Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXVII, Western Europe

265. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, December 19, 1977

Scandinavia and The Northern Flank

Attached is a study on Scandinavia and The Northern Flank which we prepared at Ambassador Lerner’s request.² The paper draws heavily on previous work in the government and on comments by interested bureaus, but it has not been formally cleared in the Department.

A capsule summary follows, but I thought you might wish to skim the entire paper. While the paper views the Scandinavian dilemma as primarily political, the analysis of problem areas also deals specifically with military factors (pages 2–6) and the Svalbard issue (pages 7 and 8).³ The back half of the paper offers some tentative ideas for further policy.

Problems and Implications for US Policy

a. Political Aspects

The paper describes the political interests of Russia and the Scandinavians as diverging strongly, but unlikely to lead to direct conflict. The key problem areas are:

— Sweden’s role in the Nordic defense calculus has been undermined somewhat in recent years by continuing economic and financial problems; it is in our interest, insofar as it is possible, to help sustain a viable, indigenous Swedish armaments industry. This should be considered as we implement our arms sales restraint policy;

— At Agustsson’s request, we are re-studying the air terminal issue in the light of the impending Icelandic election campaign and with an eye to ensuring the continued use by Canada and ourselves of the crucial facilities at Keflavik.

— The greatest uncertainty for the Nordic balance is Finland and what happens after Kekkonen. While the Finns will attempt to continue Kekkonen’s practice of “accommodation on Finnish terms,” it is possible that the immediate succession period will involve internal Finnish jockeying for power; severe Soviet pressures to influence the succession issue; and ultimately, some shift in Finland’s political course.

We will want to support the Nordics in maintaining an acceptable equilibrium in Scandinavia, including through diplomatic demarches with Moscow. A main policy objective is to press Moscow to curb its political-military intimidation tactics.

B. Svalbard Modus Vivendi

US interests are best served by strongly supporting Norwegian sovereignty over the Svalbards, while taking account of the Soviet interest in maintaining access for its Northern Fleet to the Atlantic. We should seek to ensure that Norway resists both Soviet pressures to resolve Svalbard issues bilaterally and encroachment westward in the boundary dispute. Arms control negotiations, involving constraints on regional military activities, also may be worth consideration to supplement such a security modus vivendi.

While maintaining a reservation with respect to shelf resource rights, we are exploring with Norway and other allies the possibility of a practical economic development regime for the Svalbard shelf. It may prove feasible to find a de facto “higher consensus” corresponding to US, Norwegian, allied, and Soviet interests, perhaps without negotiations with Moscow. If the allied consensus we have been developing along these lines erodes in the future or runs into serious Soviet resistance, it may be necessary to consider an alternative US position. One approach might be exclusive Norwegian control over the shelf area with suitable bilaterally-agreed guarantees for future American access to shelf resources. Alternatively, the parties might prove more amenable to a regime defined by “multiple-bilateral” agreements (with the Norwegian sovereign) than by one multilateral agreement.

I have sent the paper to our Ambassadors in Scandinavia and anticipate that our exchange of views will enable us to build, together with EUR, toward a further refinement of our current constructive policies toward the area.⁴

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780016–1837. Secret. Drafted by Phillip S. Kaplan in S/P.
2. Tab A, a paper entitled “Scandinavia and the Northern Flank,” November 16, is attached but not printed. It was drafted by Kaplan in S/P.
3. The paper noted: “The Scandinavian dilemma is at core political and psychological, with significant military and economic components. The essential issue for the West is how to manage a political situation which has been generally stable throughout the post-war era, but which also is characterized by underlying forces eroding the security and confidence of the Nordic states. Triggered by the huge preponderance in Soviet regional military power, this erosive process has been fed by weak Scandinavian governments, economic problems and growing feelings of insecurity. In recent years, the dispute over Svalbard and the mineral-rich Arctic seabed has taken on growing importance. Recent Soviet heavy-handedness has led to some stiffening of Nordic will. While Soviet military superiority on the Northern Flank is beyond doubt, it should prove possible to sustain the overall political status quo and stability it has generated for Northern Europe.”
4. On December 5, Lake sent the paper under cover of letters to Blake, Dean, Kennedy-Minott, Lerner, and Ridgway. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780016–1837)