State argues that it is probably unrealistic: (a) to expect the Junta’s
agreement on all these criteria, (b) on any more
specific criteria, or (c) even for there to
be much tangible progress in this area. Whether
or not that assessment is correct, I believe that the helicopters
represent a significant enough “carrot” that the Junta might bite, and
perhaps agree to tangible criteria. We ought to aim for specific
targets. Steps #A, B, and C provide specific criteria, but #D and #E are
a bit too general. In steps #D and #E, we should ask the Junta for signs
of progress, like reassigning Col Carranza abroad or establishing special courts to try
leftists or rightists suspected of being involved with violent acts.
Perhaps, an international tribunal could help try these people; it would
certainly enhance the credibility of the trial. (S)
1. That you approve the strategy and the steps described on page 3 of
State’s memo as the criteria necessary to conclude after two months that
the Salvadorean government is committed to trying to halt human rights
violations. We will begin training helicopter pilots immediately.3 (S)
Tab A
Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the
Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)4
Washington, July 17, 1980
SUBJECT
- Decision on Helicopters for El Salvador: Specific Steps to
Control Violence
Discussion
If the President approves the helicopter proposal for El Salvador, we
will brief concerned members of Congress on our plan and then
instruct Ambassador White to
reach an understanding with the Military High Command on specific
measures they will take to reduce the indiscriminate violence and
excessive use of force involving or associated with the armed
forces. First, Ambassador White will seek from the High Command their
commitment to improve human rights performance. Then he will suggest
to them specific measures which we think would be helpful in
accomplishing this objective. He will seek their proposals as to
what might be done and obtain their comments concerning our
suggestions. In his discussions with the High Command he will seek
to work out a mutually acceptable and realistic list of actions to
be taken while the helicopter pilot training is underway in Panama
and the United States. At the conclusion of approximately 60 days we
will evaluate the armed forces performance against this mutually
agreed list. If we conclude that there has been sufficient progress
towards our objectives we will consult with the Congress and then
seek the President’s final approval for lease of the
helicopters.
Our principal objective is demonstrable progress by the armed forces
in eliminating human rights abuses coming from within their
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ranks. Measuring such
progress or even being certain that it takes place may be difficult,
however. For example:
—Recent raids on guerrilla bases have turned up Salvadoran military
and National Guard uniforms. This substantiates reports that
guerrilla organizations, in their efforts to depict the JRG as a repressive regime, are in
some operations posing as elements of the armed forces in committing
atrocities.
—The guerrilla groups have announced that they plan a major offensive
against the JRG forces within the
next two months, and recent reports of an increased clandestine flow
of arms and ammunition to the guerrillas from abroad add credence to
these announcements. Unfortunately, the launching of such an
offensive by the guerrillas will inevitably increase the high amount
of killing by all sides, including the military, and worsen the
human rights situation.
—The extreme left and some of their supporters abroad are
systematically spreading disinformation about official repression
and USG involvement with it. This
campaign has had some success, particularly in the U.S. and Western Europe. We can expect
the leftists to step up their propaganda to counter any efforts by
the armed forces to improve their human rights image. U.S. provision of helicopters,
regardless of the justification for such a decision, will be used
effectively in such disinformation efforts.
Given these factors, we will have to base our judgment of the High
Command’s performance, prior to our decision to make the helicopters
available, primarily on their performance in carrying out the
specific measures that they agree with us to undertake. The JRG may not be able to reduce the
general level of violence. We do expect, however, that it will take
measures effectively reducing indiscriminate violence by the
security forces.
Specific Steps to Discuss with the High
Command
Steps which Ambassador White
will suggest during his discussions with the High Command are listed
below. He will also seek proposals from the High Command. We
anticipate that some combination of our proposals and theirs would
form a mutually agreed list against which their performance could be
evaluated.
Steps we will propose for consideration are:
A. The High Command should issue a specific directive making clear
JRG and High Command policy
regarding indiscriminate violence and human rights violations, and
should discipline violators. In particular, the directive should
repudiate the summary treatment of suspected terrorists, including
their abduction, torture and execution. This step will be
specifically susceptible to confirmation and monitoring.
B. Improve command and control over anti-subversive operations to
assure that they are conducted in accordance with this directive,
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and conduct training
aimed at increasing professionalism, respect for human rights, and
ensuring compliance with the directive. We would expect to be able
to monitor and assess progress on this.
C. Identify those areas of the country where official violence and
abuses are reportedly at a high level, and transfer out of these
areas responsible military personnel and units possibly involved. We
should be able to see specific examples of this during the next two
months.
D. A commitment from the top military officers that they intend to do
all possible to clamp down hard on extreme rightists including those
still in the military. Since the implementation of this is a
sensitive internal matter within the armed forces, we should leave
specifics to them. However, Ambassador White will make known the symbolic importance of
restraining those, such as Col. Carranza, most suspected of collaboration with the
extreme right. Measuring “progress” on this issue will be
difficult.
E. Since one of the key problems has been the judicial system’s
inability to successfully prosecute leftists or rightists suspected
of being involved with violent acts, Ambassador White should raise with the JRG and the High Command the problem
of intimidation that individual judges face, and urge urgent action
to correct this situation. It may be possible to see some evidence
of action in this area, but like (D), it will be difficult to
monitor.5
Peter
Tarnoff
Executive Secretary
