Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

169. National Security Decision Directive 249¹

Washington, October 29, 1986

ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE CURRENT NST NEGOTIATING ROUND

The attached instructions² supplement existing guidance for the current round of the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) which began on September 18, 1986, in Geneva. They set forth in detail the proposals made to General Secretary Gorbachev during my meeting with him in Reykjavik, Iceland, and provide guidance for building on the agreements we reached there.

Ronald Reagan

Attachment

Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva³

Washington, October 22, 1986, 0311Z

330271. Subject: (S) Additional Guidance for US/Soviet Nuclear and Space Talks. Ref: State 291634⁴

1.–Entire text.

2. Following is additional guidance for the NST delegation for Round VI, reflecting discussions in October 11–12 Reykjavik meeting. Washington continues to evaluate how best to build upon positive accomplishments of that meeting and will provide additional guidance shortly, including guidance on the concept of eliminating all offensive ballistic missiles and its link to obligations with respect to the ABM Treaty. Previous guidance (Reftel) remains valid except as modified below. Guidance for each of the three negotiating groups is being provided septel.

3. U.S. objectives for the remainder of Round VI include:

—To build upon the positive accomplishments of Reykjavik by inducing the Soviets to continue the seriousness and flexibility displayed there.

—To present U.S. proposals for amplifying the understandings reached in Reykjavik, as set forth in the instructions to each negotiating group.

—To reject Soviet attempts to mischaracterize the understandings reached in Iceland.

—To reject Soviet attempts to hold progress in one negotiating forum hostage to progress in another. Delegation should vigorously object to any Soviet characterization that progress in INF is once again linked to progress in other areas, noting that this contradicts specific understanding reached during Geneva summit to seek a separate INF agreement and to accelerate progress in areas of common ground.

4. Should Soviets raise issue of elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles by 1996, as proposed by President in Reykjavik, delegation should note that the first step in the elimination of ballistic missiles must be the 50-percent START reductions and significant INF reductions discussed in Reykjavik and that it is more efficient to discuss these steps first. (FYI: Washington anticipates replacing this guidance with detailed guidance on ballistic missile elimination by 27 October.)

5. If the Soviets raise other, non-NST arms control issues, the delegation should respond that these issues should be pursued in the appropriate fora, not NST. Should the Soviets specifically link nuclear testing and progress in NST, as suggested by General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik, delegation should reply that the United States expressed its readiness in Reykjavik to enter negotiations on nuclear testing issues and that specific Soviet recommendations should be raised in the appropriate channels. The delegation should resist any further Soviet efforts to discuss limitations on nuclear testing in the NST forum.

Shultz

Attachment

Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva⁵

Washington, October 22, 1986, 0312Z

330273. Subject: (S) Additional guidance for START Negotiating Group. Ref: (A) State 291634⁶ (B) State 290210⁷

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Following is additional guidance for the START negotiating group in Round VI, reflecting discussions in October 11–12 Reykjavik meeting. Washington continues to evaluate how best to build upon positive accomplishments of that meeting and will provide additional guidance shortly, including guidance on timeframe for 50-percent reductions and on the concept of eliminating all offensive ballistic missiles.

3. It is the U.S. understanding that the following was agreed and, therefore, the U.S. START negotiating Group should confirm their acceptance by the Soviets:

—A 1600 ceiling on ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers;

—A 6000 ceiling on warheads, to include ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and long-range ALCMs.

—All heavy bombers count against the SNDV limit. Each heavy bomber carrying gravity bombs or SRAMs would count as one warhead toward the limit of 6000. Each ALCM carried by heavy bombers would count as one warhead. (FYI: As part of the negotiations on these provisions, accounting rules for implementing them will have to be worked out, and Washington invites delegation’s views on such rules.)

—Consideration of appropriate sublimits would continue.

—Heavy ICBMs would be significantly reduced.

—The sides shall find a mutually acceptable solution to limiting deployment of long-range nuclear-armed SLCMs. When such a solution is found, it will not involve counting long-range nuclear-armed SLCMs within the 6000/1600 limits. In this regard, the delegation should seek out details, especially details relating to verification, of the Soviet position that would attempt to meet U.S. concerns.

4. In the context of the above agreement on counting gravity bombs and SRAMs, the previous U.S. proposal to limit heavy bombers to 350 is redundant and is no longer a part of our position.

5. At Reykjavik, the sides understood that other provisions would have to be added to what was agreed in order to make a complete agreement. A number of sublimits were discussed but not agreed; it was agreed the consideration of sublimits could continue. The U.S. START negotiating group should propose that there be sublimits on:

—Ballistic missile warheads;

—ICBM warheads;

—Warheads on all permitted ICBMs except those on silo-based light and medium ICBMs with six or fewer warheads;

—While the preferred numbers for these sublimits remain 4500, 3000, and 1500, respectively, the US START negotiating group is authorized to propose sublimits of 4800 ballistic missile warheads, 3300 ICBM warheads, and 1650 warheads on ICBMs except silo-based light or medium ICBMs with six or fewer warheads. (Note: This proposal results in no RPT no sublimit on ALCMs.)

—The aforementioned sublimits are the U.S. proposal for implementing the Soviet offer in Reykjavik that heavy ICBMs be significantly reduced. The U.S. side anticipates that such an approach will reduce heavy ICBMs significantly (e.g., by roughly half) in an appropriate manner.

—All other elements of the 50-percent U.S. START proposal remain the same (e.g., the ban on mobile ICBMs and the 50-percent reduction in ballistic missile throw-weight).

6. The October 15 Soviet plenary statement cited the Soviet proposal for 50-percent reductions in total SNDVs and weapons as well as in each category of strategic system (i.e., ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers) which was presented in Reykjavik and rejected by the U.S. Should this formulation be tabled in Geneva, the negotiating group should reject the proposal as follows:

—In Reykjavik the sides agreed in principle to 50-percent reductions in strategic offensive arms, specifically to 1600 SNDVs and 6000 warheads appropriately applied. Certain other elements of the initial Soviet formulation proposed in Reykjavik were determined by the U.S. at the time to result in an inequitable outcome and therefore were rejected. The U.S. proposal for 50-percent reductions builds on those elements mutually agreed at Reykjavik and provides for an agreed equitable outcome.

7. Effective verification is essential to both sides. As agreed at Geneva last year, verification measures should be negotiated concurrently with reductions and limitations. The two sides should seek to apply progress made in INF with respect to verification principles (see INF instructions, para 4) to the negotiations on strategic offensive arms.

8. Except as modified above, previous instructions remain unchanged.

9. Paragraph 9a contains the text of the initial Soviet proposal made in Reykjavik the morning of October 11. Paragraph 9b contains the language agreed to by the U.S.-Soviet experts group during the early morning of 12 October. Both are provided only for the information of the negotiating group.

—A. Initial Soviet proposal, AM October 11. On strategic arms. An agreement to reduce by fifty percent the strategic offensive arms of the USSR and the USA taking into consideration the historically formed distinctive features of the structures of the parties’ strategic forces. Within this framework, reductions shall apply to all types of offensive strategic arms, including heavy missiles. A solution shall also be found with regard to limiting the deployment of long-range sea-launched cruise missiles.

On all matters relating to the problem of strategic offensive arms the parties will negotiate having regard for their mutual interests and concerns, and displaying a political will to reach agreement.

—B. Experts group agreed language, early AM October 12. On strategic arms. An agreement would be prepared to reduce by fifty percent strategic offensive arms to an equal number of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers (approximately 1600) and warheads (not more than 6000), taking into account historically formed distinctive features of the structures of the parties’ strategic forces. Within this framework, reductions shall apply to all types of strategic offensive arms, including a significant number of heavy missiles. A mutually acceptable solution shall also be found to limiting deployment of long-range nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles.

On all matters relating to the problem of strategic offensive arms the parties will negotiate having regard for their mutual interests and concerns, and displaying a political will to reach agreement.

Shultz

Attachment

Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva⁸

Washington, October 22, 1986, 0311Z

330272. Subject: (S) Additional Guidance for Defense and Space Negotiating Group. Ref: (A) State 291909;⁹ (B) State 29566¹⁰

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Following is additional guidance for the Defense and Space Negotiating Group for Round VI, based on US proposals made to the Soviet Union in Iceland meeting between the President and General Secretary Gorbachev on October 11–12. This guidance is in addition to, and does not replace guidance for, D&S Negotiating Group of reftels (a) and (b) and previous rounds, except as specifically noted below.

3. The existing US proposal as contained in previous guidance and in the President’s July 25 letter to General Secretary Gorbachev remains on the table.

4. Paragraph (4a) contains the initial Soviet proposal made in Reykjavik on the first day of the discussions. Paragraph (4b) provides the text of the first US alternative proposal made by the President to General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik on the afternoon of the second day of discussions. Paragraph (4c) provides the text of the Soviet counterproposal made that same afternoon. Paragraph (4d) provides the text of the second and last US alternative proposal made in writing by the President. These are provided for the information of the Negotiating Group.

A. Soviet proposal, AM October 11. For the purpose of strengthening the regime of the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, which is of unlimited duration, an understanding shall be reached that the USSR and the USA undertake not to exercise their right to withdraw from that treaty for a period of ten years, and to strictly comply with all its provisions throughout that period. Testing in space of all missile-defense space elements shall be prohibited except for research and testing carried out in laboratories. This would not entail a ban on the testing of such fixed land-based systems and their components as are allowed under the ABM treaty. Subsequently, within several years, the parties shall negotiate further mutually acceptable solutions in this area. The parties deem it appropriate to undertake additional efforts with a view to achieve mutually acceptable agreements banning anti-satellite systems.

B. First US proposal, PM October 12. Both sides would agree to confine themselves to research, development and testing, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty, for a period of five years, through 1991, during which time a 50 percent reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals would be achieved. This being done, both sides would continue the pace of reductions with respect to all remaining offensive ballistic missiles with the goal of the total elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles by the end of the second five year period. As long as these reductions continue at the appropriate pace, the same restrictions will continue to apply. At the end of ten year period, with all offensive ballistic missiles eliminated, either side would be free to deploy defenses.

C. Soviet proposal, PM October 12. The USSR and the United States would undertake for ten years not to exercise their existing right of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, which is of unlimited duration, and during that period strictly to observe all its provisions. The testing in space of all space components of missile defense is prohibited, except research and testing conducted in laboratories. Within the first five years of the ten-year period (and thus through 1991), the strategic offensive arms of the two sides shall be reduced by 50 percent. During the following five years of that period, the remaining 50 percent of the two sides’ strategic offensive arms shall be reduced. Thus by the end of 1996, the strategic offensive arms of the USSR and the United States will have been totally eliminated.

D. Second US proposal, PM October 12. The USSR and the United States undertake for ten years not to exercise their existing right of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, which is of unlimited duration, and during that period strictly to observe all its provisions while continuing research, development and testing, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty. Within the first five years of the ten-year period (and thus through 1991), the strategic offensive arms of the two sides shall be reduced by 50 percent. During the following five years of that period, all remaining offensive ballistic missiles of the two sides shall be reduced. Thus by the end of 1996, all offensive ballistic missiles of the USSR and the United States will have been totally eliminated. At the end of the ten-year period, either side could deploy defenses if it so chose unless the parties agree otherwise.

5. Guidance on the US proposals made at Reykjavik is under consideration in Washington, including additional analytical work. In the interim, the Negotiating Group should avoid discussion of the specifics of either of the US proposals.

6. If questioned about the US proposals made in Reykjavik, the US Negotiating Group should respond that the US intends to build upon the positive accomplishments of the Reykjavik meeting, and that the US will be making a proposal in Geneva based on these accomplishments shortly. If asked whether the additional commitments suggested in the US proposals discussed in Reykjavik depend upon other conditions, the Negotiating Group should note that in Reykjavik it was clear by the terms of the proposals made that the additional commitments included in the proposals tabled by the US were strictly conditioned on the two sides’ reaching a mutually satisfactory agreement now on a schedule of reductions resulting in 50 percent reductions in the strategic offensive forces of both sides to equal levels by 1991 and total elimination of the offensive ballistic missiles of both sides by 1996.

Shultz

Attachment

Draft Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Nuclear and Arms Talks in Geneva¹¹

Washington, undated

Subject: Additional Guidance for NST Delegation. Refs: (A) State 330271¹² (B) State 291634¹³

1. Secret—Entire text

2. Reftel a provided initial post-Reykjavik guidance for the NST delegation for Round VI, reflecting discussions in October 11–12 Reykjavik meeting. This cable provides additional contingency guidance on relationship of SNF to the concept of eliminating all offensive ballistic missiles. Previous guidance (refs a and b) remains valid except as modified below. Guidance for the Defense and Space Negotiating Group is being provided septel. There will be no additional guidance for START and INF Negotiating Groups this round.

3. The U.S. proposal to eliminate all offensive ballistic missiles, of whatever range, involves SNF systems of ranges less than those previously the subject of negotiations. Discussion of such systems may require agreement on an appropriate negotiating forum. Only the general concept of eliminating all offensive ballistic missiles should be introduced this round. Should the Soviets raise questions on negotiating forum for SNF missiles in this regard, delegation should note that at this time it is the U.S. opinion that the INF Negotiating Group may provide the most logical forum.

4. Once delegation has reviewed these instructions and supporting instructions to individual negotiating groups, Washington would welcome delegation’s views on appropriate ending date for current negotiating round.

Attachment

Draft Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva¹⁴

Washington, undated

Subject: Additional Guidance for the Defense and Space Negotiating Group. Ref: (A) State 291909;¹⁵ (B) State 293566;¹⁶ (C) State 330272¹⁷

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Following is additional guidance for the Defense and Space Negotiating Group for Round VI. It supplements the guidance provided in Ref C. This guidance is in addition to, and does not replace guidance for D&S Negotiating Group of REFTELS (A), (B) and (C) except as modified below. There will be no additional guidance for START and INF negotiating groups this round.

3. In addition to the existing proposal in the President’s July 25 letter to General Secretary Gorbachev, which remains on the table, the US negotiating group is authorized to present the following elements for an agreement which we proposed in Reykjavik as an alternative to the president’s July proposal.

—The USSR and the United States would undertake for ten years not to exercise their existing right of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, which is of unlimited duration, and during that period strictly to observe all its provisions while continuing research, development and testing, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty.

—Within the first five years of the ten-year period (and thus through 1991), the strategic offensive arms of the two sides shall be reduced by 50 percent.

—During the following five years of that period, the remaining offensive ballistic missiles of the two sides shall be eliminated.

—Thus, by the end of 1996, all offensive ballistic missiles of the USSR and the United States will have been totally eliminated, and either side could deploy advanced strategic defenses if it so chose, unless the parties agree otherwise.

4. The above undertakings would be recorded in a new treaty.

5. In presenting the above proposal, the negotiating group should make clear that the above commitment would be strictly conditioned on the two sides’ reaching a mutually satisfactory agreement now, as part of a new treaty, on a schedule of reductions resulting in 50 percent reductions in the strategic offensive forces of both sides to equal levels by 1991 and total elimination of the offensive ballistic missiles of both sides by 1996.

6. When presenting the position described in Para 3–5, the US negotiator should make it clear that in not exercising its rights to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, neither side would be forfeiting its right to withdraw for reasons of its supreme national interest, or to respond to a material breach, or other circumstances recognized under international law. He should indicate that:

—A blanket commitment to waive all rights of withdrawal is not acceptable.

—The US is prepared to meet Soviet concerns through a more limited commitment not to withdraw for the purposes of deploying advanced defenses.

—New conditions for withdrawal would have to be negotiated and agreed as part of the proposed treaty described in Para 4 and 5 above. We would expect such conditions to include a material breach of that treaty or linked agreements (e.g., failure to adhere to the schedule of reductions provided in an associated START treaty).

—If the Soviets have other concerns, we are prepared to discuss them.

7. If the Soviets question the use of the language in the President’s proposal (i.e., “undertakes for ten years not to exercise their existing right of withdrawal from the ABM treaty”) the negotiator should note that the President anticipated our finding a solution with respect to the interpretation of the non-withdrawal phraseology that acceptably accommodated both US and Soviet concerns.¹⁸

Ronald Reagan

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR 094, NSDD 249. Secret. Poindexter forwarded the decision directive to Reagan under cover of a handwritten note of October 28: “Mr. President, As a result of yesterday’s meetings on arms control, I signed out the two attached cables reflecting your guidance. The earlier cables went out last week. Request your signature on the attached NSDD for the record. John.” (Ibid.) Poindexter distributed the signed decision directive to Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Herrington, Casey, Vessey, and Adelman under cover of an October 29 memorandum: “The President has approved the attached National Security Decision Directive providing supplemental guidance for the current round of negotiations in the Nuclear and Space Talks.” (Ibid.)
2. Attached but not printed, at Tab 4, are the INF instructions of October 22.
3. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.
4. In telegram 291634 to NST Geneva, September 17, the Department transmitted overall instructions for Round VI of Negotiations with the USSR on Nuclear and Space Arms. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860704–0990)
5. Secret; Immediate.
6. See footnote 4.
7. In telegram 290210 to NST Geneva, September 16, the Department transmitted the START instructions for Round VI. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860713–0752)
8. Secret; Immediate.
9. In telegram 291909 to NST Geneva, September 17, the Department transmitted the Defense and Space instructions for Round VI. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860705–0290)
10. In telegram 293566 to NST Geneva, September 18, the Department transmitted additional guidance to the Defense and Space instructions for Round VI (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860708–0824)
11. Secret. Sent as telegram 336325 to NST Geneva, October 28. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860817–0492)
12. In telegram 330271 to NST Geneva, October 22, the Department transmitted additional guidance for Round VI. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860801–0087)
13. See footnote 4.
14. Secret. Sent as telegram 336324 to NST Geneva, October 28. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860817–0491)
15. In telegram 291909 to NST Geneva, September 18, the Department transmitted additional guidance for Defense and Space for Round VI. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860708–0824)
16. See footnote 10.
17. In telegram 330272 to NST Geneva, October 22, the Department transmitted additional guidance for Defense and Space for Round VI. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860801–0090)
18. Reagan signed below the last line of the draft telegram.