Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXVII, Western Europe

103. Telegram from the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

5073.

London, March 31, 1978, 1607Z

Department Pass to Presidential Party for Secretary Vance.² Department for Tarnoff. Subject: Meeting with Chancellor Schmidt.

To Secretary from Christopher. Summary: Considering the circumstances, Chancellor Schmidt took the ERW message relatively calmly. He was at pains to point out the steps taken by FRG to enable us to carry out an anticipated positive decision on production. Yet, given President’s strong inclination, he now appears prepared to help us implement a negative decision. He will face sizable domestic political problems with the anticipated decision, and urges that we schedule NAC and US announcement after Genscher’s visit to US next Tuesday or Wednesday.³ At the end of the two hour meeting at his residence in Hamburg, he was in a much better mood than in the early portion. End summary.

1. When Vest, Stoessel, and I met with Schmidt in Hamburg at 11 a.m. today, I immediately addressed the ERW topic. I outlined President’s views along same lines as my presentation yesterday to Genscher.⁴

2. It was good, Schmidt said, that I had briefed Genscher yesterday because it had forewarned him. But, having had only 12 hours to ponder the message I brought, he would have only questions and “provisional” remarks. On the substance of the decision, he would not question the President’s judgment, for the decision was his alone to take. He will call a Federal Security Council meeting Monday or Tuesday,⁵ and Genscher will bring their more matured reaction on modalities when he comes to Washington next Tuesday or Wednesday. He asked that any announcement be delayed until after Genscher’s visit so that he could have an opportunity to comment on the text.

3. Schmidt then commenced a review of the US–FRG consultation prior to March 20. He wanted to be certain that the President was fully conscious that the FRG had totally agreed with the US on substance and procedures prior to March 20, and had worked hard to persuade others in Germany and elsewhere of the validity of our three-step approach, including ultimate ERW deployment on FRG soil. He could not hide his astonishment at the turn of events that had occasioned my trip. But he did not labor the point unduly, and the moment passed.

4. Referring to my remarks about potential divisiveness in the Alliance, he asked which countries had reservations about a decision to produce. When I mentioned Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, and Belgium, he was surprised about Belgium. When he specifically asked, I said we did not put Germany among that group. On my point of a wide division of public opinion in NATO countries, I said in response to his question that there was such a division in the US. As for Germany, he said some may welcome a negative decision, but not the majority.

5. Schmidt then diverted to a statement on the dangers of SALT for the security of Europe, especially the limitations in the protocol on cruise missiles and the potential of the Backfire bomber. Because he believes the Soviets are getting an edge in theater and strategic weapons, he had welcomed the attempt to use the ERW as a bargaining chip against the SS–20, or preferably, the Soviets’ tanks. But it was not to be, and he accepts the President’s probable decision.

6. When I asked his advice on whether a negative ERW decision could be used not as a specific bargaining chip but as a general factor to influence Soviet behavior, Schmidt answered with a question: what did you get out of the B–1 decision?⁶ He did agree that a negative ERW decision would deprive the Soviets of a propaganda ploy, and enable US to focus on their true arms control stance, but thought this would be a fleeting advantage.

7. These points now off his chest, Schmidt turned to the question of how best to handle the decision, making the following points: (A) the decision is and should be presented as a sovereign decision taken by the President; (B) it would be unwise to allow concern about potential divisiveness in the Alliance over a positive decision to flow into the announcement; (C) he is doubtful that there should be any reference in the announcement to a divided public opinion; (D) there should be a NAC meeting just before the announcement, though he accepts the desirability of prior telegraphic notification to NATO capitals.

8. He strongly urges that announcement be delayed until Genscher can come to Washington to consult with US on the announcement. He will try to advance Genscher’s departure so he can arrive late Tuesday. His emphasis on this point indicates that he wants Genscher’s physical as well as intellectual involvement.

9. By the end of the meeting, the mood had changed markedly. He was anticipating with pleasure the President’s trip, and showing me momentos in his bar of California, the Florida Keys, and Texas. Stoessel will be reporting on the other topics which arose in the wide-ranging discussion, as well as his evaluation of Schmidt’s reaction, which he found reassuring.⁷

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N780004–0171 and P840139–2308. Secret; Flash; Exdis; Handle as Nodis. Repeated for information to Bonn for the Ambassador.
2. On March 31, Carter and Vance left Brazil and flew to Nigeria as part of a trip that took them to Venezuela, Brazil, Nigeria, and Liberia.
3. On Tuesday, April 4, Genscher visited Washington for talks with Vance, Brown, and Carter. (Telegram 87492 to Bonn, April 5; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780147–06840) A record of Carter’s discussion of ERW with Genscher and Vance is in Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 36, Memcons: President: 4/78.
4. Telegram 5775 from Bonn, March 30, reported on Christopher’s March 30 discussion of ERW with Genscher, during which Christopher explained that Carter was “strongly leaning to a decision against the production of ERW.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N780004–0152 and P850106–1412)
5. April 3 or 4.
6. Reference is to Carter’s decision, announced June 30, 1977, to cancel production of the B–1 bomber. See “The President’s News Conference of June 30, 1977,” Public Papers: Carter, 1977, pp. 1197–1206.
7. In telegram 5883 from Bonn, March 31, Stoessel wrote: “Chancellor’s mood entire discussion, including ERW subject, was calm, reflective and positive. He took no categoric positions, was prepared to listen and in general seemed more relaxed and quieter in manner than I have observed him in the past. His short period of vacation probably contributed to this, but it may be that he was deliberately making an effort to show restraint, having in mind press commentary concerning his alleged harshness in the recent past regarding the U.S. He also made it a point to stress the desirability of frequent personal, high-level contacts between U.S. and German representatives, which he said would be useful in countering person who wished to cause trouble between us. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N780004–0185 and P850101–2742)