Thailand and Burma
393. National Intelligence Estimate 52–1–75, Washington, January 9, 1975.
The estimate assessed the implications for the United States in light of the political situation in Thailand.
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, OPI 122 (National Intelligence Council), Job 79R01012A, Box 497, Folder 6, NIE 52–1–75. Secret. Concurred in by all members of the U.S. Intelligence Board except the FBI, who abstained. Thailand’s election occurred on January 26.
394. Memorandum From Richard T. Kennedy of the NSC Staff to the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), Washington, January 15, 1975.
Kennedy asked Scowcroft to direct the DOD to produce an alternative policy option for the level of U.S. forces in Thailand.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–245, NSDM 249, Folder 4. Secret. Sent for action. Concurred in by Smyser. Scowcroft wrote, “Done,” near the bottom of the page, indicating that he handled the matter by phone. The attached memorandum to Wickham on “Long Term U.S. Military Force Levels in Thailand” is not published.
395. Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Washington, February 6, 1975, 8 a.m.
Kissinger and his staff discussed the situations in Thailand and Burma.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, E5177, Box 6. Secret.
396. Memorandum From the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford, Washington, February 6, 1975.
Kissinger asked Ford to determine long-term U.S. military force levels in Thailand.
Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–57, NSDMs, NSDM 286, Long-Term U.S. Military Force Levels in Thailand (2). Secret. Sent for Action. Ford initialed his approval of Tab A, not attached, which became NSDM 286. Tab B apparently refers to two memoranda from Schlesinger to Kissinger on “Long-Term US Military Force Levels in Thailand (FY 76 and Beyond),” the first, which presented four options, dated October 11, 1974 and the second, presenting a fifth option, dated January 18, 1975. Both are attached but not published. Tab C, not attached, is apparently a reference to Colby’s Memorandum to Thomas Bigley, then Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, of July 9, 1974 providing comments on Defense’s memorandum entitled “Long-Term U.S. Military Force Levels in Thailand (FY 1976 and Beyond).” (Ibid., Box 245, Folder 4, NSDM 249)
397. National Security Decision Memorandum 286, Washington, February 7, 1975.
Kissinger issued NSDM 286 concerning long-term U.S. military force levels in Thailand.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Decision Memoranda and Study Memoranda, Box 1. Secret. Copies were sent to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
398. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, April 25, 1975, 4:30 p.m.
[not declassified in time for publication]
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 11. Secret.
399. Telegram 8690 From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State, May 13, 1975, 1315Z.
The Embassy in Bangkok complained about the lack of information on the use of U.S. forces stationed in Thailand during the Mayaguez incident.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Country Files, Box 18, Far East, Thailand, State Department Telegrams to SECSTATE, NODIS (1). Secret; Flash; Nodis. The same day, at 1454Z, Zurhellen replied, “Regret fast moving situation here has made it impossible to keep you fully informed as we would otherwise intend. Matters you raise are currently under discussion and we hope to have word for you soon. Meantime, please do not, repeat not, raise this matter further with Thais.” (Telegram 110792 to Bangkok; National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files) Earlier in the month, Masters sent a telegram to Washington warning that the “often secret agreements we have with the RTG relating to our military presence here is coming unraveled because of Thai nationalistic sentiment, Thai popular mistrust of the old military governments that concluded the agreements with us, and a deep concern over the effectiveness of the U.S. military presence.” (Telegram 7857 from Bangkok, May 1; ibid.)
400. Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Washington, May 16, 1975, 8:08 a.m.
Kissinger and his staff discussed force levels in Thailand, the aftermath of the Mayaguez incident, and the basis for the U.S. military presence in Thailand.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, E5177, Box 6. Secret. An undated paper on “Secret Agreements with Thailand Relating to the U.S. Military Presence in Thailand” is at the Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 17, Thailand, Senator Mansfield’s Request for Agreements with Thailand (1). On May 19, Masters delivered a note, which the Thai government took as an apology, stating “The United States regrets the misunderstandings that have arisen between Thailand and the United States in regard to the temporary placement of Marines at Utapao to assist in the recovery of the SS Mayaguez.” Telegrams 115952 to Bangkok, May 18, and 4359 from Bangkok, May 19; ibid., Central Foreign Policy Files)
401. National Security Study Memorandum 225, Washington, May 27, 1975.
NSSM 225 directed the CIA and the Departments of State and Defense to review U.S. policy toward Thailand.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Decision Memoranda and Study Memoranda, Box 2. Secret; Nodis. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
402. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Deputy Secretary of State Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements, and Director of Central Intelligence Colby, Washington, July 1, 1975.
Kissinger asked DOD, DOS, and CIA to make recommendations on U.S. force reductions in Thailand.
Source: Library of Congress, James Schlesinger Papers, Box 22. Secret; Nodis. Scowcroft signed the memorandum for Kissinger. In response to this memorandum, the USIB approved a memorandum, July 31, on the “Future of US Military Intelligence Installations and Units in Thailand,” which was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for South and Southeast Asia, and reflected the views of CIA, DIA, INR, and NSA. (Library of Congress, Henry Kissinger Papers, TS 10, 8/75) Scowcroft received this memorandum under a covering memorandum, August 7, from Quinn. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 17, Thailand [12])
403. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, Deputy Secretary of State Ingersoll, and Director of Central Intelligence Colby, Washington, August 5, 1975.
Kissinger asked the Departments of Defense and State, and the CIA to develop a plan for the permanent resettlement of the Meo refugees in Thailand.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 17, Thailand [12]. Secret. Sent for action. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of the Office for Management and Budget.
404. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford, Washington, September 22, 1975.
Kissinger recommended that Ford approve the signing of a memorandum to implement a plan to resettle Meo refugees in Thailand.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Subject File, 1974–1977, Box 16, Presidential Determinations, FY 1976 (1), August-October 1975. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action. Scowcroft initialed the memorandum for Kissinger. Ford initialed his approval of Kissinger’s recommendation. Tab A, a Determination transferring $6.8 million to finance the plan, was not attached. Tab B, the memorandum from Kissinger directing implementation of the plan, is attached and published as Document 406.
405. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Schlesinger to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, September 23, 1975.
Schlesinger presented Kissinger with options for U.S. force reduction in Thailand.
Source: Library of Congress, James Schlesinger Papers, Box 22. Top Secret. Tabs A, B, and C, the withdrawal rate schedules for options I, II, and III, are attached but not published. Schlesinger received this memorandum, with a recommendation that he sign it, under a covering memorandum, September 2, from Ellsworth.
406. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, Deputy Secretary of State Ingersoll, and Director of Central Intelligence Colby, Washington, September 24, 1975.
Kissinger informed DOD, DOS, and CIA about the President’s decision regarding Meo refugees in Thailand.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Subject File, 1974–1977, Box 16, Presidential Determinations, FY 1976 (1), August-October 1975. Secret; Nodis. Scowcroft signed the memorandum on behalf of Kissinger. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of the Office for Management and Budget.
407. Note from the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, October 4, 1975.
Scowcroft criticized a paper on force levels in Thailand and recommended that Kissinger convene an SRG meeting on this subject.
Source: Library of Congress, Henry Kissinger Papers, Geopolitical File, Container CL 238, Thailand, 1974–1976. No classification marking. Kissinger checked the option to hold an SRG meeting. Scowcroft’s note was probably in reference to Schlesinger’s memorandum to Kissinger of September 23 (Document 405).
408. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, October 4, 1975, 2:40 p.m.
[not declassified in time for publication]
Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P–820123–2306. Secret; Nodis.
409. Paper Prepared by the NSSM 225 Working Group, Washington, undated.
The NSSM 225 Working Group summarized its review of U.S. policy toward Thailand.
Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–15, Senior Review Group Meeting, U.S. Force Reductions in Thailand, October 17, 1975 [1]. Secret. Habib sent the summary and the paper with three annexes to Kissinger under his covering memorandum of October 8. The paper is attached, but not published. (Ibid.)
410. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, October 17, 1975, 11:21–11:40 a.m.
The Senior Review Group met to discuss force reductions in Thailand.
Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–24, Meeting Minutes, SRG, June–October 1975. Top Secret. The text of Colby’s briefing on the situation in Thailand, October 16, is attached but not published. A message from Scowcroft to Kissinger, October 20, contains the response to Kissinger’s request to Colby for an analysis of the likely Thai reaction to a continued U.S. combat presence. Colby estimated that Thailand would reject a U.S. combat presence beyond March 1976. (Backchannel telegram 51999, October 21, from Scowcroft to Kissinger; ibid., National Security Adviser, Trip briefing Books and Cables for HAK, Kissinger Trip File, Box 15, October 19–23, 1975, People’s Republic of China, TOSEC [5])
411. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, Deputy Secretary of State Ingersoll, and Director of Central Intelligence Colby, Washington, October 24, 1975.
Kissinger outlined the U.S. position for negotiations on U.S. force reductions in Thailand.
Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–36, NSSMs, NSSM 225 (2), Review of U.S. Policy toward Thailand (2). Top Secret; Sensitive. The Chairman of the JCS and the Director of OMB also received copies. Scowcroft signed the memorandum for Kissinger.
412. Telegram 282411 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand, November 29, 1975, 0120Z.
The Department of State reported on Kissinger’s lunch with Chatchai.
Source: Library of Congress, Henry Kissinger Papers, Geopolitical File, Container CL 238, Thailand, June 1974–February 1976. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
413. Memorandum From Thomas J. Barnes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), Washington, February 5, 1976.
[3 pages not declassified.]
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 17, Thailand (16). Secret; Nodis; Sensitive.
414. Memorandum From Thomas J. Barnes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), Washington, February 20, 1976.
Barnes described political events in Thailand.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 17, Thailand (17). Secret. Sent for information. Scowcroft initialed the memorandum. Attached but not published are Tab A, an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, February 1976, on “The Thai Election and Its Implications for the US,” and Tab B, a covering memorandum, February 4, from Bush to Scowcroft.
415. Memorandum From Thomas J. Barnes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), Washington, March 4, 1976.
Barnes reported Whitehouse’s claim that the Thai government has withdrawn its support for a significant U.S. military presence in Thailand.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 17, Thailand (18). Secret. Sent for urgent information. At the end of the memorandum, Scowcroft wrote, “Whitehouse’s position doesn’t surprise me at all. What is present status?” Attached but not published is Tab A, telegram 5023 from Bangkok, March 4, in which Whitehouse analyzed opinion within the Thai government toward U.S. residual forces. Also attached but not published is Tab B, Intelligence Information Cable DB-315/02282–76 from March 4.
416. Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Washington, March 5, 1976, 8:05 a.m.
Kissinger and his staff discussed residual military force levels in Thailand.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, E5177, Box 9. Secret.
417. Memorandum From Thomas J. Barnes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), Washington, March 20, 1976.
Barnes outlined the consensus U.S. government view on how to respond to Thailand’s request to withdraw U.S. forces.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 17, Thailand (19). Confidential. Urgent; Sent for information. According to the correspondence profile, Scowcroft saw this memorandum on March 22. Tab A, the questions and answers from EA, was not attached.
418. Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Washington, April 2, 1976, 8:09 a.m.
Kissinger and his staff discussed residual military force levels in Thailand.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, E5177, Box 9. Secret.
419. National Security Study Memorandum 240, Washington, April 9, 1976.
Scowcroft asked the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the CIA to examine alternative locations for U.S. activities formerly conducted in Thailand.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Decision Memoranda and Study Memoranda, Box 2. Confidential. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
420. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford, Washington, April 20, 1976.
In response to NSSM 225, Scowcroft recommended that Ford approve a memorandum setting U.S. policy toward Thailand.
Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–65, NSDMs, NSDM 327, U.S. Policy Toward Thailand (1). Secret. Sent for action. Ford initialed his approval of Tab A, not attached, which, once signed, became NSDM 327. (See Document 421) Not published are Tab B, attached, the undated NSSM 225 paper, which is summarized in Document 409; and Tab C, not attached, which is likely Kissinger’s memorandum of October 24, 1975 on force reductions in Thailand, printed as Document 411. Not published are Tab D, attached, a memorandum from Colby to Kissinger of October 23; Tab E, attached, a memorandum from Ingersoll to Kissinger of October 27; and Tab F, not attached, a memorandum from Clements to Scowcroft of November 4. (Ibid., Box 36, NSSMs, NSSM 225, Review of U.S. Policy Toward Thailand [3])
421. National Security Decision Memorandum 327, Washington, April 21, 1976.
Scowcroft issued NSDM 327 outlining U.S. policy toward Thailand.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Decision Memoranda and Study Memoranda, Box 1. Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
422. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford, Washington, May 3, 1976.
In response to NSSM 240, Scowcroft recommended that Ford approve a memorandum on alternative locations for US activities based in Thailand.
Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–65, NSDMs, NSDM 329, U.S. Political Operations and Intelligence Activities Based in Thailand [2 of 2]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Umbra. Sent for Action. Ford initialed his approval of Tab A, not attached, which, once signed, became NSDM 329 (Document 423). Tab B, not attached, is the undated interagency paper prepared in response to NSSM 240, which the NSC staff sent out under a covering memorandum, April 21, from Davis to DOS, DOD, and CIA. (Ibid.) Tab C, attached, is a memorandum, April 24, from Springsteen to Scowcroft. Tab D, attached, is a memorandum, April 24, from Ellsworth to Scowcroft. Tab E, attached, is a memorandum, April 23, from Bush to Scowcroft.