175. Telegram From the Embassy in Uganda to the Department of State1
711. Subject: Meeting With President Binaisa. Ref: State 68614 Notal.2
1. Secret–Entire text.
2. I went through points reftel with Binaisa at State House, Entebbe, late afternoon March 17. I emphasized that I had instructions to point out concerns in Washington about Binaisa’s apparent efforts to create an independent force loyal to him. I said the US is concerned about the possibilities of unilateral Kenyan involvement in some form as this issue more than anything else has stirred some National Consultative Council members to think of acting against him. Roger Channel message3 cited reftel did not arrive but I mentioned some specifics of alleged Kenyan involvement and Binaisa’s own security force that I have read or heard about. In fact, I pretty well explored the limits of possible security activities Binaisa might be undertaking on his own behalf. This drew no reaction at all.
2. The other point I emphasized was the necessity of Binaisa’s working with the NCC. I said that it had been demonstrated that a majority of the NCC has so far not favored dismissing him. In the interests of Uganda’s stability and his own position he should consider how this sentiment can be turned to constructive advantage.
3. Binaisa heard me out on these points, then launched into a jumble of details. He wondered why Obote had chosen this time to announce his candidacy. He wanted to know why Tanzania had suddenly decided to dump 700 Ugandan POWs on him with only four days notice (the POWs are at Mwanza). To my suggestion that his unannounced trip to Nairobi had created serious tensions, Banaisa asked, “Am I not a free agent?” I said that was the essential point; in the context of the interim arrangements he was definitely not a free agent. He said his ministers come and go as they please, so why shouldn’t he? Banaisa [Page 452] said he followed the point on working with the NCC. He acknowledged that he receives help from the Democratic Party. He said he has been requested to attend a “secret” NCC meeting on March 18 at which a no-confidence motion may arise.
4. Binaisa said he could do nothing now about a Commonwealth or other international force. The Cabinet, he said, is firmly against it since his March 10–11 meeting with Moi.4 He said there can now be an international force only if the word comes from Nyerere as no one will send in troops unless Nyerere invites them. Binaisa asked for help from the US in persuading Nyerere to move in this direction.
5. Absent an international force, Binaisa seemed to think Uganda could squeak by. He expects all Tanzanian soldiers to be gone by September, by which time, he said, Uganda’s army and police should be able to maintain security. Binaisa sees a role for an elections-monitoring force (I will comment on this aspect of reftel separately)5 and dwelled at length on political and constitutional aspects of advancing the date of elections.
6. Binaisa indicated that his relationship with Nyerere is at an end. He said he will not go to Tanzania again because Nyerere might lock him up as he did Lule. Binaisa does not expect that there will be another East African summit and said he would not want to attend one while Nyerere is treating him “like a little schoolboy.” He is tired of Nyerere’s dictates and wants to get out of the way entirely. He was visibly irked that Tanzanian Minister of State Shekilango had just arrived, probably with another message from Nyerere. He was pleased to be able to keep Shekilango waiting for about an hour while we talked. He said the underlying problem with Tanzania is ideological. Tanzanian envy of Uganda’s relatively greater wealth is an additional complication.
7. Binaisa had a good deal to say about plots against him by Obote and his followers. He said that if he is attacked he will not “turn the other cheek.” He will stay and fight. He said he has no plans to leave the country. “I will be killed here. I will do no such thing as Lule did.”
[Page 453]8. Comment. There was little in today’s presentation I have not said to Binaisa before. Fact of instructions, which I emphasized, added helpful weight but I am not optimistic that Binaisa will be much influenced. Others have tried to get across more or less the same message without apparent effect.
9. Binaisa’s stated determination to fight back if attacked and his refusal to rise to the bait and comment on his own security arrangements lead me to suspect that he has put something together to defend himself. He knows what the US thinks about his plans and may be suspicious that the US will interfere if we find out for certain what he is up to.
10. The March 17 meeting may have provided some new insights into how Binaisa sees things. I think it is probable that he sees things in the following way: Obote’s supporters, who now include Nyerere, are determined that Obote should return and run the country without elections. Obote is the one who matters. Politicians in the NCC are largely irrelevant. Binaisa believes that he has limited time to set the country irreversibly on a course towards elections. Obote will revive a socialist dictatorship. Binaisa is the only hope for free enterprise and democracy. The NCC cannot be trusted to uphold democratic principles. The NCC will not be around to help when Obote’s forces move against him. Binaisa therefore has to be prepared to stand on his own. He believes he represents the will of the great majority of Ugandans and that he has their interests at heart.
11. If this is indeed how Binaisa sees things, adjurations to him about avoiding confrontation will fall on deaf ears. Probably the best we can hope for is that he will reduce his isolation by cooperating more with those whom he thinks are not after his hide, but he is likely to see confrontation with the rest of the NCC as inevitable and even necessary.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800140–0571. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information Priority to Dar es Salaam and Nairobi. The transmission time was garbled.↩
- In telegram 68614 to Kampala, March 15, the Department instructed Halsted to raise four points with Binaisa. The United States supported the idea of an international peacekeeping force, thought an East African summit would be useful, believed that Binaisa needed to work with the National Consultative Council, and was concerned that his effort to create an independent force loyal only to him would likely backfire. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800132–0200)↩
- Not found.↩
- In telegram 68015 to Nairobi, March 14, the Department voiced concern over reports that during May 10–11 meetings, Moi may have offered to supply Binaisa with weapons to arm a militia that would be loyal to him. The Department, instead, advocated urging Binaisa to work with the NCC and rely upon an international peacekeeping force in the event of a TPDF withdrawal. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800131–0180)↩
- In telegram 724 from Kampala, March 19, the Embassy advocated an election-monitoring force as an alternative to an international peacekeeping force. Such a force “would be tied to a specific objective, rather than involved in an open-ended ʻpeace-keeping’ operation.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800140–1018)↩