Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe

280. Memorandum From Stephen Larrabee of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, February 13, 1980

SUBJECT

• VBB: Contingency Planning for Yugoslavia (U)

Public Posture: As Ambassador Loncar emphasized to you the other day,² the Yugoslavs are concerned that Western press speculation may overheat the political atmosphere and will play into the Soviet’s hands. (See also Yugoslav Defense Minister Ljubicic’s remarks to General Graves at Tab A).³ In the coming days and weeks we need to avoid alarmist commentary. Our public posture should be that we have confidence in the Yugoslav’s ability to handle the transition successfully. You should emphasize the need within the USG to hew very closely to this line. (C)

Head of Delegation: Vance, Shulman, and Vest think that the President should represent the US at the funeral. Ambassador Eagleburger also strongly believes that the President’s attendance is in the U.S. interest.⁴ I concur. As Larry points out, what the US does immediately and in the weeks ahead will have a major psychological and substantive impact on Yugoslav perceptions—particularly in light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The President’s attendance would send an important signal to the Yugoslavs—and to the Soviets—of our support for Belgrade. Conversely, his failure to attend the funeral might cause doubts about our support. I suggest that you recommend the President attend the funeral. (C)

Meeting with Brezhnev: If the President does go to the funeral and Brezhnev also attends, this raises the question of how to handle any possible meeting between the two. A meeting would be impossible to avoid. State feels that it should be low profile and perfunctory.⁵ This is probably impossible. If the President goes, Marshall, Bob and I feel that he should emphasize our concerns about Afghanistan and that he should above all give the impression of firmness and determination. (Alternatively, Vance could meet with Gromyko if the Vice President heads the delegation.) If possible, bilaterals with the allies should precede any meeting with Brezhnev, but we should avoid a Quad type meeting since this would offend the Yugoslavs. (C)

Coordination with the Allies: Over the next few days, the allies will be looking to us for indications of what we plan to do and we need to convey to them our views. If we do not, the allies may get out in front—Giscard leading the pack—and attempt to act as mediators between the US and the Soviets. The Soviets could try to play on this lack of unity within the allies to further split the US from its allies. The President needs to convey our thinking to the allies as soon as possible. (C)

Military Supply Relationship: General Graves has been in Yugoslavia where he has had talks with Ljubicic and other Yugoslav officials (Tab A). The main problem in the military supply relationship remains the high cost of US weapons and the inability of the Yugoslav’s to pay for them. Ljubicic made several proposals on how we might overcome the financial obstacles (military credits to Yugoslavia and they would then use them to pay for US hardware, etc.)⁶ Ask Harold to explore the feasibility of Ljubicic’s proposals and report back as to how we can overcome the financial obstacles.⁷ (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 34, Meetings—Vance/Brown/Brzezinski: 1/80–2/80. Secret; Outside System. Sent for action.
2. Brzezinski met with Loncar on February 8 at 12:15 p.m. in his office in the West Wing of the White House. They discussed Tito’s health, U.S. support for Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and the Non-Aligned Movement. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 78, Sensitive X: 2/80)
3. Not attached. The Embassy in Belgrade reported the conversation in telegram 1089, February 12. Ljubicic complained to Graves that coverage in the Western press of the situation in Yugoslavia “strengthens the hands of the Soviets, who are looking for ways to demonstrate that Yugoslavia is moving toward the West.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800075–0640)
4. In telegram 1137 from Belgrade, February 13, Eagleburger emphasized his strong belief that Carter should lead the U.S. delegation to Tito’s funeral. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800077–0396)
5. Brzezinski underlined “low profile and perfunctory” and wrote an illegible comment in the margin.
6. Ljubicic made two proposals: 1) That the U.S. help Yugoslavia obtain commercial credits that could be used for the purposes of buying military hardware if FMS credits remained a challenge. 2) That the U.S. consider selling Yugoslavia small quantities of some of the up-to-date anti-tank and air-defense systems for training purposes. Ljubicic told Graves: “Yugoslavia recognizes that in exceptional situations—‘and we both understand what such situations might be’—Yugoslavia may be able to obtain from the United States the up-to-date weapons systems it needs to defend itself.” These weapons—which the Embassy identified as the Viper, Stinger, and Roland missile systems—would be used for training purposes in preparation for larger scale acquisition in a time of crisis. (Telegram 1089 from Belgrade, February 12; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800075–0640)
7. Brzezinski highlighted this sentence and wrote “Very important” in the margin. At the bottom of the page he wrote: “We should immediately call Armstrong, Von Staden, Wahl[erhime] to see what their people plan to do, & to set up a system for coordinating our statements and the line our leaders [wi]ll take in meeting the Soviets, that should include: * restore Afghanistan as a buffer; * token Soviet withdrawals and new plans; * Will guarantee neutrality of non-aligned Afghanistan ([illegible] pro Sunni, Islamic (eg Iraq)).