74. Memorandum of Conversation1


  • U.S.

    • The Secretary
    • National Security Advisor Carlucci
    • EUR/SOV Director Parris (Notetaker)
    • Dimitry Zarechnak (Interpreter)
    • Joined meeting in progress:
    • Ambassador Nitze
    • Ambassador Ridgway
    • Ambassador Glitman
    • Director Adelman
  • U.S.S.R.

    • Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
    • Mr. Sredin (Notetaker)
    • Mr. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)
    • Joined meeting in progress:
    • Ambassador Karpov
    • DepForMin Bessmertnykh


  • Bilateral Issues, INF, START, Nuclear Testing, and Summitry

THE SECRETARY opened the meeting by explaining that he thought it might be useful to have National Security Advisor Carlucci [Page 363] present for the final session. SHEVARDNADZE said it was good that Carlucci had joined the Ministers. THE SECRETARY said that in fact he had been there all along. Carlucci was a strong colleague in his role at the White House and had been helpful in working the various problems. SHEVARDNADZE said this was an important factor.

THE SECRETARY said he hoped the next time he came to Moscow Carlucci could accompany him so that Carlucci could meet the other members of the Soviet leadership and get some sense of their outlook and the quality of their minds. His problem was that it was Carlucci’s job to sit next to the President so that there was professional expertise available to the President when the Secretary was busy. SHEVARDNADZE noted that he had already formally invited Carlucci to visit Moscow, and would at some point outline his ideas on arrangements.

THE SECRETARY said that the two Ministers’ purpose that morning was to take stock, to push further where they could, and to get some sense of where to go from here. Both had had a large number of working groups focusing on different subjects. Perhaps they should work through the groups reports. SHEVARDNADZE said he understood that the Ministers would hear from the groups later. THE SECRETARY explained that they were assembled on the eighth floor, and observed that they would certainly want to hear from the Ministers later on the results of their private meeting. But for the moment it might be best for the Ministers to take the time they needed, as their private sessions were always productive, and then meet with their delegations. SHEVARDNADZE agreed.

On bilateral issues, THE SECRETARY began, it was his understanding that there had been an extensive, worthwhile discussion and that the experts were close to an agreement on satisfactory arrangements for our respective embassies. One issue which remained was the number of people we needed to send to Moscow to renovate our existing office building. The Soviet side had insisted on a specific number; we had provided an outside estimate of 140. The Soviet side had counterproposed, suggesting they would be prepared to take a positive approach to applications above that number. We had accepted the concept, and reduced our number to 75, assuming such a positive approach. Agreement on this point was important to us, as we wanted to pour on the manpower to get the job done.

A second outstanding issue was the question of letting our people visit Moscow without buying an expensive Intourist package. The Secretary knew that this was an official sanction, but urged that it be dropped in the spirit of their discussions. So, in general, a lot had been accomplished in this area, but the Secretary wanted to bring these two points to the Foreign Minister’s personal attention.

SHEVARDNADZE reiterated that he hoped it would be possible later to hear reports from our experts. In the bilateral area they had [Page 364] done good work. On the first question the Secretary had raised, “we can agree.” This should not be a question which is impossible to resolve. The specific number, be it 65, 75, or 85, was not a problem. The important thing was that the principle of reciprocity be respected. (THE SECRETARY said he agreed.) The second question could be resolved “in the same fashion.” Shevardnadze recalled how the guest-of-embassy question had arisen in the wake of their discussion the previous year of the Daniloff affair. But this was not a question which could not be resolved, and, if necessary, the Minister would look into it in order to find a solution. THE SECRETARY thanked him for the offer.

Moving on to human rights, the Secretary noted that there had been good, lengthy discussions at their level and that of experts. It was his impression that a real process of dialogue had taken hold. He had found helpful Shevardnadze’s explanation of what was taking place in the Soviet Union in this field. So the two sides were making progress. Some cases still required special attention, as did the categories the Ministers had discussed. The Secretary reminded Shevardnadze that the Foreign Minister had said he would look into what further could be done on the Soviet side.

SHEVARDNADZE said that he, too, had been briefed by his experts on humanitarian issues. They had said their discussions had been interesting, constructive and non-polemical. Perhaps they could be given the floor to make a more detailed report. Shevardnadze said that in general he wanted the two sides’ experts to feel responsible for the larger political dimension of their work. They often spent the night arguing over fine points, but sometimes their efforts were not fruitless. Shevardnadze said he had been told that the U.S. side would also give attention to problems raised by the Soviet side. This was good; it had not always been the case. As such, it was a “noble” development in the two countries’ dialogue on such matters. As to the specifics that the Secretary had referred to, they would be considered.

THE SECRETARY acknowledged that they would have more detailed reports later, but noted that the Foreign Minister’s appraisal that the two sides were making progress, and that the dialogue had become more constructive, coincided with his own.

SHEVARDNADZE took the opportunity to raise the case of a Soviet defector, Bogatiy, whom the Foreign Minister alleged U.S. officials had denied the Soviet Embassy in Washington an opportunity to interview. The Embassy had now been contacted directly by Bogatiy, who had expressed a desire to return to the Soviet Union. Shevardnadze expressed the hope that the State Department could facilitate a meeting, and would take no steps to obstruct Bogatiy’s return to the Soviet Union were he to make his desires clear.

THE SECRETARY said it was U.S. policy that people should come or go as they chose without official interference. We would of course [Page 365] need to be sure that the individual in question in fact wanted to return to the Soviet Union. The Secretary was not personally familiar with the case, but believed that there would be no problem in principle in determining whether Bogatiy was interested in meeting with Soviet authorities, and, if he were, it would be done.

SHEVARDNADZE reminded the Secretary that he had complained of Soviet bureaucrats on Tuesday.2 The Soviet Union was probably not the only country with this problem.

Shevardnadze said he had one more question regarding reciprocity in radio broadcasting. The matter had been discussed at length in the past. Shevardnadze hoped it could be considered by the U.S. at a high level; otherwise it would be difficult to resolve. The guideline here should be reciprocity in the access of U.S. and Soviet citizens to the other side’s ideas. Shevardnadze understood that it might be difficult for technical and other reasons to achieve reciprocity, but urged that a solution be found.

THE SECRETARY said that we had never had any problem with our citizens’ having access to Soviet broadcasts. We had never jammed them and did not now. (SHEVARDNADZE interjected that Moscow wasn’t jamming either. THE SECRETARY acknowledged that at least VOA was not now jammed.) There was a system for allocating broadcast channels. USIA Director Wick had made clear our willingness to discuss the problem. As Wick had reminded the Foreign Minister at dinner the night before, he was awaiting Soviet answers to some questions he had raised on related issues. Wick was prepared to work, and the Secretary would relay to him Shevardnadze’s expression of interest. SHEVARDNADZE said this would be fine.

As for regional questions, THE SECRETARY observed that there had been no working groups, but confirmed that he had now seen reports on the UN Secretary General’s trip to Iran and Iraq. As had been expected, the results were somewhat ambiguous, and would have to be struggled with in the Security Council next week. Our first impression was that we should be ready to proceed with a second resolution, even though, apparently, Perez de Cuellar had not returned completely empty-handed.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed that there was a need to discuss the Iran-Iraq war, particularly as they had had little time to do so the day before. Shevardnadze was also interested in hearing U.S. views on Central America, as he would be visiting the region immediately after his stay in New York. The Ministers might also find time for a few [Page 366] words on the Middle East. There was no time for other regional issues, but perhaps they could be taken up in the plenary session.

THE SECRETARY suggested that the two Ministers first run through the list of working group reports, and then join their delegations for the plenary. If necessary, they could return to regional questions later in a smaller group. The Secretary would probably want to have only Carlucci and Armacost present. SHEVARDNADZE agreed, noting that the discussion the day before with Armacost on Afghanistan had been a useful, if extensive one.

The SECRETARY agreed, and suggested moving on to arms control. He asked Shevardnadze to lead off.

Drawing on joint materials prepared by U.S. and Soviet arms control working groups the night before (Tab 1),3 Shevardnadze summarized areas of agreement and disagreement on INF:

Agreed Points

—Prior to the process of eliminating INF ballistic missiles, nuclear explosives and guidance systems will be removed from reentry vehicles. The remaining reentry vehicle structure will then be eliminated under agreed procedures.

—When reentry vehicles for German Pershing 1a missiles are withdrawn, they become U.S. reentry vehicles not associated with an existing POC and therefore will be subjected to the same elimination procedure as for reentry vehicles removed from U.S. and Soviet INF ballistic missiles.

—The sides agree on the need for effective verification of an INF agreement and on the necessity promptly to develop an effective verification regime.

Remaining Questions

—The United States proposes to retain an operational force of IRMs at proportionately lower levels for the period of reductions; the Soviet Union proposes to render all such missiles inoperable in one year by removing their nuclear weapons. The sides agree to continue to seek a mutually acceptable solution to this question.

—The United States proposes to eliminate shorter range missile systems in one year and longer range missile systems in three years; the Soviet Union is proposing to accept such a timetable if it can be shown that this would be possible taking into account technical and [Page 367] environmental considerations. Otherwise, the Soviet Union proposes a longer period such as five years for IRMs and two years for SRMs. The sides agree to send experts on this issue to Geneva promptly, to reinforce the INF negotiating group and help resolve this question.

On the final two points, Shevardnadze commented, the differences were of a practical nature. He did not rule out that experts would be able to resolve them, and, on the destruction question, made clear that, if U.S. experts could convince their Soviet counterparts that their approach was technically feasible, Moscow was prepared to go along.

THE SECRETARY observed that his points coincided perfectly with those Shevardnadze had read. The Ministers thus were in the healthy position of being able to talk about essentially operational, workable questions about what they had already decided they wanted done. The issues were technical, but they had to be done right. So the experts should be told to make as much progress as they could while Shevardnadze was here. The Secretary believed the remaining technical issues could be resolved; there were no issues of principle involved.

SHEVARDNADZE said he agreed. Agreement in principle had been reached. There was only one remaining issue of principle—how to reflect the understanding which had been reached on German P–1a’s in documentary form. The Secretary the day before had promised the Minister an answer to this question.

THE SECRETARY noted that his version of the agreed NST paper had a third area of disagreement on the question of the timing. The Soviet side had, it appeared, proposed a timetable for the elimination of P–1a warheads. The Secretary confirmed SHEVARDNADZE’s understanding that the Secretary was referring to the third paragraph in the section describing areas of disagreement, which read:

In the United States view, Chancellor Kohl’s statement of August 26 and the publicly stated U.S. position that once the FRG carries out the approach stated by Chancellor Kohl, it will withdraw the P–1a reentry vehicles and eliminate them per the same procedures as ageeed upon for the U.S. and Soviet SRMs, has resolved the question of the German Pershing 1–a missile system; the Soviet Union proposes that there be a timetable for the elimination of the warheads for these missiles.

The Secretary repeated the passage he had read the day before from Chancellor Kohl’s August 26 statement, i.e., that “with the elimination of U.S. and Soviet INF missiles” the FRG program of P–1a dismantlement would take place. The Secretary told Shevardnadze that the U.S. regarded that moment as the moment in which its program of cooperation (POC) with the FRG on P–1a’s ended, and at which the warheads for those missiles would revert to unencumbered U.S. ownership. At no time would the FRG, therefore, become the only country in possession of operable missiles of the type covered by the Treaty.

[Page 368]

The Secretary noted that he had worked with Mr. Carlucci to put the assurances he had given Shevardnadze the day before into written form, which he would like to read to the Foreign Minister. He then read the following points:

The U.S. understands the August 26 statement by Chancellor Kohl to mean that he will notify us of the end of our program of cooperation and dismantle the Federal Republic’s Pershing 1–a missiles with the final elimination of U.S. and Soviet INF missiles.

The beginning of this dismantlement process would of necessity mean that this program of cooperation between the U.S. and the Federal Republic had ended.

Therefore, at the end of the three-year period (the Secretary added “or at the end of whatever period was worked out”), when the last U.S. and Soviet INF missiles are eliminated, the conditions established by Chancellor Kohl’s August 26, 1987 statement will be met, and the US/FRG program of cooperation will have ceased.

At that time, the U.S. reentry vehicles will be withdrawn and subjected to the same procedures to be used to eliminate the reentry vehicles of U.S. and Soviet INF missiles.

The Secretary said he thought these points should satisfy Soviet concerns. We had, he added, no problem putting them in writing in a letter he could give Shevardnadze, so the Soviet side would have a document. Thus, we felt that we had dealt with both the timing and disposition of the P–1a’s in a way which should be satisfactory.

SHEVARDNADZE asked how what the Secretary had described would be reflected in a document. What kind of document?

THE SECRETARY speculated that he might write a letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the Vice President in his capacity of President of the Senate. The Secretary could specify that this was what we were doing, making it official U.S. committed policy. We could provide the Soviet Union with a copy of the letter as an assurance that the process described in the letter would take place.

SHEVARDNADZE said that he did not think this would work. Correspondence between the Secretary and Congress was not a document for the Soviet Union. The warheads on the German P–1a’s were a subject for negotiation between the U.S. and Soviet Union. Kohl had told the Soviets that himself. The Soviet demand was not a capricious one, and had nothing to do with the missiles involved. It was the warheads that belonged to the U.S. The question was how to record the resolution of the issue. The formula that the Secretary had suggested was fine from the U.S. perspective, but not from the Soviet. Were Shevardnadze to agree, his lawyers would accuse him on his return to Moscow of being an illiterate.

THE SECRETARY said that they would on the contrary compliment him on his adroitness. The Secretary offered to explain again the key elements of what he was suggesting.

[Page 369]

The U.S. was not, he stressed, discussing with the Soviet Union the warheads on the FRG P–1a’s. We were discussing warheads which were the property of the U.S. and unencumbered by POC’s with the FRG. That discussion, along with Kohl’s statement, had produced the conditions under which those warheads currently on FRG P-1a’s would become unencumbered U.S. warheads. Although we believed that should satisfy the Soviet side, we were prepared to record what the Secretary had described in writing in a way which made it clear that this was committed U.S. policy. Thus, the Soviet Union would know precisely how the P–1a warheads would be handled, and when. And Moscow would know there would never be a situation in which the FRG would have a weapons system after everyone else had eliminated theirs.

SHEVARDNADZE replied that the relationships between such major problems were routinely handled on the basis of international agreements. That was why the two sides were negotiating on INF missiles. That was why the most minute details of a possible agreement were being negotiated. Such things could only be done on the basis of a government-to-government agreement. Were it otherwise, there would be no need for treaties. The Secretary could sign letters to Congress, and Shevardnadze to the Supreme Soviet.

What was the difference from the Soviet standpoint, Shevardnadze asked, whether the P–1a warheads were on American or German missiles? The U.S. had no right to transfer warheads to the FRG, and the Soviet Union did not say that it had. Moscow did not believe that the U.S. had violated the NPT agreement. The warheads in question were American, and therefore the subject of negotiations between the two countries. Any solution to the problem they posed must be based on a treaty.

Shevardnadze said he could and did believe that the Secretary was prepared to write the letter he had described. But what about his successor? A successor might not agree with the position the Secretary had taken. He might say that the Secretary’s actions were not legal. There was no reason to dramatize the impact on U.S.-FRG relations of dealing with the P–1a warheads in the framework of a treaty. Kohl himself had told the Soviets that the warheads were not his, and to work out their disposition with the Americans.

THE SECRETARY said that was precisely what the Ministers were struggling over, and again offered to describe the situation as the U.S. saw it. The warheads were not exclusively those of the U.S. at the moment. They were part of a carefully constructed POC with the FRG. POC’s with other countries were not the subject of bilateral U.S.-Soviet negotiations. But the Soviet Union had raised certain questions about this POC, and Kohl had made a declaration which is binding and [Page 370] official, since it had been the subject of debate and a vote in the Bundestag. The FRG had stated, as a consequence, that, at the time all the missiles the U.S. and Soviet Union were negotiating about were eliminated, the POC would end at that moment. When the POC ended, the warheads would become unambiguously ours.

SHEVARDNADZE interrupted that the U.S. did not, however, want to put that in the draft agreement.

THE SECRETARY replied that the scenario he had described was of interest to the Soviet Union, but was not part of the negotiations. We were nonetheless prepared to inform the Soviet Union of our thinking on the subject. Once the warheads were ours, he continued, and out of the context of a POC, they became a warhead like any other INF warhead, and would be dealt with like any such warhead. That was something we could discuss with the Soviet Union.

So the bottom line was that, “with” the end of the U.S. and Soviet INF programs, there would be no operable German P–1a’s. Shevardnadze had said he needed a written record of the scenario the Secretary had described. We had no problem recording that scenario and giving the Soviet Union a copy of the document. So their need for something official and written would be met.

SHEVARDNADZE asked whether the document would be simply a letter or a pledge by the U.S. government.

THE SECRETARY replied that it would be an understanding on the part of the U.S. government recorded as a letter between the executive and legislative branches. This was done quite often. In this case it would enable us to deal with the problem posed by the U.S.FRG POC. As for warheads which were unambiguously ours, that was a matter between the U.S. and Soviet Union, and would be covered by the way we describe in a treaty what happens to such warheads.

After a pause of several minutes, during the course of which Palazhchenko appeared to be explaining the interrelationships that the Secretary had described, SHEVARDNADZE said that the Secretary’s option should be passed on to experts. What the Secretary had described seemed to contain the essence of an agreement. The question was how that agreement should be reflected in a treaty. The Secretary might indeed write Congress; and Moscow considered what Kohl had said important. But that was not enough. The key was that any solution be reflected in a treaty.

THE SECRETARY said we saw the problem in the following way. The treaty would deal with things which were totally Soviet or American. A moment would occur when the warheads on P–1a’s became ours in an unencumbered way. The Soviet side had said it was concerned not only with those warheads which were part of our POC, but with [Page 371] our entire inventory of warheads designed for the P–1a. The U.S. had said that, at that moment when the warheads on German missiles became like those warheads which were unambiguously ours, they would be encompassed by the agreement. Shevardnadze has asked when this would occur. The Secretary had said that would depend not on the Soviet Union, but on a program between the U.S. and FRG. So it was up to us to negotiate that not with the Soviet Union, but with the FRG.

But the Kohl statement had been made, and the Bundestag had given that statement the status of official FRG policy. We had said that we interpret the Chancellor’s use of the word “with” to mean that, “with” the elimination of U.S. and Soviet missiles, the FRG would start its own program of dismantling. That would mean the end of our POC with the FRG. Therefore the warheads involved would become unencumbered, and would fall within the treaty and be destroyed in accordance with whatever procedures we agreed to.

SHEVARDNADZE said these were all good statements. The question remained how they could be reflected in a treaty. He asked if the U.S. would be prepared to include in the treaty the language which U.S. and Soviet experts had agreed to the night before, and read the first “tick” of the “agreed” section he had read earlier in the conversation.

THE SECRETARY said there could be no specific reference in the agreement to FRG P–1a missiles, or to any POC involving a third country. The treaty would state what would happen to nuclear warheads for missiles with ranges covered by the agreement. U.S. warheads on FRG P–1a’s, once unencumbered by our POC, would fall within that category, and could be treated as such. So it was a matter of meeting the definition in the treaty. The experts had agreed on this.

SHEVARDNADZE suggested that the leaders of the relevant working groups be invited to join the Ministers. Any understandings, he stressed, would have to be reflected in the treaty. That was why the experts had agreed on a formula that after the termination of POC’s, warheads included in POC’s became U.S. property. This was all true, but it was important that all this be reflected in the treaty.

THE SECRETARY said that the two Ministers could sit and argue the point forever. But he wanted to make clear that the U.S. could not agree to have POC’s with a third country included in a bilateral agreement between the U.S. and Soviet Union. On the other hand, we were prepared to say that unencumbered warheads associated with missiles in the relevant ranges would be destroyed in accordance with agreed procedures. We had taken pains to describe how that would come about. (SHEVARDNADZE said he understood.) THE SECRETARY noted that Mr. Carlucci (who had stepped out of the room briefly, passing the Secretary a note on his return) had a suggestion.

[Page 372]

SHEVARDNADZE quipped that the national security apparatus always came to the rescue. He suggested as well that the Ministers hear from their working group leaders how they had intended their agreed language to be used. Picking up on a point the Secretary had made earlier, he recalled that the Soviet side had insisted the night before on a timetable for the elimination of U.S. P–1a warheads. The U.S. had disagreed. This “central question” should be cleared up.

THE SECRETARY said there was no need for a schedule. What Shevardnadze was talking about would happen “immediately.” CARLUCCI added that on “Day One” after the end of the destruction period, our warheads would come out. THE SECRETARY emphasized that we were not disagreeing about the content of a solution to the problem, only how to express it. He reiterated that Carlucci had an idea to try out on the Foreign Minister.

CARLUCCI suggested that the U.S. might be able to refer in a treaty to “residual reentry vehicles, including those which by unilateral decision have been released from existing programs of cooperation.”

SHEVARDNADZE said he understood. This was closer, he said. If the Secretary did not mind, however, perhaps the Ministers could invite their working group leaders to join them.

[After a brief pause in the discussion, NITZE, GLITMAN, BESSMERTNYKH AND KARPOV arrived.]

SHEVARDNADZE opened the next phase of the discussion by reiterating that he wanted an INF treaty to reflect the agreed language that the working groups had arrived at. He briefly described the option that the Secretary had outlined, as well as that proposed by Carlucci. He asked Karpov to describe the Soviet understanding of how the agreed language worked out the night before on INF was to be used.

KARPOV indicated that the Soviet side understood that the language was to be reflected in an INF treaty. NITZE said that the issue had not been discussed in those terms. What had been discussed was the relationship between the Kohl statement and our own position on systems covered by POC’s, and, finally, how those warheads covered by POC’s would be eliminated. As to whether or not the discussion would be reflected in a treaty, the issue had not been addressed.

After further discussion between Nitze and Karpov relating to the content of the agreed statement, SHEVARDNADZE interrupted to pose once again the question of whether the language agreed to was to be included in a treaty.

THE SECRETARY emphasized that two quite different sets of issues were being discussed. One could be reflected in a treaty. The other, dealing with arrangements made with a third country, we were simply informing the Soviet side about.

[Page 373]

KARPOV noted that the U.S. and Soviet working groups had not envisaged that the INF treaty would refer to the dismantling of the P–1a’s themselves. Rather, he said, the treaty should include more general language on the elimination of all warheads associated with missiles covered by the treaty. He thought language could be found to satisfy U.S. concerns; how to reflect this in the treaty could be discussed.

GLITMAN pointed out (and KARPOV challenged) that neither the U.S. nor Soviet treaty texts referred to warheads except as a unit of account.

After a brief discussion of how the Soviet text handled warheads, SHEVARDNADZE suggested that the experts be given an hour to agree on language which could be included in an agreement. Shevardnadze said he wanted no “gentlemen’s agreement.” The important thing was what was in the treaty itself. The Foreign Minister noted that Carlucci had suggested an interesting way of dealing with the problem. Shevardnadze believed a solution can be found.

THE SECRETARY agreed to Shevardnadze’s suggestion that the working group leaders make an effort to come up with acceptable language based on Carlucci’s proposal. CARLUCCI said it could be done quickly. BESSMERTNYKH asked for a clarification that what was being discussed was language in the text of the treaty. CARLUCCI said it would be an amendment to the protocol. THE SECRETARY said that the treaty and protocol were the same thing in a broad sense. SHEVARDNADZE suggested the group get started. GLITMAN summarized some of the advantages of amending the protocol, rather than the treaty: both were equally binding from a legal standpoint, amending the protocol would require fewer textual revisions of language already agreed in the treaty.

SHEVARDNADZE again suggested that the group get to work, and asked for a copy of the points4 the Secretary had read on the relationship between the Kohl statement and the elimination of U.S. P–1 warheads not encumbered by POC’s. THE SECRETARY handed over a copy, explaining that the points were provided the Soviets for their information only; we were prepared to incorporate them in a letter of the type the Secretary had described, not in a bilateral undertaking.

BESSMERTNYKH asked for clarification that the U.S. POC with the FRG would terminate in “about the same time frame” as the elimination of INF systems. THE SECRETARY replied, “not about, but exactly at the same time.” That was what Kohl had said.

[At this point (11:30) NITZE, GLITMAN and KARPOV left the room.]

[Page 374]

[After the Ministers had begun to discuss START, NITZE, GLITMAN and KARPOV returned at 11:50. START discussion will be picked up below.]

THE SECRETARY quipped that INF was always interrupting useful discussions. He would be glad to get it out of the way. He then asked Glitman to report.

GLITMAN said that a solution had been found.

—There would be a technical change in the first paragraph of the agreed statement, substituting the word “weapons” for “explosives” in the interest of precision;

—A new sentence would be added in that paragraph as the third sentence, to read: “Such procedures should apply to all residual reentry vehicles, including those which by unilateral decision have been released from existing programs of cooperation.”

—A new, final sentence would be added to the same paragraph: “The protocol on elimination should reflect these procedures.”

Glitman noted that it would still be necessary to work out agreed procedures on the return of warheads to the U.S.

SHEVARDNADZE said he thought it would be a mistake to leave any gaps. The Secretary had said that the elimination of U.S. warheads would coincide with the elimination of U.S. and Soviet missiles, and that was correct. There should be no gap of, say, five or ten days.

THE SECRETARY said that that should not be a big problem. Aircraft and/or trucks could be prepositioned and “away we go.”

BESSMERTNYKH asked if they could be removed before the “deadline.”

NITZE said procedures could be worked out to ensure simultaneity. SHEVARDNADZE said that was necessary.

KARPOV suggested adding language to take care of the problem. Could the U.S. accept adding to the second paragraph after the words “same elimination procedure” the phrase “and time frame”? GLITMAN replied that the time frame would be different. THE SECRETARY said it would be different because what was being discussed would be the last units to be dealt with. Others would already have been eliminated.

KARPOV suggested dealing with that problem by adding the word “final” before the word “elimination” in the following clause, so that the entire sentence would read:

When reentry vehicles for FRG Pershing 1a missiles are withdrawn, they become U.S. reentry vehicles not associated with an existing POC, and therefore will be subject to the same elimination procedure and time frame for final elimination as for reentry vehicles removed from U.S. and Soviet INF ballistic missiles.

[Page 375]

THE SECRETARY noted that, if this language were accepted, the final tick on areas of disagreement would become unnecessary since it would have been established that the destruction process would be collapsed to zero. There would thus be no need for a timetable. KARPOV asked if the tick should be struck. NITZE said, “yes.”

SHEVARDNADZE remarked with a broad grin that experts did not always make things more difficult. He expressed his understanding that the understanding he and the Secretary had reached would be reflected in the treaty protocol.

KARPOV said Glitman had told him he was prepared to move quickly in Geneva to wrap up additional details, including those pertaining to the protocol. GLITMAN said there was still a lot of work to do on issues like verification procedures.

THE SECRETARY said in his view there remained two things to do. First, to agree on a destruction schedule. This was mainly a question of examining the technical problems involved, and both sides seemed prepared to take on that task in a constructive spirit. (NITZE interjected that our technical people would be in Geneva within the week.) Second was the verification protocol. Here, too, it appeared both sides wanted a strong verification process. The Soviets had our protocol, and we looked forward to discussing it when they were ready. But there appeared to be no differences of principle. So that is what it would take to wrap up an agreement. SHEVARDNADZE endorsed the need to move ahead on these details.

[At this point NITZE, GLITMAN and KARPOV left the room. BESSMERTNYKH remained.]

[The Secretary and Shevardnadze resumed their discussion of START, reported below without interruption].

At the invitation of the Secretary, SHEVARDNADZE read aloud the START segment of the NST working group joint report, prefacing his remarks with the comment that there had been little “useful product.” (Text of report at Tab 1.) Summarizing, Shevardnadze said his experts had reported no movement forward, with the exception of the Soviet acceptance of the principle that no more than one leg of the strategic triad could account for more than 60% of total warheads. So, he concluded, what should be done?

THE SECRETARY said it was his opinion that this was an area where more progress was possible, but that the P–1 and other issues had so dominated these talks, as well as those during his April visit to Moscow, that the Ministers had been unable to focus on START. He hoped that there would soon be a time when this was not so.

The Secretary did feel that some useful points had been exchanged during Shevardnadze’s visit. While the Soviet side had not agreed to [Page 376] the 4,800 warhead limit we proposed, we had had a chance to explain our rationale for seeking such a limit. It provided some minimum, agreed content for the air leg of the triad by ensuring that the entire 6,000 unit warhead limit was not all on ballistic missiles. Not a third, but only 20% of the 6,000 limit would be reserved for the aircraft leg. It was important to have that understood.

The question of the 3,300 ICBM warhead limit—which the Soviets thought should be 3,600—also bore discussion. There was no question about the fact that ICBM’s had special significance.

[At this point, NITZE, GLITMAN and KARPOV returned, and the balance of the INF discussion reported above occurred.]

The triad, the Secretary continued, did not have three equal legs. Land-based ballistic missiles were distinguished by two characteristics: they were always on station (unlike SLBM’s); and they were more accurate than other systems. They were also associated with the throwweight problem.

The Secretary said this was all by way of saying that we recognize that differences in force structures exist. We needed to design sublimits so that they did not force either side to restructure. There was no disagreement on that point.

On mobiles, the Secretary believed that what was needed was a very intensive discussion of the issue. Our problem was that we had no good idea of how to verify them. We would be interested in any ideas the Soviets might have, but we saw the issue as one of great difficulty. That was what was behind our attitude on mobiles. Shevardnadze had suggested the day before that we had not had difficulty in the past monitoring the mobile SS–20. The fact was that we had stated repeatedly that there would be a real verification problem if 100 such systems remained after the conclusion of an INF agreement, and that their elimination would dramatically ease the problem. So the Soviet side could contribute constructively to START prospects by addressing the question of how we verify the number of mobile missiles. The Soviet Union was a vast country, with extensive road and rail systems. We were talking about an enormous task. But we were willing to listen.

As for Defense and Space, we did not have much to add at this time. We would take a hard look at what had been presented by the Soviet side. The Secretary did believe, however, that, as we looked back at the context in which the ABM Treaty had been negotiated, one could not help but be struck by the fact that it had been assumed the defensive regime would see offensive reductions to levels below those prevailing in 1972. In fact, the reverse had happened. Offensive levels had exploded. Even a START agreement incorporating 50% reductions would not get us to the levels which existed in 1972. That was why we saw no justification for any linkage between a START agreement [Page 377] and the ABM Treaty. In the right atmosphere, this might be discussed further. For the moment, the Secretary wished only to underscore the importance we attached to getting at the “root problem” described by General Secretary Gorbachev in Prague and again in his Pravda article of that morning. We were in full agreement with the General Secretary.

SHEVARDNADZE said it was no accident that in his Prague speech Gorbachev had said that strategic stability could be ensured with only 5% of current arsenals. At the next stage, even that 5% could be eliminated. This assessment was based on the analysis not only of Soviet experts, but of American authorities as well. The Soviet Union was sincerely interested in a radical reduction of strategic arms, in establishing stability at the lowest possible levels of armaments.

This was the guideline adopted in Reykjavik. Unfortunately, as he had noted the day before, after Reykjavik there had been an erosion of the understandings reached there. Shevardnadze called for a return to the Reykjavik understandings.

The Foreign Minister said he agreed with the Secretary that existing force structures should not be broken up. That would only result in a new race to build weapons. So if reductions were desired, the two sides should seek to preserve the traditional structures of their arsenals.

Perhaps the two Ministers could formulate instructions to their delegations to work henceforth on the basis of the Reykjavik understandings, taking into account the Ministers’ discussions. Shevardnadze believed that the Ministers—and Carlucci—should constantly monitor and interact with their delegations in Geneva. In the absence of such an effort, there would be no breakthrough.

There were, Shevardnadze continued, differences on the question of sublimits. For example, he said, on mobile missiles, he believed the problem could be resolved. The Secretary’s people could tell him that ballistic missiles, which were as big as a house, could be monitored by systems which could read the numbers on license plates.

Overall, there had been substantial progress on verification. Who would have predicted that U.S. specialists would be visiting Soviet nuclear test sites, or that U.S. Congressmen would be visiting the Krasnoyarsk radar? Radical reductions in strategic arms would require more inspection and other forms of verification.

THE SECRETARY said the U.S. would listen, but that Shevardnadze should not underestimate the difficulties involved in monitoring mobile missiles.

SHEVARDNADZE said he agreed, but pointed out that the U.S. was also developing a mobile missile. THE SECRETARY said we would be prepared to give up the effort in the context of an agreement.

SHEVARDNADZE pointed out that, were 50% reductions agreed to, a verification regime would have to be worked out, as it would for [Page 378] INF. THE SECRETARY agreed, adding that it would have to be much more extensive. In the INF context, we were dealing with a zero outcome. For START, we would have to deal with production facilities, test flights, and a whole range of activities besides just the numbers of launchers and warheads involved. SHEVARDNADZE acknowledged this to be the case, and suggested that a sub-group might be created in Geneva on verification matters. THE SECRETARY said the important thing was to get to work on the problem.

Turning to the ABM Treaty, SHEVARDNADZE said that in the wake of the Reykjavik summit, leading Soviet experts and scientists had devoted considerable attention to the problem of how to strengthen the ABM regime. Shevardnadze thought that some good alternatives had been put forward. One would be a simple undertaking not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for 10 years, while “strictly” observing its provisions, as one would for any agreement. The U.S. knew the Soviet position on the question of research and testing; Moscow had taken a number of steps to accommodate American concerns. Another alternative was an agreement on a list of devices which would be barred from placement in space, without regard for the intent of such an action. That issue had been referred to experts.

Concluding his remarks on the ABM Treaty, Shevardnadze underscored that it “was the view of all Soviet leaders and of the leadership as a whole that unless the ABM Treaty were preserved for at least 10 years there would be no START Treaty.”

As for the Secretary’s point that the ABM Treaty had not prevented either the development of new types or major increases in strategic offensive weapons, Shevardnadze saw the matter from a different perspective. In 1972, no one was talking about reductions of strategic weapons. Now the situation was different: a whole class of weapons was being eliminated by an INF agreement; at Reykjavik agreement had been reached on the principle of 50% reductions in strategic arms. So the situation was new, and means had to be found to take all of this into account. Shevardnadze did not believe that the situation with respect to the ABM Treaty was hopeless. If both sides wanted radical reductions in strategic weapons, a solution could be found.

THE SECRETARY assured Shevardnadze that the U.S. was prepared to look for such a solution. We would think carefully about what Shevardnadze had said. We knew the Soviet side would reflect on what we had said. The Ministers should return to the issue later, and in the meantime should keep the pressure on their delegations.

The Secretary noted that the paper which Shevardnadze had presented Tuesday afternoon on the offense-defense relationship had been translated, but that the Secretary had not yet had a chance to read it. He would study it, and appreciated that the Soviet side had responded [Page 379] to the paper the Secretary had given Shevardnadze on the subject in April.

Changing the subject, the Secretary noted that the nuclear testing working group had produced a piece of paper for their consideration. SHEVARDNADZE said he was prepared to accept a zero solution on this matter. THE SECRETARY said that would depend on what happened with nuclear weapons.

Taking up the paper, SHEVARDNADZE asked what were the differences. As the word “continuous” was bracketed in the first sentence, was it unacceptable to the U.S.?

THE SECRETARY explained that our only concern was to be clear. The word suggested that the negotiations would go on endlessly and without normal breaks. That clearly was not the intent. But this should not be a big problem.

SHEVARDNADZE said perhaps the Soviet side could agree to drop the word if the U.S. would agree on the next point (whether to accept alternative bracketed phrases indicating, respectively, that negotiations on interim steps would begin “after” or without waiting for ratification of the TTBT and PNET treaties).

THE SECRETARY and CARLUCCI expressed the view that explicit language that negotiations would begin before ratification could complicate the ratification process itself. Both expressed the view that, once the treaties were presented, ratification would be a quick formality. But if it would make it easier for the Soviet side to agree, the U.S. would be prepared to drop both sets of brackets. BESSMERTNYKH said that this would be acceptable, and SHEVARDNADZE concurred.

BESSMERTNYKH pointed out that the nuclear testing working group had agreed on additional language that morning which should be included in any final text. After ACDA Director Adelman was called into the meeting to confirm this, THE SECRETARY agreed to the inclusion of the sentence:

This process, among other things, would pursue, as the first priority, the goal of the reduction of nuclear weapons and, ultimately, their elimination.

In so doing he made clear his understanding that the nuclear testing negotiations would not become involved in issues being discussed in such other fora as the NST talks. Noting that the dates for beginning negotiations had been left blank in the draft statement, the Secretary asked when they should start. BESSMERTNYKH suggested December 1, which would give the delegations time to prepare. THE SECRETARY expressed concern that the process of developing improved verification provisions for the TTBT and PNET not be delayed. SHEVARDNADZE [Page 380] said he agreed with this. THE SECRETARY proposed the phrase “before December 1.” SHEVARDNADZE agreed. (Final text at Tab 2.)5

Shevardnadze next turned to a question he had raised with the Secretary during their first meeting—the possibility of a joint statement summarizing the results of their talks. THE SECRETARY said he would like to have Assistant Secretary Ridgway on hand for that discussion. As she was being summoned, the two ministers spoke highly of her and Bessmertnykh’s skill in preparing the final statement issued at the 1985 Geneva summit. SHEVARDNADZE said that Ridgway was held in great respect in Moscow.

Once Ridgway arrived, Shevardnadze handed the Secretary a Soviet draft (Tab 3)6 joint statement for consideration.

THE SECRETARY indicated that we had no problem in principle with the notion of a statement. He suggested that Ridgway and Bessmertnykh produce a joint draft, which the Ministers could review later.

Noting that the Soviet document referred to another meeting of the Ministers in Moscow in October, the Secretary noted that this was something he and Shevardnadze had already talked about. The Secretary agreed that such a meeting was necessary, particularly with a summit in prospect. He observed further that the Soviet draft’s reference to a summit would inevitably be read as signifying that a decision had already been made that it would occur this year. If that was the Soviet view, it would be better to say so now rather than wait a month. If we have indeed reached that point, we should not be playing any games at all. So if it were possible to give in the statement even a rough idea of when a summit would occur, it would avoid a lot of unhelpful speculation.

The language of the Soviet draft, the Secretary continued, suggested they were thinking in terms of a November meeting. As a practical matter, if it went beyond then, one would run into a jammed December period here. The Secretary cautioned that he may not have drawn the right inference from the Soviet text. But he did not want to mention a summit in an official announcement unless it was firm. This should not be a matter for speculation.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed with the Secretary’s statement that another meeting at their level was necessary. They would need to review how work was progressing on an INF treaty and what needed to be done to move ahead on strategic offensive and space arms. The [Page 381] President and Gorbachev’s meeting should not be merely a ceremonial occasion to sign an INF agreement. There should be a serious discussion of strategic arms and of the ABM Treaty. The two sides’ state of preparations was low in those areas. But if the two Ministers pushed their experts and delegations, much could be accomplished before they met in October. This would create a solid groundwork for the top leaders’ meeting as well. When the Secretary was in Moscow, he would have the opportunity to meet with General Secretary Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders. Perhaps Mr. Carlucci could accompany him.

THE SECRETARY said he would try to find him a seat on the plane. The question was, would the President let him go?

The Secretary reiterated that he had felt from the beginning that another meeting between the two Ministers would be necessary before a summit. So he agreed with what Shevardnadze had said. Both sides wanted a summit which would be a success in every way. That took a lot of planning.

If a summit were to take place this year, there was only a limited time frame in which it could occur. It would be a mistake to wait until late October to get people working on planning for so important an event. There would be a real risk that things would not be done as well as they should be. For that reason, the Secretary was asking Shevardnadze if the Soviet draft represented a proposal that we agree definitively that there would be a summit.

SHEVARDNADZE said that in terms of the basic Soviet approach that was the intent. But he proposed that the Ministers reflect a bit on how to proceed.

Like the American side, the Soviets had a busy fall coming up, including the 70th Anniversary of the October Revolution. That was not a problem. The General Secretary would find time to meet with the President, sign a significant agreement and make progress on strategic arms. The General Secretary had empowered Shevardnadze to make arrangements for a future summit. But Shevardnadze did not want to be overly hasty. Perhaps it would meet the Secretary’s concerns if “this fall” were added to the Soviet text.

CARLUCCI, having asked to comment, said it would be fine to add that phrase, but as the person responsible for White House planning of a Gorbachev visit, wanted to have a clear understanding of the Soviet position. The Soviet draft’s words “to sign a treaty” suggested that that was a sufficient condition for a summit. But Carlucci thought he heard a new element in what Shevardnadze had been saying—that there needed to be progress on START as well. We wanted progress in that area, of course, but we did not want a situation to arise in which a meeting had been agreed only to be confronted with new obstacles. We wanted as much certainty as possible.

[Page 382]

SHEVARDNADZE suggested that the language of the Soviet text be worked to take this concern into account. He had meant to suggest only that the foundation for a good discussion on START should be laid by Ministers.

THE SECRETARY said he felt the discussion of what the leaders would do to be too narrow. An INF agreement would be signed. They would discuss all other areas of arms control, including START. We would also expect to review bilateral and human rights questions, as well as other issues, as the two leaders had in Geneva and Reykjavik. In other words, this was a summit. There would be a treaty signing, but there should be a broad discussion between them which contributes to the development of the relationship and to stability. It would be, the Secretary emphasized, “a big meeting!” The Ministers could now be confident that an INF agreement would be completed, and there was a need to discuss every other area as well. They might, for example, take up Afghanistan, as the Secretary and Shevardnadze had yesterday.

SHEVARDNADZE explained that in drafting their statement the Soviets had wanted START to be in “capital letters.” This did not mean they meant to rule out other issues, but strategic arms should be mentioned because of their international importance. It would be a mistake to create the impression that the two leaders would sign an INF agreement and then just sit around on strategic arms.

There was one other great concern that Shevardnadze wanted to mention—ratification. As he had told the Secretary before, the Soviet experience in this area was bitter. Moscow expected a debate in the Senate on ratification of an INF agreement. The Soviets feared (and had been warned by some Congressional leaders) that the debate would be more difficult were there no progress in the strategic arms area. The Soviet people would not understand were the General Secretary to sign an agreement which was later rejected by the Senate. There should be no risks in this regard.

Shevardnadze repeated that a meeting of Ministers would be a good thing. It would help clarify prospects for movement in arms control in the minds of Congress and elsewhere. The Ministers could agree on dates and an agenda for a summit. Shevardnadze did not rule out that a meeting could take place in November or even late October (Note: the interpeter first said “April” instead of October.) THE SECRETARY replied “no way.” SHEVARDNADZE said he was just throwing out ideas.

THE SECRETARY said that this would be the event of the year. If it became part of a process which led to 50% reductions in strategic arms, it could be the event of a decade or more. So it would be broad in content. There should be progress in START. The General Secretary should spend some time seeing the United States. It would be a major event. It would take real planning.

[Page 383]

As for ratification, the Secretary was not worried about the problem. He thought it likely that the general tone of the relationship would be as important as anything.

SHEVARDNADZE said that there were really no differences between them. He was talking about November or December. The General Secretary would find the time for so important a meeting, despite his busy schedule. The important thing was that the groundwork be carefully laid. So it would be better not to talk about specific months. Perhaps one could say “this year.”

THE SECRETARY said that Shevardnadze needed to keep in mind that December is difficult. A meeting during the first part of the month was not impossible, but the month filled up fast. As Bessmertnykh knew, it was a funny month in the U.S. The latter part of November would be better for many reasons. The Secretary did not know when Congress would adjourn, but it would be more likely to be in session in late November than early December. It would be desirable for Congress to be here and for the General Secretary to meet with Congressional leaders. So the range of possibilities was not broad at that time of year for things to go in the best possible way. Therefore, the sooner we established a time frame for planning purposes, the better it would be.

SHEVARDNADZE suggested that the statement include the following elements: first, the Ministers would “speak in favor” of a summit meeting this year; second, they would announce a meeting in Moscow in the second half of October and a framework for preparations for the meeting. As for specific arrangements for a summit, these could be decided during the Moscow meeting.

THE SECRETARY said he would prefer to say that a summit would take place in the latter part of November, without reference to specific dates. This would give us a basis for planning. The Soviets, like ourselves, had people who needed to do advance work, who would want to satisfy themselves that the program and arrangements for a visit were those which the General Secretary felt were to his best advantage. There were security questions to consider. Someone had to make these kinds of decisions on his behalf, and would need time to work.

SHEVARDNADZE said these considerations were of as much concern to him as to the Secretary. If the Secretary wanted to be more precise, perhaps Shevardnadze could agree to the phrase “this fall.” He did not want to be too specific.

THE SECRETARY said that Ridgway had a suggestion, and read the following formulation:

. . . a view toward a summit between President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev during the second half of November, [Page 384] with the exact dates to be determined in the course of the Ministers’ meeting in Moscow.”

SHEVARDNADZE asked if it were necessary to say “November.” November was the last month of fall. THE SECRETARY said we could say “fall,” but that that meant November. SHEVARDNADZE urged that “fall” be used. He said he did not like sensations, and felt any reference to November would be sensational. Moreover, it would undercut the significance of the Secretary’s October visit to Moscow if the timing of the summit were so precisely defined.

THE SECRETARY asked Shevardnadze to envisage what would happen were his option accepted. “Fall” means there will be a summit this year. The interest will be intense. The Foreign Minister was aware that there was always a stakeout outside the Department when an important visitor was present. Ridgway had just told him that the largest stakeout in memory was outside awaiting his departure. If the exression “this fall” were used, someone would ask what that meant. The Secretary would have to say, obviously, after the Ministerial. And people would realize that doing it in December would be hard. So what did that leave?

It was also important from both sides’ standpoints that the planning process begin, that advance people be in touch with one another. Everything that the General Secretary did would be on TV in both countries. The Soviet side would want him shown to best advantage. The General Secretary’s own people would have a better sense of his preferences than our own. So we needed to start work. We did not need precise dates, but we needed to get busy. The Secretary said this not to prod, but because he wanted the visit to be a great success, because he wanted to do everything he could think of to make that happen, and because he knew what a major effort would be required. The Secretary knew the visit would go better if it were well thought out in advance. This took time and effort.

Perhaps, he suggested, the Ministers could ask their two colleagues (Ridgway and Bessmertnykh) to work on a draft and show the Ministers some phraseology, accepting the general structure of the Soviet draft. If the Foreign Minister wanted to leave the question of timing vague, the Secretary would not push. But the more they could answer these kinds of questions, the better off they would be.

SHEVARDNADZE said he thought it would still be better to say “this fall,” with dates to be determined during the Ministers’ meeting. This would demonstrate that the two sides were proceeding seriously and responsibly.

THE SECRETARY asked Carlucci if he had any ideas. Carlucci said that, if it was impossible to be more specific on timing, there should at least be a decision to proceed with planning. He agreed with [Page 385] the Secretary that trying to organize an October meeting would be an impossible task.

SHEVARDNADZE interrupted to say that he was not talking about a purely “formal” meeting of Ministers. When they met, they would be able to deal with all aspects of planning for a summit. He was proposing a serious approach. If it would be better for the Secretary, Shevardnadze would be prepared to meet with him in mid-October. There was another consideration. Shevardnadze had not even reported to his boss that there was agreement in principle to conclude an INF agreement. THE SECRETARY said he hadn’t either.

SHEVARDNADZE said he thought a good formula had been found for describing the timing of a summit. This did not mean that local contacts could not take place in advance of the Ministers’ meeting.

CARLUCCI said that that was fine, as long as tentative planning could proceed for approval by Ministers. The thing we needed to avoid was a last minute crush.

SHEVARDNADZE suggested seeing how things developed as they proceeded. He would inform Moscow of the results of his visit. Who knew? Perhaps he would be told the agreement he had reached was unacceptable. (THE SECRETARY said in that case he would have to stay here.) As for the language of the statement, Ridgway and Bessmertnykh could work on it.

The Secretary agreed, noting that there were a number of aspects to be dealt with. First, that the Ministers were satisfied that an INF agreement could be finished in principle. Second, that we have in mind a summit in the U.S of the two leaders in the fall of 1987. Third, that the Ministers would meet again in Moscow in late October to further plan the content of the meeting and to review the many subjects already being discussed, including strategic arms, as well as to set specific summit dates. The Secretary noted that by that time we would have the benefit of the thinking of advance personnel for purposes of operational planning. Finally, the statement should indicate that we expect to be able to sign an INF agreement and perhaps other things and to move forward the broad agenda between the two countries when the leaders meet.

SHEVARDNADZE said that this was broadly acceptable.

THE SECRETARY asked Carlucci when the President returned from Philadelphia.7 CARLUCCI answered that he would be in the White House at 3:20 p.m.

[Page 386]

THE SECRETARY suggested that there were a number of things that should be done. The statement should be worked. The Ministers should get formal reports from their working groups. They should agree on how to release the statement.

While the Secretary could make no commitments because he did not know the President’s schedule, he wondered if it would not be good for Shevardnadze and him to see the President again that afternoon. This would give him a chance to react directly to what they had been discussing. After CARLUCCI indicated that he thought the President would be available, the Secretary suggested that he and the Secretary plan on moving to the White House in about an hour and a half.

SHEVARDNADZE said he would be delighted to see the President again, especially since he had something to report.

THE SECRETARY said that Ridgway (who had left the room earlier to begin work on a U.S. draft) would get together with Bessmertnykh as soon as she was ready. In the meantime the two Ministers could have some sandwiches which had been brought in and then meet with their working groups.

The meeting concluded with a discussion of press arrangements for that afternoon and the following morning.

  1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, ShultzShevardnadze—Wash—9/87. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Parris. The meeting took place in Shultz’s private office at the Department of State. All brackets are in the original.
  2. September 15.
  3. Attached but not printed are the Report of the Working Group on the Nuclear and Space Talks, a draft plan for Phasing of INF Reductions, and a U.S.-Soviet Joint Statement on Nuclear Testing.
  4. Not found.
  5. Attached but not printed is the Joint Report in Washington with the amended language “before December 1.”
  6. Not found; the final version of the Joint Statement is in Department of State Bulletin, November 1987, pp. 39–40.
  7. The President was in Philadelphia to deliver a speech commemorating the bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution.