30. Note From Paul Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1


  • Castro on his Involvements in Africa—Significant CIA Report

Here is the CIA report I mentioned in my evening report of yesterday.2 It is worth reading in its entirety. CIA tells me they regard its source as very reliable.

The information in this report rings true. It matches most of the less authoritative and more piecemeal reporting we have been receiving lately. Castro clearly sees the disadvantages of getting caught in the Eritrean morass. Moreover, he clearly senses that he is close to being bogged down in an Angolan morass. And that bothers him because he would rather see Cuba “bringing its full military weight to bear on more pressing Southern African problems.”—This provides the strongest justification yet for what you have been pressing the USG to do re Angola: step up Savimbi’s capabilities and complicate Cuba’s problem; this will limit what they can try to do farther south. . .

This report reveals interesting facets of Castro’s psychology, in which there is a certain naive quality which I suspect is not entirely contrived—much as Castro must realize that he is effectively serving the Soviets as supplier of mercenaries for their own African purposes.

Suggest you will want to show this report to the President if it has not been included in the PDB.3

  1. Source: National Security Council, Carter Intelligence Files, Box 29, USSR-Cuban Intervention in Africa, 9 Jan 1978–7 Jul 1978. Secret. A copy was sent to Pastor. At the top of the page, Brzezinski wrote, “RI [Inderfurth], DR [Daily Report] item on Angola.”
  2. Attached but not printed.
  3. A notation at the top of the page reads: “PDB Fri [May 4].”