97. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting1


  • Persian Gulf Security Framework—XIX


  • State

    • David Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
    • Reginald Bartholomew, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
    • Peter Constable, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
  • Defense

    • W. Graham Claytor, Jr., Deputy Secretary
    • Robert Komer, Under Secretary for Policy
  • JCS

    • General David Jones, Chairman
    • Lt. General John Pustay
  • CIA

    • Stansfield Turner, Director
    • Robert Ames, NIO for Near East and South Asia
  • Treasury

    • William Miller, Secretary
    • Robert Carswell, Deputy Secretary
  • Energy

    • Charles Dayan, Secretary
    • Les Goldman, Assistant Secretary for International Affairs
  • OMB

    • Edward Sanders, Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs
  • White House

    • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
    • David Aaron
  • NSC

    • General William E. Odom
    • General Jasper Welch
    • Captain Gary Sick
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Dr. Brzezinski asked that the meeting address two items. First, it should review agency responses to his memorandum of November 52 in so far as they concern short-term actions which need to be taken. Second, the meeting should discuss a draft Presidential Directive as possible guidance for the next administration and as a legacy of President Carter’s major effort in building a security framework for the Persian Gulf region. (S)

A. Short-term actions and responses to Dr. Brzezinski’s memorandum of November 5, 1980.


Secretary Miller asked for no short-term actions but observed that economic and security assistance do impact on the stability and viability of regimes in the region, depending on their ability to absorb it. Second, he raised the question of our efforts to deal with some issues through the Joint Military Commission which really should be handled by the Joint Economic Commission. Third, he commented that a number of our dealings with Saudi Arabia are through different and not always coordinated channels. (S)

Newsom observed that we should press the Saudis to contribute more to UNRRA than traditionally is the Saudi practice. (S)


Dayan noted three items: the Saudi decision to raise its oil prices; late intelligence that Iraqi pipelines through Syria and Turkey have both been cut by bombing; and that the OPEC deliberations in Bali indicate an upward move in oil prices. These developments are likely to make the spot market very active. We may face a difficult period in the next month as the spot market prices move to new highs. In explaining the longer-term economic impact he cited Charles Schultze’s paper which estimates that a $10 increase in the price of a barrel of oil will push the CPI up by two to three percent and take about $10 billion4 out of OECD country incomes. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski asked what short-term action we might take. Dayan enumerated the steps that we have taken with the IEA and in other channels to constrain undesired price activity. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski asked if Iran is exporting oil now. Dayan reported that two tankers departed Karg Island last week and that the Iran [Page 322] export level is about 200,000 barrels per day. Minister Yamani, Dayan said, reports that Iraqi production is about one million b/d and might go above that. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski asked when the Iraqi pipelines would be repaired. Dayan estimated that it would be the end of this month. The French are helping them with the repairs. (S)

Finally, Dayan noted that the oil inventories by April 1, 1981 will be approximately where they were on April 1, 1979 with the attendant summer gas shortages entirely possible. Those difficulties can be mitigated if distribution is managed well. (C)


Newsom raised three short-term issues. First, the FY 1982 budget reflects no MILCON money for Somalia. In the case of Kenya it has been reduced from the promised $36 million to $17 million. Our diplomatic credibility with Somalia is at stake if we do not restore some MILCON funds for FY 1982. Second, on Ras Banas, our negotiations with the last Congress indicate that they will tolerate MILCON funding without a written agreement with Egypt. Should we approach the new Congress in early January to reaffirm this or leave it for the next Administration? Third, a Somali request for air defense equipment makes it imperative that we provide an intelligence report about the Ogaden to Congressman Solarz. We would like the DCI to make that ready by January 1st. (S)

On Somalia MILCON funds, Komer agreed that some addition for FY 1982 is necessary, but we can’t give as much as promised to Somalia or to Kenya. Dr. Brzezinski asked Defense to let us know about how they manage the shifts in MILCON funds to meet this credibility requirement. On negotiations with the new Congress about Ras Banas all agreed that State and Defense should open discussions at the first opportunity in January. The DCI was tasked to render a report on the Ogaden for State by January 1st. (S)


Komer raised two issues. First, he proposed that the President send Sadat a letter on nuclear powered war ships through the Suez Canal. Dr. Brzezinski asked Defense to provide a text for such a letter because it is consistent with what the President recently told Vice President Moubarek. (S)

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Second, Komer underscored the inadequacies of our security assistance in the short-term for the Southwest Asia/Persian Gulf region. He implored the SCC to make one more effort with the President in behalf of the Southwest Asian add-on package with particular emphasis on Turkey, Egypt, and Pakistan. There is no way to have a credible deterrent with the RDJTF if it has no facilities access in the region. OMB has cut back the original add-on, but Defense is willing to absorb about $300 million in FY 1982 in order to launch a $911 million security assistance program for the out years. Komer argued that not only must this be proposed once more, but there must be more flexibility in our security assistance funding if the security framework effort is to succeed. (S)

David Aaron noted that the President was for a security assistance package but on the basis that it be taken from the Defense budget. Dr. Brzezinski asked how we should relate this issue to the President. Komer suggested that the SCC should endorse it, and the details should go by a separate memo which is now in progress. (S)

When Dr. Brzezinski asked who supports this proposal, all agencies voiced strong support except Bill Miller who initially expressed uncertainty about the details. In a brief post-SCC clarification between Miller and Komer, Treasury agreed with Defense while noting that the additional proposal of $200 million in economic assistance for Turkey is equally important as security assistance. Defense and State agreed that we need both, particularly in the Turkish case. (S)

State made the reservation that the additional security assistance will not necessarily buy military access immediately but that it is crucial, if we are to have access in the future, that we do this now. (S)

General Jones intervened to report on his recent discussions with the Turkish military where he learned of Turkey’s enormous energy dependence on oil from Iran. He also added that close relations with Saudi Arabia are absolutely critical if our military capability for the region is to be effective. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski raised an additional topic, the Iran-Iraqi war. Should we remain passive as we are doing at present? Is our response adequate? What are the implications—economic, military, and political—of our passiveness? Should U.S. policy toward this war be kept hostage to the hostage issue with Iran? (S)

Komer said that Defense had studied ways to prevent the Soviet tilt toward Iran but had not found one. A second tactic would be to seek ways to get both sides from destroying oil production facilities. His staff had not come up with promised suggestions. (S)

Dayan reported that the French and the Saudis say that the Soviets are supplying considerable oil to Iran and spare parts to Iraq. (S)

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Newsom declared that there is no such intelligence available from U.S. sources. He also added that three diplomatic issues have been taken on without success thus far: (1) the Islamic Conference initiative, (2) the Cuban initiative, and (3) the UN initiative by Waldheim. Muskie will see Waldheim this Thursday about reviving his initiative. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski directed that a mini-SCC be held tomorrow to review our options and to provide support for Muskie when he sees Waldheim on Thursday. (C)

B. Passing the Security Framework to the next Administration

Dr. Brzezinski distributed a draft Presidential Directive which repeats the President’s State of the Union commitment to the region and briefly outlines our strategy for building a security framework.7 It then repeats the four components structure and identifies objectives under each. Dr. Brzezinski described the PD as stating briefly but explicitly what the President’s policy has been for the security framework in the region and providing a series of beacons under each of the four components for the successor administration. He then asked for comments and reactions. (S)

Newsom expressed concern that listing countries, as the PD might, should not be made public. He also asked if it might not be better to render a report to the next administration rather than a belated PD by the President. Muskie would not object to a summary but would have his own reservations about a PD. Dr. Brzezinski replied that the President would have his own historic interests in a PD which transcends Muskie’s views and concerns. (S)

OMB supported the PD idea and added that it needs to make the point about coordination of our many efforts with Saudi Arabia. (C)

Miller asked if a PD might not be a red flag to the next administration. Dr. Brzezinski responded that we could produce a report, but that it would only be one of hundreds of memoranda passed on to the next administration. But a PD for codification of the structure and process is what is needed. A PD could summarize and codify what this President has been identified with in the region in the post-Afghanistan period. (S)

Both Claytor and Komer spoke very strongly on behalf of a PD. Claytor found no downside to this approach. Komer argued that if it is a reasonably brief document like the draft at hand, not a list of our accomplishments, it is more likely to survive and to affect the policy of the next administration significantly. (S)

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There was further discussion as to whether the PD should not list more of the administration’s actions since last January. State seemed to favor this, supported by Treasury. Defense and OMB did not. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski asked how each agency stands on the long versus the short version PD. Komer repeated his case for a short version, and Aaron pointed out that most of State’s concerns could be taken care of with a short preamble. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski closed the meeting asking that each agency return with its comments on the PD to be scheduled for tomorrow afternoon. (C)

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 117, SCC 355, 12/16/80, Security Framework. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The minutes are not attached and were not found. Carter initialed the first page, indicating that he saw it. Odom sent the Summary of Conclusions to Brzezinski under a December 17 memorandum, indicating that he would collate responses to the draft PD that evening. (Ibid.)
  2. See Document 93.
  3. For the Department of Energy response to Brzezinski’s November 5 memorandum, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXVII, Energy Crisis, 1974–1980, Document 288.
  4. Carter circled “$10 billion.”
  5. See Document 95.
  6. See Document 96.
  7. Not found. The final version of PD/NSC-63 is printed as Document 98.