Styrmir Gunnarsson and others in the IP leadership.
6. This shift in views is not limited to the IP—it spans the entire political spectrum in Iceland apart from the leftists in the People’s Alliance who are using the episode to show that they have been right all along in saying that Iceland cannot rely on the U.S. Indeed, these disputes have provoked numerous calls from all quarters here for greater self-reliance in foreign affairs and for the need to reduce Iceland’s dependence on U.S. fish markets. With regard to the latter, while we believe recent trends in exchange rates are responsible for the growing interest by exporters in markets other than the U.S., the greater attention being paid to other potential customers is being justified in political terms.
7. It is important to recognize that at this juncture the political dimensions of the whaling and shipping disputes take on greater importance than the economic aspects. Icelanders have reacted strongly not because of fear of loss of revenues or jobs but rather because they perceive the U.S. to be interfering in Iceland’s internal affairs and ignoring Iceland’s legitimate interests. This offends their strong sense of nationalism. Iceland, which only became independent in 1944 and only has a population of about a quarter of a million people, is very sensitive about such interference. Moreover, because the U.S. has no economic interest at stake in the whaling dispute, unlike the military cargo dispute, USG behavior in this matter was all-the-more incomprehensible and outrageous in the view of the Icelandic public.
8. What must be done? In order to present the U.S. case in both private discussions and to the media, we need a statement of some kind making clear that the USG, 1) will not certify Iceland for its whaling activities as now agreed upon by the two countries, 2) that from a bilateral standpoint this issue is currently over, 3) that the USG is not intervening in any way to prevent a Japanese purchase of whale meat from Iceland, and 4) that the “impreciseness” of the IWC resolution will be addressed within a multilateral framework and that the U.S. looks forward to working together with Iceland within the IWC to make certain that further misunderstandings of this kind are avoided. With regard to the latter point, we would encourage Dr. Calio to continue to nurture the very useful personal relationship that now exists between himself and Halldor Asgrimsson. We believe the relationship is on a footing of mutual respect and we intend to urge the Fisheries Minister in the same direction. The Calio/Asgrimsson telephone conversation of August 13 is right on the mark.3 It also occurs [Page 908] to us that a great deal could be gained by Dr. Calio visiting Iceland, if only for 24 hours, sometime in the not too distant future. The image of the Fisheries Minister scurrying to Washington in order to continue fishing in Icelandic waters played badly with Icelanders and a visit by Dr. Calio to Iceland could do much to reinforce the importance we attach to Iceland. A visit billed as one IWC Commissioner visiting another could also help put discussion of whaling back into a multilateral framework. It won’t take long to ascertain if this idea is worth pursuing.
9. Finally, our future actions will be much more important than whatever we say. The first test will be Japanese purchase of whale meat. If they refuse to buy from the Icelanders because the USG did not give them the assurances they want, we will be hard pressed to convince the Icelanders the USG did not intervene (even if this is actually the case). We need to explain our position in a clear way. Next, we need to avoid a replay of the whaling dispute next year—definition and clarification will help. Finally, we need to convey the view that we are moving as quickly and forcefully as possible to achieve a durable resolution to the military cargo issue. We recognize that these are tall orders. However, whaling and Rainbow4 have already caused considerable damage to the U.S. position in Iceland; we must avoid further damage and attempt repairs before public emotion leaves no room for our Icelandic political allies to maneuver.
- Source: Department of State, Dumping; Arctic; Whaling; Antarctic; Scientific Research, 1976–1987, Lot 94D419, Whaling: Iceland 1985–86 Including 1986 Agreement. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Naval Air Station Keflavik.↩
- In telegram 1810 from Reykjavik, September 10, the Embassy reported, “During the period 1967–1984, Icelandic vessels carried supplies for the defense force in Iceland. This activity proved to be reliable for the U.S. military and important to Iceland by utilizing available space on the return voyage of Icelandic vessels carrying fishery products to the United States market. Then, suddenly, in 1984 an American company, Rainbow Navigation, Inc., entered this route claiming preferential treatment on the basis of a 1904 Cargo Preference Act, which provided that American Government property should be carried on U.S. vessels.” (Ibid.)↩
- No record of this conversation has been found.↩
- See footnote 2, above.↩