Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

198. Letter From the Administrator of the Energy Research and Development Administration (Seamans) to President Ford¹

Washington, June 9, 1976.

Dear Mr. President:

I believe there is an opportunity and a need for the United States to take a major initiative to resolve uncertainties that now exist in the nuclear fuel cycle and to reduce the risk of international proliferation of special nuclear materials. This opportunity, if successfully pursued, would complete your evolving nuclear policy and could be the central feature of a major Presidential Message.

Background:

Until recently, Federal nuclear policy: (1) stressed Government funding of enrichment plants; (2) assumed that reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel and recycling of plutonium and uranium would be accomplished in the private sector without Government support; and (3) placed less stress on safeguards against theft or diversion of nuclear material than now seems wise.

Your initiatives in the past two years have substantially reformed this policy. Specifically you have:

• Limited the Federal role in enrichment by supporting private entry as the best means for assuring additional enrichment capacity;

• Increased Government research in reprocessing and recycling so that safe and secure private facilities could be demonstrated;

• Sponsored a major Government program to demonstrate the safe management and disposal of nuclear waste; and

• Increased stress on materials and physical safeguards at both Government-owned and private facilities licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

These measures will greatly strengthen the nuclear fuel cycle and our controls over the handling and utilization of plutonium in this country. Yet, despite substantial progress, a final and crucial issue remains unresolved—the need to control carefully the world’s supply of plutonium. Among the factors bearing on this issue are:

• A recent court decision most likely will prevent the Nuclear Regulatory Commission from licensing private reprocessing facilities that would produce plutonium for recycled use until approval of the generic environmental statement on mixed oxide fuels, probably years from now.

• Uncertainty is growing among other nations about the United States as a reliable supplier of reactors and fuel because of (1) final decisions on export licenses now rest with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; and (2) recent amendments to nuclear legislation indicating firm Congressional intent to review individual nuclear initiatives with the private sector.

• Other supplier nations are developing national reprocessing and recycling capabilities, and some are under pressure commercially to sell plants to other countries desiring to build an integrated indigenous nuclear power capability, for example, Iran and Brazil. This trend could multiply the chances of theft or diversion of plutonium and could lead to a dramatic increase in the number of nations with nuclear weapons.

• Multinational regional reprocessing centers have been suggested as a means for minimizing this proliferation. However, the technical, logistical and political feasibility of the idea has yet to be demonstrated.

Recommendation:

I believe the time is at hand for the United States to address this basic issue with a major initiative. Such an initiative might have the following features:

• An offer to supplier and consumer states to join with the United States to demonstrate the viability of a multinational reprocessing approach using the United States as the demonstration site. The question of excess plutonium and disposal of nuclear waste resulting from the reprocessing requires further exploration to optimize the attractiveness to both the host and participating nations.

• A call upon supplier nations to suspend temporarily the export of reprocessing technology until the multinational centers or other effective controls have been agreed to. I have already suggested this to the Secretary of State in a letter dated May 13, 1976.

• A commitment to employ in the multinational centers and to make available advanced United States safeguards and security technology.

The key to the initiative is a willingness of the United States to offer reprocessing and recycling services to other nations and to open our facilities to international inspection. The facility could well be a new plant or a partially completed private plant at Barnwell, South Carolina that was financed by a consortium composed of Allied Chemical, Gulf Oil Corporation and Royal Dutch Shell. Arrangements for serving foreign needs from this facility would, of course, have to be worked out, however, it is anticipated that the consortium will have an interest in a governmentally-encouraged demonstration.

In any event, the United States could provide some funding and appropriate technical assistance and guarantees for the establishment of an international reprocessing facility in the United States and invite those nations which would utilize the services of such a facility to provide a pro rata share of operating expenses. Of course, a successful international demonstration, under the auspices of the United States, would also materially assist in the development of our domestic reprocessing capability over the long run as increasing nuclear power production results in needed new reprocessing facilities. Such an initiative could become the centerpiece of a truly comprehensive Presidential policy on nuclear power and non-proliferation.

Decision:

If you approve, I will pursue and intensify work with appropriate departments and agencies to develop a recommended nuclear reprocessing initiative to be available to you as soon as possible.

Respectfully yours,

Robert C. Seamans, Jr. Administrator

1. Summary: Seamans recommended that the United States pursue a “major initiative” regarding the nuclear fuel cycle, noting that such an initiative could constitute a “central feature” of a major Presidential message.

   Source: Ford Library, James M. Cannon Files, Issues File, 1972–77, Box 24, Nuclear Policy Statement, June-July 1976. Confidential. A copy was sent to Richardson. Attached as Tab A to Document 200. Seamans signed “Bob Seamans” above his typed signature. Seaman’s May 13 letter to Kissinger was not found.