Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

153. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, December 7, 1978, 11–11:25 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Summary of President’s Meeting with Ambassador Dinitz, December 7, 1978, 11:00–11:25 a.m., Oval Office (U)

Ambassador Dinitz commented on the two substantive problems in the negotiations: Article VI and the timetable. On Article VI he emphasized the importance of keeping the text of the treaty intact. Any reopening of the text would encourage some members of the Israeli Cabinet to ask for review of other articles, including the preamble. Dinitz warned against an interpretive side letter to the effect that Egypt would be able to exercise the right of collective self-defense. Since any Arab war with Israel is defined by the Arabs as a defensible war, this interpretation would dilute the meaning of Article VI. (S)

The President said that we prefer to keep the text of the treaty as it now is. But if there is a difference between having no treaty at all and a treaty with an interpretive letter, would Israel be better off with no treaty? Dinitz said no; it would be better to have the treaty. The question of collective self-defense is already covered by reference to the U.N. Charter in Article VI. The President repeated that our preference is to accept the treaty text as it is. If Sadat is adamant, he has the right to reopen this issue for negotiations. (S)

Ambassador Dinitz said that Israel had agreed to a form of political linkage by accepting four references in the preamble to the Camp David agreements. While opposing any mention of a target date for elections, Dinitz said that if a target must be set, he would make two personal suggestions. The target date should be after the period when normalization of relations should have begun, for example, 12 months after ratification. Second, there should be no conditionality between the successful conclusion of the negotiations to establish the self-governing authority and the completion of the interim withdrawal and the beginning of normalization of relations. (S)

The President said that this would be difficult for Sadat to accept. If there is a normalization of relations at the end of nine months, an exchange of ambassadors, and if Israel and Egypt cannot agree on the modalities for elections and for the powers of the self-governing authority, this would put Sadat in an indefensible position with the other Arabs. He would have taken his own land back and not achieved any agreement on the West Bank and Gaza. The President said he feared that in those circumstances the treaty might then be abrogated by Egypt, along with claims of Israeli bad faith. Sadat does not feel that Begin is sincere in his determination to carry out the Camp David agreements on the West Bank and Gaza. He needs assurance that there will be some time constraint working on Israel. (S)

The President said that we have considered a proposal to remove the nine-month deadline for the interim withdrawal and to tie the withdrawal to the establishment of the self-governing authority, while maintaining the three years deadline for the full implementation of the Egypt-Israel treaty. In any event, the President said that he was worried that the whole discussion of target dates might become moot if agreement were not reached by December 17th. This would set a horrible precedent. (S)

Ambassador Dinitz said that he agreed that it was important to reach an agreement by December 17th, but the difficulty of doing so demonstrated why a target date for the West Bank/Gaza elections was unwise. The President said that the alternative to setting a target date may be that there will be no treaty and there might then be a possible rapid deterioration in relations between the two parties. Egypt and Israel can agree to sign the treaty, to carry out the interim withdrawal, to exchange ambassadors, to start negotiations on the West Bank and Gaza, to set a goal for reaching agreement on the holding of elections, combined with a clear exclusion of any responsibility on Israel’s part if the Palestinians and Jordanians are the obstacles to progress. If Egypt tried to hold Israel responsible in an unwarranted manner, then our opinion and world public opinion will be important. Sadat considers his letter to Begin to be significant.² He said that he would not hold Israel responsible if other parties block progress. We would be prepared to make statements to Sadat and Begin and to assign a high-level negotiator to help carry out the Camp David agreements. The President again repeated that he attaches importance to December 17th. (S)

The President added that Israel is demanding too much in Article VI. In his view, Article VI should say no more than that the present treaty is not contradictory to any other obligations and that no actions will be taken in the future which are contradictory to the treaty. Ambassador Dinitz pointed out that there are Egyptian commitments that are contradictory to this treaty. The President replied the Egypt-Israel treaty would take precedence since it is the most recent and it would be understood to prevail, even if it is in conflict with previously signed documents. This is hard for Sadat to say publicly. (S)

The President concluded by saying that he did not see why it would be difficult for Israel to set a goal of concluding the negotiations by the end of 1979 and for Sadat to say that Israel will not be held responsible if other parties prevented the elections. This should be an adequate compromise. The President said that he is not recommending any position of his own and that anything Egypt and Israel can agree upon we will support. (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 37, Memcons: President, 12/78–1/79. Secret. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. At the top of the memorandum, Carter wrote: “OK. J.” According to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter met with Dinitz from 11 a.m. to 11:32 a.m.; the only other attendee at the meeting was Quandt, who attended from 11 a.m. to 11:25 a.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) Quandt sent Brzezinski a draft of the memorandum under a December 7 covering memorandum. A notation in an unknown hand on the covering memorandum indicates that the original of the memorandum of conversation was to be hand-carried to Clough. Brzezinski wrote an additional notation directing Inderfurth to deliver the memorandum of conversation to Clough for delivery to Carter. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 22, Israel: 11/78–2/79)
2. See Document 146.