119. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- Dr. Brzezinski’s Conversation with Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (U)
PARTICIPANTS
- Chancellor Helmut Schmidt
- Berndt Von Staden, Ambassador, Federal Republic of Germany
- Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
- Stephen Larrabee (notetaker)
- George Vest, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, State Department
Dr. Brzezinski opened the meeting by welcoming Chancellor Schmidt to the U.S. and conveying regards from the President.2 He inquired how Chancellor Schmidt had enjoyed his stay at Bohemian Grove and the atmosphere there. (C)
Chancellor Schmidt replied that he had enjoyed his stay there very much and that he had done a lot of “lobbying” on SALT. He had talked in particular with Kissinger, Ford and Haig. (C)
Noting that unfortunately he would not have as much time for discussion as he had originally hoped, Dr. Brzezinski said he had three points which he wished to raise with Chancellor Schmidt. The first was regarding the recent Cabinet shuffles.3 He emphasized that there would be a continuity in processes and objectives in the foreign policy generally and that these moves did not imply any foreign policy shift. This was particularly true in the financial field where Bill Miller would continue implementing the policies which Mike Blumenthal had tried to carry out. Dr. Brzezinski also reiterated the President’s firm commitment toward meaningful long-range energy program. (C)
Chancellor Schmidt said he understood this and that he did not expect any major changes in U.S. policy as a result of recent changes. He said that he had full faith in Bill Miller, who was a close friend, and was sure he would do a good job as replacement for Blumenthal. He emphasized that Miller’s rapid confirmation was particularly important for the international monetary situation. (C)
Turning to the second point, Dr. Brzezinski raised the issue of the U–2 flights over Turkey, which he stressed were very important for SALT verification. He briefed Chancellor Schmidt on some of the technical aspects of verification and why these particular flights were important. In particular, he emphasized that these were not spying missions but rather would be used solely for verification purposes, pointing out the differences between these flights and past U–2 activities. He said that it would be useful if Chancellor Schmidt could raise the U–2 issue with the Russians whom he said did not seem to grasp the vital importance of the issue for SALT ratification. (C)
Chancellor Schmidt agreed to do what he could in this regard. (C)
Dr. Brzezinski then turned to the third issue which he wished to discuss—TNF modernization. He stressed the importance in maintaining some shared target date and pointed to December as a time when the U.S. hoped some alliance decision should be ready. While he admitted that this date should not be cast in concrete, he also cautioned in showing too much flexibility and reiterated the importance of maintaining a firm target date. (C)
Chancellor Schmidt replied that in principle he would be willing to make a decision, but he was not sure that the alliance would be ready. His main concern was to achieve a good decision. (C)
Dr. Brzezinski emphasized the crucial role which Schmidt would play politically in the decision process. He asked him to use his influence with the Belgian Socialists and Italian Socialists, particularly Craxi and Simonet. (C)
Chancellor Schmidt emphasized that the Federal Republic was prepared to go forward on two conditions: (1) that there be no singularity, and (2) that modernization be combined with some form of arms control. The latter point he emphasized was extremely important. TNF had to be combined with some arms control initiative, otherwise it would not get support in Europe. On the one hand the alliance had to take certain steps to modernize; on the other, they needed to work out arms control measures. (C)
Dr. Brzezinski said that we should have an arms control proposal for the Soviets by December but that we intended to go ahead with modernization. (C)
Chancellor Schmidt reminded Dr. Brzezinski of his domestic political problems, stating that he had been “burned once” and did not wish to be burned again. He hoped Dr. Brzezinski understood this. (C)
Dr. Brzezinski said that he did and noted that David Aaron would be returning to the Federal Republic some time in September for further discussions.4 (C)
Before departing, Chancellor Schmidt said that there were two points he wished to raise. First, that the Federal Republic was not enthusiastic about dividing up national packages.5 Second, he felt that it was not advisable to give up sea-based systems. These were a means of cementing solidarity for taking risks among the Allies. (C)
In response, Dr. Brzezinski pointed out the problems associated with this. SLCMs were self-evidently nuclear weapons. This would influence the situation. As it was now the Scandinavians did not incur major risks during port calls. This would change with SLCMs.6 (C)
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 34, Memcons: Brzezinski, 7–8/79. Confidential. The meeting took place in the German Military Representatives’ Lounge at Dulles International Airport. From July 19 to 24, Schmidt made a private trip to the United States that included a visit to California. (AAPBD 1979, Document 214, note 2)↩
- On July 24, following Brzezinski’s talk with Schmidt, Carter spoke to Schmidt by telephone from 8 to 8:16 p.m. A memorandum of conversation is in Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 37, Memcons: President, 7/79–9/79.↩
- Reference is to Carter’s decision to replace several Cabinet members, including in particular Blumenthal and Schlesinger, who were replaced by Miller and Duncan. (“Reshaping of Carter’s Presidency: 16 Days of Shifts and Reappraisal,” New York Times, July 22, 1979, pp. 1, 30)↩
- Aaron visited Bonn from October 18 to 19 for meetings with senior FRG officials. (Telegram 18826 from Bonn, October 20; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N790008–0220 and P840133–2049)↩
- In this sentence, an unknown hand underlined the words “dividing up national.” Next to this sentence, the same hand drew three vertical lines and wrote a question mark.↩
- Following this sentence, Brzezinski wrote: “It would also give others an easy way out for GLCM’s.”↩