344. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Smith) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1
SUBJECT
- Report on Nuclear Talks in South Africa
Our discussions in South Africa were encouraging. As reflected in the attached Joint Minute,2 which conforms to our instructions,3 the South Africans appear receptive to a package deal including the following elements:
(1) South African adherence to the NPT;
(2) prompt start of a safeguards development project at their pilot enrichment plant at Valindaba to provide interim safeguards at that facility;
(3) a “simultaneous closing” procedure to ensure that both sides fulfill their package obligations. South Africa would promptly renegotiate its agreement for cooperation with the U.S. to meet the standards under our legislation for new agreements; the revised agreement would become effective upon completion both of successful Congressional review and of NPT adherence by South Africa; and
(4) cooperation with us to reduce the enrichment of the fuel for the Safari research reactor (which now uses HEU).
If they agree to the foregoing (the South African cabinet is expected to consider the package in August), our part of the package would include the following assurances:
(1) We would recommend NRC approval of limited quantities of HEU fuel for their research reactor pending availability of lower enriched fuel. We would do so only after establishing that the export meets all statutory requirements and that the safeguards project at Valindaba has commenced, but before completion of SAG accession to the NPT. Such HEU shipments would be under tight monitoring arrangements and would not permit an accumulation of more than 15 kgs of HEU in South Africa.
(2) We would be prepared to authorize export of the LEU we have contracted to enrich for the Koeburg power reactors in the context of the renegotiated agreement and actual accession to the NPT.
(3) If this package is concluded, we will not permit its frustration by UN Security Council action on specifically nuclear matters.
The South Africans accepted the limitation of our discussions to nuclear matters, but noted that they planned to discuss at an appropriate level the broader question of the consequence of a UN economic boycott.
The South Africans were disappointed that we would not be able to provide equipment for the expansion of their enrichment facility, but appeared to accept this as a practical reality.
We made clear to the South Africans that our new legislation made continued supply dependent on our being able to establish that they had conducted no nuclear explosions, had not violated safeguards or guarantees to us, and were not using nuclear materials in connection with a weapons development program.4 In the latter connection, we sought and received some modest additional information [2 lines not declassified].
We stressed the urgency of reaching agreement which might well not be possible much longer. The South Africans agreed to seek a Government decision within the next two months.
Next Steps. The South African cabinet is expected to consider the package the first half of August. We believe that a favorable decision will be recommended by the delegation with which we met, which included the Permanent Foreign Secretary and the President of the Atomic Energy Board.
In the meantime, we will prepare for an interim safeguards presence at Valindaba and continue our efforts to clarify [less than 1 line not declassified] questions that have been raised.
We will advise key Congressmen confidentially and generally of our progress on this case, and are advising the French, the British, the Germans (and in less detail) the Nigerians and the Soviets.
I am also sending this report to Secretary Vance.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 70, South Africa: 6–9/78. Secret.↩
- Attached but not printed. See also footnote 2, Document 343.↩
- See Document 342.↩
- See footnote 6, Document 332.↩