Attachment
Paper Prepared by the Ambassador to Hungary (Salgo)4
U.S. POLICY TOWARD EASTERN
EUROPE
Summary. You asked me to write down my thoughts on devising a more
effective approach toward the non-Soviet members of the Warsaw pact.
In brief, my observations and suggestions are:
A—We should stop talking both in public and in private about
“differentiation”. Branding countries as “good” or “bad” or “better”
from a U.S. point of view does not encourage change in those
countries; it embarrasses the reformers and puts them under greater
pressures from the Soviets.
B—Abandoning the touting of differentiation does not mean we
shouldn’t make policy distinctions between the countries of Eastern
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Europe, based on the
extent to which each is prepared to reciprocate steps we might take
to improve bilateral ties.
C—Political relations in this part of the world are essentially
influenced by economic and cultural relations. They legitimize
better political ties.
D—Most of the East European leaders want improved cultural and
economic ties with the United States. Disillusionment with
Marxism-Leninism is growing. However, we should not be pushing East
Europeans for closer ties. Rather, we should encourage them subtly
that it is in their interest to move toward us and then be prepared
to respond. East European leaders are the best judges of what the
Kremlin will tolerate.
E—We must learn oriental patience. We should recognize that leaders
like Janos Kadar think
policies should be devised for 20–30 years ahead, implemented in a
process of “small steps”. In Eastern Europe the chess players win
against the poker players.
F—It will be decades before Soviet military and foreign policy reins
will be loosened. We must be more sensitive to ethnic and
nationalistic rivalries, latent (and not so latent) fears about
boundary realignment and explosiveness of ethnic hatred.
G—Artificial information boundaries are disappearing. We, much more
than the Soviets, can exploit this. Audiences in Eastern Europe are
receptive to U.S. cultural influences, provided they follow a
straight-forward BBC style rather than the ideological style RFE has adopted.
H—We should not expect Eastern Europe to emulate the U.S. model.
Austria, with its welfare state but efficient private sector, is the
model for Hungarians—and probably for the Poles, Bulgarians and
Czechoslovaks as well.
I—We should try to understand East European long-range objectives,
and decide whether they correspond to our own long-range
interests.
- —
- In twenty to thirty years time, the Hungarians see themselves
as evolving into a neutral federation of non-Slavic states,
something akin to a Danubian, Austro-Hungarian entity.
- —
- Similarly, the future may see a pan-slavic, Swiss-type
federation of the Slav elements of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact
states. Such a federation would be neutral and perhaps
demilitarized. It would be an economically viable political
buffer zone, probably including Yugoslavia.
- •
- Romania may want to join either 1 or 2, most likely 1.
However, until a sound new leadership emerges, Romania will be a
destabilizing factor.
- •
- East Germany does not fit either mold. They are the logical
turn-plate of the historical “drang nach Osten”5 and
the equally historic Russian ambition westwards.
J—We must clarify our own policy. We need to reach an effective
consensus within our Government on what our economic and financial
policy toward Eastern Europe should be. A policy review should
include a thorough interagency examination of the technical transfer
issue: protect our military interest, but use our technical progress
to further our economic interest and link meaningfully Eastern
European economies to ours.
K—We need to be more imaginative in devising ways to encourage U.S.
trade and investment with Eastern Europe. One promising way to do
this is establishment of joint trading companies to channel U.S.
investment and know-how into Eastern Europe to be financed through
sales hard-currency generating exports to the far east or other
markets. It is in our interest to introduce U.S. marketing and
business concepts into Eastern Europe. It is also in our interest to
increase their stake in economic relations with the U.S. and the
West. End Summary.
The countries of Eastern Europe share certain conditions:
A—Disillusionment of the population with Marxist propaganda and
promises, and, particularly, the alienation of the younger
generation from the “ruling classes” (party apparatchiks).
B—In this age of communication, there is no way to shut out
information—they compare their stagnant living standards with the
West.
C—History: Eastern Europe always absorbed and often even improved on
the great waves of human progress from the West; waves generally
stopping at the borders of impenetrable Russia. Forty years ago the
military conquest from the East brought Eastern Europe under Russian
hegemony, and the western waves of progress now stop at their
western borders. The material and spiritual benefits of western
achievements stop at the iron curtain—but not the knowledge and envy
of it.
D—Last but not least: The governments in Eastern Europe are
Soviet-imposed. They are judged, maintained or toppled not by local
will but by Russian control.
All of the above would logically indicate a very strong desire for
“common action” among these populations. Nothing is further from the
truth. Probably one substantial element of the Russian hegemony is
that the Eastern European countries even today are more preoccupied
by their conflicts, internal and external, than by their common
fate. No East European country can today or in the foreseeable
future tolerate an openly touted “differentiation” policy toward
them. Of course, they yearn for ties to the U.S. and the West. But
they need to build these ties
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discreetly and gradually, without a lot of
references to their departures from the Soviet model or comparisons
to other East European states.
The borders of practically every Warsaw Pact member state were
changed by another member following World War II. We should keep
this fact, and the resulting minority and historical forces, in mind
in dealing with Eastern Europe. Nationalism is increasingly a force
to be reckoned with in Eastern Europe. It brings opportunities for
increased independence from the USSR on cultural and economic issues, but recreates
some of the dangerous rivalries of the past.
The next generation of East European leaders, 30–45 years of age,
could not be more different than their predecessors. While trained
in the USSR, they fall into
different national molds. They show greater diversity in their
adherence or deviation from the Russian “model”, and they
nonetheless demonstrate initiative only in areas tolerated by
Moscow, which are essentially in the economic and cultural sectors.
Of course, they take advantage of opportunities for change depending
on timing and national characteristics.
In this regard, the most successful have been the “survivor
nations”—the Hungarians, followed, and sometimes overtaken, by the
“achievers”—the East Germans. But the others will emerge in time
with similar, evolutions based on their diverse national
characteristics.
Remarkably, even the Soviet Union is waking up and its leaders begin
to worry about the ever greater discrepancy between their and our
human progress. The overriding advantage of the western democracies
is the living proof of the 20th century: Modern capitalism is able
to produce the greatest advance in the conditions of man in an
atmosphere of human freedom unprecedented in man’s history. Our
western allies and Japan have greater ease in dealing with Eastern
Europe than we do. Some of my recommendations are inspired by their
successes.
The do’s and don’ts as I see them are as follows:
- —
- Do not knock on closed doors. Pass by and enter those that
are open. By sheer curiosity, the man behind the closed door
will open his to see what happens in the
neighborhood.
- —
- Watch for the smallest signals and acknowledge and return
them, but do not take visible initiatives—this may give rise
to paranoia.
- —
- Expect hard bargaining and reciprocate just as hard as an
evenly matched partner. Consider every opening a “trade”,
whether it is cultural or economic, and shoot for “even”. A
good agreement is one that both sides consider good.
- —
- Encourage meaningful personal travel by East European
party leaders to the U.S. No reading, no telling, will sell
as experience will. It took Havasi four impromptu visits
into four different department stores in four cities to
overcome his natural inclination to believe that we had
artificially organized things to impress him—a normal
procedure in the
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East. (The winning item was his search for and purchase of a
pair of well made size 14C shoes for his son—no 14C in
Potemkinia!)6
- —
- Be extremely sensitive and responsive in a pragmatic way
to any suggestions and openings which are not contrary to
our national interests. Adopt the “continuous small steps”
formula so dear to Eastern Europeans. Our allies understand
this. We should too.
- —
- Be patient, accept eastern rites and rhythms. Moscow’s
eyes are watching.
- —
- Maintain our fundamental policy of respect for human
rights and freedom of choice as our long range aim. But for
greater effectiveness, do it in a discreet way.
- —
- Look for “openings” and, once created, respond swiftly,
with subtlety and understanding of the circumstances.
- —
- Develop specific policy initiatives to enhance our trade
relationship with Hungary and the rest of Eastern Europe. A
first step would be an interagency re-examination of the
technology transfer issue. We need a coherent tech transfer
policy that permits us to be a reliable supplier of
non-strategic technology. At the same time, we can turn
necessary COCOM
restrictions to our advantage by luring East Europeans with
the possibility of acquiring presently controlled
technologies at a later time (the “delay factor”) when the
technology could be safely released. Offer them the
possibility of a higher technology item later in return for
purchase of a non-strategic item now. Such a policy turns
negative into positive elements; gives us a sales tool to
increase exports; provides necessary controls over tech
transfer; and gives us leverage to obtain other trade
advantages.
- —
- Another way to enhance our trade relationship,
particularly with Hungary, is to establish American trading
companies to provide working capital to enable Hungarian
industry to develop new products for sale in the U.S., the
Far East, and elsewhere. The credits would be repaid with
export goods. Other creative ideas to stimulate a growing
business relationship between Eastern Europe and the U.S.
would give the East Europeans a greater stake in relations
with the West.
The Future
It is clear that the East Europeans yearn for much greater
independence, a better life for their populations and a much sounder
economic and political base. If we are
sensitive to their dreams and listen to their subtle allusions, we
can sense how they see their evolution twenty to thirty years ahead.
The vision here is of a new Austro-Hungarian federation based on
neutrality and complementary economies. The Russians
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left Austria, maybe they will leave
Hungary one day too. For the rest of Eastern Europe, one can
envisage a multinational, pan-slavic federation from the Baltic to
the Mediterranean, including Yugoslavia, and possibly Romania. It is
hard to imagine Balkan countries in such a federation but there are
clearly very few choices—either Russian tutelage and exploitation,
or voluntary confederation under new, pragmatic, intelligent
leaders. Long-range U.S. policy toward this region should take into
account these East European aspirations.
