Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXVII, Western Europe

117. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, June 5, 1979

SUBJECT

• Your Meeting with Chancellor Schmidt (U)

Format

You are seeing Schmidt on Wednesday, June 6, from 1:00–2:30. The meeting will start in the Cabinet Room; and after a few minutes, you and Schmidt will have lunch privately, while Cy and I entertain the rest of the German party. (U)

Because of the importance to us of energy, I suggest you begin the larger meeting with this subject, (while Mike Blumenthal and Henry Owen are there), and continue on economic issues, generally. (If there is time, you might ask Cy to report briefly on his visit to the opening of the Autonomy Talks.)² (C)

In your private meeting, I suggest you turn to the Brezhnev Summit,³ building from there to Western security issues—especially TNF and MBFR. Politically for the Germans, the TNF discussion will be the most important, and will permit each of you to take decisive soundings of the other. It would also be useful to fill Schmidt in on the Middle East/Persian Gulf and southern Africa. Schmidt also told Senator Muskie that he would like to discuss detente with you.⁴ Finally, for domestic reasons, it is important for you to raise the extension of the German Statute of Limitations on murder—if you prefer, privately at the end of the meeting. (C)

Energy and economic issues are covered in Henry Owen’s memo at Tab A;⁵ TNF and MBFR are at Tab B;⁶ Cy’s Scope Paper is at Tab C;⁷ and a good CIA background paper is at Tab D.⁸ (U)

In other meetings, I will be seeing Schmidt for breakfast (and among other things will give him a position paper on MBFR); and Mike and Henry will meet with him on Tokyo Summit and other economic issues. (C)

Background

Since your visit to Germany, there has been a general improvement of relations with the Federal Republic, as much of the underbrush of German doubts about US leadership and resolve on specific issues has been cut away. Your individual successes have been important: especially support for the dollar, the Egypt-Israel Treaty, and now SALT, where Schmidt has been strong in his support and enlisted that of Margaret Thatcher as well. SALT II has also been particularly important in easing a central German preoccupation: doubts that we could manage relations with the Soviet Union effectively. (S)

Nevertheless, real German doubts about our directions, leadership, and effectiveness remain—abetted by a chronic German habit of magnifying domestic US criticism of any administration. Central to these doubts are our difficulties with energy and inflation, which also reinforce uncertainties that we will follow through effectively on TNF (avoiding another neutron bomb, on the one hand, or ignoring German political needs on the other). (S)

The Germans—like the other allies—are also having difficulty adjusting to new facts of international life brought about by shifts in relative power: the onset of Soviet–American strategic parity, and the relative decline of US economic power compared with Europe and Japan. (S)

The Germans’ concerns also derive from their own immediate situation: they have emerged from the time when they were comfortable with political limitations imposed by their unique history, but they are ambivalent about assuming leadership themselves, even in Western Europe—for example, on aid to Turkey, though Schmidt eventually came through after we clearly resumed the lead.⁹ Thus the German need for a clear sense of American steadiness and purpose has increased, at this changing and uncertain time in their history; and this need is increased by the growth of problems (e.g. Iran and oil, Soviet expansionism, chronic global economic difficulties) where Germany is directly affected, but alone can do little. (S)

Schmidt did try two limited experiments in leadership: combining with France to promote the European Monetary System (which became relatively unimportant as soon as our monetary actions began to take hold); and his November 1977 speech on theater nuclear forces.¹⁰ Schmidt has been somewhat chastened by this first entry into the big leagues of nuclear strategy, as he and his colleagues have had to face political and strategic responsibilities they were unprepared to face. TNF issues also provoked the German defense debate in March, which among other things revealed that Schmidt is less in control of his own coalition than had been believed. He is therefore very much concerned that we take command of this issue. (S)

Supplementary Issues

Detente: The defense debate in March brought home clearly to Schmidt that he needs to be better able to integrate necessary efforts in defense (especially TNF) with a concept of detente, in order to maintain coalition support for his overall approach to East-West issues. Yet unlike defense issues, we have had no systematic discussions with the Germans on detente in this administration—unlike the practice when Kissinger used his German background to good effect. Nor do we have any senior-level officials to whom the Germans instinctively relate. If he raises the subject, therefore, you might amplify your views by suggesting that our two embassies, and senior officials, include detente issues in their regular consultations (along with the other allies). (S)

Statute of Limitations: In about a month, the Bundestag will vote on whether to extend the Statute of Limitations on murder, which will otherwise expire at the end of the year. Chances for passage are good, although a possible “compromise” is emerging that will limit prosecutable crimes to the less encompassing “genocide.” Schmidt has taken the lead in support of extending the Statute. Stu, Ed and I suggest you make the following points:¹¹

— The issue of the extension of the statute of limitations is attracting a lot of attention in the United States, and there is very strong support for that extension, unamended.

— You want to compliment Chancellor Schmidt for his courageous leadership in seeking the extension, and you hope that he succeeds, for you strongly support the extension. You are prepared to do whatever would be useful in aiding his efforts. (C)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, VIP Visit File, Box 4, Germany: Chancellor Schmidt, 6/6/79. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action.
2. On May 25, Vance attended the opening session of the negotiations between Egypt and Israel regarding Palestinian autonomy. (Bernard Gwertzman, “Egypt and Israel Open Negotiations at Beersheba on Palestinian Areas,” New York Times, May 26, 1979, p. 3)
3. Reference is to the June 15–18 Summit in Vienna, during which Carter and Brezhnev signed the SALT II agreement.
4. On May 7, Muskie met with Schmidt in Bonn. (Telegram 8391 from Bonn, May 8; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840133–2143)
5. Tab A was not found attached. The memorandum from Owen to Carter, June 5, is in Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 24, German Federal Republic: 6/79.
6. Tab B was not found attached. The memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter, undated, is ibid.
7. Tab C was not found attached. The memorandum from Christopher to Carter, undated, is ibid.
8. Tab D was not found attached.
9. Reference is to West German efforts to assemble a consortium for economic aid to Turkey and to match the $200 million U.S. contribution. (Memorandum from Owen to Carter, June 5; see footnote 5, above)
10. Reference to Schmidt’s October 28, 1977, speech. See footnote 3, Document 112.
11. In a May 19 memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski, Eizenstat, and Sanders wrote: “We are getting a lot of outside pressure here for you to support extension of the German statute of limitations. The House just passed 401 to 0 a resolution directly urging the Federal Republic of Germany to abolish or amend the statute to allow ‘prosecution of those responsible for the horrors of the holocaust,’ and the Senate will take similar action soon.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 24, German Federal Republic: 5/79) At the top of the memorandum, Carter wrote: “To Zbig only, put on my private agenda. J.”