Office of the Historian

84. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter1

Washington, June 6, 1980

SUBJECT

  • Grain Sales to the USSR (C)

We are rapidly approaching a major decision point in our grain policy toward the USSR. The support of other exporters for an extension of the grain embargo into 1980–81 is in doubt. The key to continued exporter cooperation is Canada, and your personal intervention with Trudeau is essential to win Canadian support for that policy. This memorandum provides background and talking points (Tab A)2 for a call to Prime Minister Trudeau. (C)

At a meeting of grain exporting countries on May 20, we proposed a cutback in shipments from this year’s level.3 Reactions to our proposal were discouraging; other countries will not reduce shipments. Australia and the EC have said they will not increase sales in the coming year if other exporters undertake similar commitments. But Canada appears unwilling to accept any limit on exports. (C)

The PRC reviewed the issue at its June 2 meeting on the allied response to Afghanistan. (You saw the Summary of Conclusions.4) The grain embargo is the centerpiece of our post-Afghanistan measures. Thus, any move to lift restraints on grain exports would be seen at home and abroad as a weakening of our response to the Soviet invasion. Since the cooperative effort hinges on Canadian participation, the PRC concluded that you should call Trudeau urgently and ask that Canada maintain grain exports to the USSR at the 1979/80 level (3.8 million metric tons). (S)

The Canadian bureaucracy is dead set against this approach and considers the embargo ineffective and burdensome. Trudeau may make that point and also suggest that exporter restraint will be meaningless if the Soviet harvest is average. The talking points provide a fallback position: indicate that we are prepared to review our policy in September when we have a better estimate of the Soviet crop. This may help bring Trudeau along. (See also attached forecast.5) (C)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you phone Trudeau and request Canada to restrain grain exports to the USSR, drawing on the points at Tab A.6 (C)

Approve _________ Disapprove _________

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Office File, Box 6, Country Chron, Canada, 1980. Secret. Sent for action. Carter wrote at the top of the page: “Zbig. J.”↩
  2. Tab A, Talking Points, undated, is attached but not printed.↩
  3. Telegram 9064 from Brussels, May 21, reported on the May 20 meeting of agricultural officials from Canada, Australia, Argentina, the European Communities, and the United States, which focused on restrictions on grain sales to the Soviet Union. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800250–0319)↩
  4. See Document 54.↩
  5. Not attached.↩
  6. Carter checked the Approve option. At the bottom of the page, Carter wrote: “Prepare definitive cable to Trudeau to supplement phone call—Give me copy.” Telegram WH80638 from the White House to Ottawa, June 7, transmitted a letter from Carter to Trudeau that asked that Canada hold its 1980–81 grain exports to 3.8 MMT. The letter stated: “Canada is the key to continued exporter cooperation in the coming crop year. Australia and the EC will agree to hold exports to the USSR at this year’s level if you agree to a corresponding ceiling.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 3, Canada: Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau, 4–12/80)↩