30. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1

1144. Subj: Holbrooke-Khamphay Meeting. Ref: Vientiane 1132 (Notal).2

Summary: The meeting’s major development from the Lao viewpoint was Mr. Holbrooke’s announcement of our willingness to respond to a WFP appeal for flood aid to Laos. The Lao also had an opportunity to hear categorically and authoritatively that the U.S. was [Page 101] not engaged in anti-LPDR activity. Holbrooke, in turn, was able to make our views known on the narcotics problem and to receive Lao assurances that they, too, wanted to discourage production and traffic. Holbrooke had a chance to express our human rights and MIA concerns clearly and forcefully, and he also let the Lao know we felt their restrictions on diplomats were inappropriate. Both sides described their regional interests in ways which implied no basic conflicts. The Lao chose not to make an issue of drought aid problems, and they defended themselves on the human rights issue. The Lao still want reconstruction aid, and we again pointed out that we were under no obligation to give it. End Summary.

1. Assistant Secretary Holbrooke’s lengthy Oct. 30 meeting with Lao Acting Foreign Minister Khamphay Boupha provided both sides with an opportunity to cover a full range of Lao-US issues. Although there was by no means a complete concurrence of views, the stated objectives were in many cases similar. There will still be problems in Lao-US relations, but there will also be areas in which we can work together.

2. Regional Policy. Holbrooke expressed support for a stable and peaceful system of independent Southeast Asian countries. We particularly supported ASEAN and the improvement of relations between the Indochina states and ASEAN. We welcomed improvements in Thai-Lao relations. We sought normal relations with Hanoi and Peking. Khamphay said that Laos wanted good relations with its neighbors and with all countries.

3. Holbrooke said that the U.S. did not want to take sides in either the Sino-Vietnamese or Vietnamese-Cambodian disputes. Khamphay said that such conflicts should be settled by negotiations and not by fighting. Laos supported the SRV’s call for talks. The LPDR sought good relations with the U.S. and with Thailand, though there were still problems with the RTG.

4. Aid. Holbrooke expressed regret that there had been misunderstanding in connection with our 10,000 tons of drought aid to Laos.3 It was our intention that this donation should represent a new beginning in Lao-US relations. As for the current flood-related problems in Laos,4 the U.S. had told the WFP that as soon as the WFP had issued an international flood aid appeal for Laos, we would authorize the use of a portion of our WFP contribution as Lao flood aid. We would need, however, assurances from WFP that our drought aid had been properly [Page 102] used. Holbrooke explained that direct U.S. aid to Laos was still prohibited by law.

5. Khamphay expressed appreciation for the initial U.S. drought aid donation. He said that the Lao Government did not care how aid came to Laos or through what organizations so long as it arrived. He specifically did not complain about the handling of our 10,000 tons of drought aid. He said, however, that the current flood aid need was greater than the drought need had been. Holbrooke said the U.S. would do what it could within the limits of the law and congressional sentiment.

6. Khamphay noted that the U.S. had been the only ADB member to vote against the recent wood industry loan to Laos. Holbrooke said that we would consider each such Lao proposal on its merits and with regard to our human rights policy. Khamphay said that the LPDR still hoped for U.S. aid in dealing with natural disasters and in repair of war damage, but Holbrooke pointed out that we recognized no obligation in this latter regard.

7. MIA’s. Holbrooke expressed appreciation for the return of four sets of remains to CODEL Montgomery. Khamphay said that the LDPR was glad to have been able to do this but did not think it was necessary to send Lao officials to the CIL. Holbrooke explained that the U.S. did not consider that there was any direct connection between the MIA issue and any other issue, although progress on MIA’s helped improve the overall atmosphere. We recognized that no final, perfect accounting was possible.

8. EOD. Holbrooke explained that direct U.S. assistance with explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) was not possible under the law but that he would explore the problem further with Congressman Montgomery when Congress reconvened. Khamphay said that Laos did not need EOD personnel but did need equipment.

9. Human Rights. Holbrooke spoke at length on human rights. He described the strong public and congressional concern in the U.S., particularly with respect to the Hmong and with respect to officials of the former regime and former Embassy employees in re-education camps. Khamphay explained that all Lao were attending political seminars, not just former RLG officials. After their studies, they went home and went back to work. He said that the LPDR’s human rights record was much better than the RLG’s. As for the Meo, the LPDR wanted to help them to lead a better life in the lowlands, but when Meo took up arms against the government, the LPDR had to enforce order. Some of these Meo had been trained and armed by the U.S. in the past.

10. Holbrooke expressed concern about shooting at people trying to cross the Mekong as refugees. This practice contravened the UN Charter. Khamphay said that anyone could ask permission and leave [Page 103] Laos legally, but those who left without asking permission were usually criminals and outlaws. Trying to stop them was normal border control and normal police activity such as that which took place in the U.S.

11. U.S. Non-Involvement in the Lao Insurgency. Holbrooke particularly stressed that the U.S. was in no way involved in the Lao insurgency or with groups inside or outside Laos opposed to the LPDR. No proof of any such involvement had ever been forthcoming from the Lao. If the Lao did not accept his assurances of non-involvement, there was no good basis for improving Lao-U.S. relations. Khamphay said that the Lao had not wanted to go into specifics on this issue in order to avoid poisoning the atmosphere. He pointed out that press reports had linked Lao emigre groups in France with the U.S.

12. Narcotics. Holbrooke described the U.S. concern with the narcotic problem and expressed hope that the LPDR would cooperate in discouraging production and traffic in illicit drugs. Khamphay explained the LPDR’s problems with the expensive and ineffective former UNFDAC mission in Laos. He said Lao policy was opposed to narcotics. The LPDR had programs to rehabilitate addicts and discourage production. The Meo and former RLG officials had been involved in this problem. The LPDR had done away with the corrupt RLG, and the Lao policy of resettling Meo in lowland rice-growing areas should help to reduce opium production. Holbrooke said he had taken note of the LPDR’s interest in solving the international narcotics problem.

13. Restrictions on Diplomats. Holbrooke pointed out that LPDR restrictions on Vientiane-based diplomats appeared to be in conflict with the Vienna Convention. No such restrictions were placed on Lao personnel in Washington. Our note on this subject5 had never been answered. Khamphay said that the rules had been made for the safety and convenience of diplomats and applied to all foreign personnel. Holbrooke said he hoped the restrictions could be relaxed.

14. Before leaving, Holbrooke said that he had noticed the unfortunate Radio Vientiane attack on him as an imperialist. No other country with which we had relations made such charges and they did not help the atmosphere.

Roberts
  1. Source: Department of State, Miscellaneous Old Vietnam Political Records, 1968–1991, Lot 94D430, PREL United States—General (L), Permanent File. Confidential; Limdis. Sent for information to Canberra, Paris, Rome for FODAG, Hong Kong, Beijing, Tokyo, Moscow, and CINCPAC for POLAD.
  2. Not found. Holbrooke visited Vientiane October 29–30. His meeting with Khampay took place on October 30.
  3. See Document 24.
  4. A devastating flood in the Mekong Delta caused a loss of this area’s rice crop in October. See “Floods Ravage Southeast Asia; Vietnam and Laos Appeal for Aid,” Washington Post, October 5, 1978, p. A22.
  5. The text of the Embassy’s note is in telegram 368 from Vientiane, March 23. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780128–0052)