434. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter1

SUBJECT

  • Helicopters for El Salvador (S)

In response to memoranda which Christopher and I sent you on July 1, recommending a strategy for using the transfer of helicopters to encourage the Salvadorean military to improve their human rights performance, you asked for more specific measures to judge human rights progress. (Those memos and your comments are at Tab B.)2 State consulted with Ambassador White and appropriate agencies and prepared an answer to your question (Tab A). (S)

The memo suggests the following strategy: Ambassador White should inform the Junta that we are prepared to begin training Salvadorean helicopter pilots immediately. If there is specific improvement in the performance of human rights in two months, when the training is completed, we will lease six helicopters on a no-cost basis at that time. White should try to elicit specific criteria for judging human rights performance from the Junta, using the five steps described on page 3 of Tab A to guide the discussion. (S)

State argues that it is probably unrealistic: (a) to expect the Junta’s agreement on all these criteria, (b) on any more specific criteria, or (c) even for there to be much tangible progress in this area. Whether or not that assessment is correct, I believe that the helicopters represent a significant enough “carrot” that the Junta might bite, and perhaps agree to tangible criteria. We ought to aim for specific targets. Steps #A, B, and C provide specific criteria, but #D and #E are a bit too general. In steps #D and #E, we should ask the Junta for signs of progress, like reassigning Col Carranza abroad or establishing special courts to try leftists or rightists suspected of being involved with violent acts. Perhaps, an international tribunal could help try these people; it would certainly enhance the credibility of the trial. (S)

[Page 1108]

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you approve the strategy and the steps described on page 3 of State’s memo as the criteria necessary to conclude after two months that the Salvadorean government is committed to trying to halt human rights violations. We will begin training helicopter pilots immediately.3 (S)

Tab A

Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)4

SUBJECT

  • Decision on Helicopters for El Salvador: Specific Steps to Control Violence

Discussion

If the President approves the helicopter proposal for El Salvador, we will brief concerned members of Congress on our plan and then instruct Ambassador White to reach an understanding with the Military High Command on specific measures they will take to reduce the indiscriminate violence and excessive use of force involving or associated with the armed forces. First, Ambassador White will seek from the High Command their commitment to improve human rights performance. Then he will suggest to them specific measures which we think would be helpful in accomplishing this objective. He will seek their proposals as to what might be done and obtain their comments concerning our suggestions. In his discussions with the High Command he will seek to work out a mutually acceptable and realistic list of actions to be taken while the helicopter pilot training is underway in Panama and the United States. At the conclusion of approximately 60 days we will evaluate the armed forces performance against this mutually agreed list. If we conclude that there has been sufficient progress towards our objectives we will consult with the Congress and then seek the President’s final approval for lease of the helicopters.

Our principal objective is demonstrable progress by the armed forces in eliminating human rights abuses coming from within their [Page 1109] ranks. Measuring such progress or even being certain that it takes place may be difficult, however. For example:

—Recent raids on guerrilla bases have turned up Salvadoran military and National Guard uniforms. This substantiates reports that guerrilla organizations, in their efforts to depict the JRG as a repressive regime, are in some operations posing as elements of the armed forces in committing atrocities.

—The guerrilla groups have announced that they plan a major offensive against the JRG forces within the next two months, and recent reports of an increased clandestine flow of arms and ammunition to the guerrillas from abroad add credence to these announcements. Unfortunately, the launching of such an offensive by the guerrillas will inevitably increase the high amount of killing by all sides, including the military, and worsen the human rights situation.

—The extreme left and some of their supporters abroad are systematically spreading disinformation about official repression and USG involvement with it. This campaign has had some success, particularly in the U.S. and Western Europe. We can expect the leftists to step up their propaganda to counter any efforts by the armed forces to improve their human rights image. U.S. provision of helicopters, regardless of the justification for such a decision, will be used effectively in such disinformation efforts.

Given these factors, we will have to base our judgment of the High Command’s performance, prior to our decision to make the helicopters available, primarily on their performance in carrying out the specific measures that they agree with us to undertake. The JRG may not be able to reduce the general level of violence. We do expect, however, that it will take measures effectively reducing indiscriminate violence by the security forces.

Specific Steps to Discuss with the High Command

Steps which Ambassador White will suggest during his discussions with the High Command are listed below. He will also seek proposals from the High Command. We anticipate that some combination of our proposals and theirs would form a mutually agreed list against which their performance could be evaluated.

Steps we will propose for consideration are:

A. The High Command should issue a specific directive making clear JRG and High Command policy regarding indiscriminate violence and human rights violations, and should discipline violators. In particular, the directive should repudiate the summary treatment of suspected terrorists, including their abduction, torture and execution. This step will be specifically susceptible to confirmation and monitoring.

B. Improve command and control over anti-subversive operations to assure that they are conducted in accordance with this directive, [Page 1110] and conduct training aimed at increasing professionalism, respect for human rights, and ensuring compliance with the directive. We would expect to be able to monitor and assess progress on this.

C. Identify those areas of the country where official violence and abuses are reportedly at a high level, and transfer out of these areas responsible military personnel and units possibly involved. We should be able to see specific examples of this during the next two months.

D. A commitment from the top military officers that they intend to do all possible to clamp down hard on extreme rightists including those still in the military. Since the implementation of this is a sensitive internal matter within the armed forces, we should leave specifics to them. However, Ambassador White will make known the symbolic importance of restraining those, such as Col. Carranza, most suspected of collaboration with the extreme right. Measuring “progress” on this issue will be difficult.

E. Since one of the key problems has been the judicial system’s inability to successfully prosecute leftists or rightists suspected of being involved with violent acts, Ambassador White should raise with the JRG and the High Command the problem of intimidation that individual judges face, and urge urgent action to correct this situation. It may be possible to see some evidence of action in this area, but like (D), it will be difficult to monitor.5

Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary
  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 21, El Salvador: 8–11/80. Secret. Sent for action. Carter initialed the top of the page and an unknown hand wrote August 5 below his initial. Pastor sent the memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter to Brzezinski under a July 25 covering memorandum. (Ibid.)
  2. Tab B is not attached. See Document 433.
  3. Carter indicated his approval.
  4. Confidential. Carter wrote “OK J” at the top of the page.
  5. In an August 8 memorandum to Muskie, Brzezinski informed him that Carter had approved the strategy for helicopters for El Salvador. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 21, El Salvador: 8–11/80) Telegram 210613 to San Salvador, August 9, instructed White to proceed according to the approved strategy. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880137–1491) For White’s subsequent report, see Document 435.