378. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near
Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rogers1
Washington, September 1, 1971.
Cyprus: Strategy Papers
In accordance with the consensus at the August 11 SRG meeting on Cyprus,2
NEA has prepared two papers dealing with
the evolving situation.
At Tab A is a strategy paper exploring options for controlling the Cyprus
situation by diplomatic mediation designed to sustain the ongoing local
talks. I recommend that the U.S. role
involve quiet and indirect support of mediation under some form of
UN aegis.
At Tab B is a contingency paper outlining appropriate U.S. responses to outbreaks of violence on
the island. Our reactions would vary depending on circumstances, but
generally involve direct U.S. diplomatic
activity (usually in conjunction with the U.K.) in Athens, Ankara, Nicosia, and Washington, and
support of UN efforts on the ground in
Cyprus and in New York.
Recommendation
That you approve the approach outlined in the strategy paper at Tab A.
This approach, and the contingency paper at Tab B will be discussed at
an SRG meeting now scheduled for
September 8.3
Tab A4
Cyprus: Strategy Paper for Next Steps
Situation
Ten years of experience with the Cyprus problem demonstrate one
constant: when the parties to the dispute are not negotiating, the
[Page 920]
probability of
violence increases exponentially. Since June 1968, the local talks
have kept the Cyprus problem in a negotiating context. In addition,
this instrumentality has provided what is the unique advantage of
having the people directly concerned discuss those problems which
directly concern them.
On August 9, the Turk Cypriot negotiator, Denktash, tabled a paper setting forth the “final”
Turkish Cypriot position. He insisted on and made all Turk Cypriot
compromises made thus far contingent upon the establishment of a
separate and autonomous Turk Cypriot administration from the village
to the national level. He also raised the need for a specific GOC disavowal of enosis (union with
Greece) and injected the question of international guarantees.
Archbishop Makarios
subsequently declared the talks “deadlocked,” although neither party
has made a move to break off negotiations.
With the local talks approaching termination and frustration levels
rising on all sides, the possibility of an outbreak of violence is
greater than at any time since 1968. Rather than react to a violent
development the Cyprus situation would be better dealt with by
seeking to revive US/UK/UN
diplomacy. The goal of such a diplomatic effort would be
preservation of negotiations to avoid a confrontation on the island
which would sooner or later bring in Greece and Turkey on opposite
sides. There are several options and variations thereon; all of them
involve some form of mediation.
Mediation Option I: UN
UN mediation has clear advantages.
First, the UN is already seized of
the problem and is on the spot. Both the Secretary General and the
Security Council are involved in the Cyprus problem as a result of
the March 4, 1964 (and subsequent) Resolutions5 and the
presence of the United Nations Force (UNFICYP) on the island. Second, with the UN out in front, Greek, Turk, and
Cypriot fire would be concentrated on that organization rather than
any specific country. Third, the UN
provides a broad cover for both neutral mediation and, at a later
stage, perhaps the guaranteeing of the results of that mediation.
There are, however, problems with the UN being the focus of activity. The Turks/Turk Cypriots
have already expressed their antipathy toward UN mediation, preferring instead the convening of the
London-Zurich guarantor powers. Moreover, in a UN mediation effort US inputs would necessarily be diluted
by the views of others, and it is difficult for the UN as an institution to bring pressure
to bear on the parties.
[Page 921]
Variant A. By far the most preferable
variation of the UN mediation option
would involve consultations among the Greeks, Turks, and Cypriots
which would result in joint agreement on a mediator and the
principles upon which mediation would be based. The initiative for
the consultations could be undertaken by any one of the parties,
preferably Turkey, or perhaps could be jointly undertaken by Greece
and Turkey through their dialogue. Once the parties had agreed on a
person and on guidelines, U
Thant could formally give the individual his blessing
and the mediation would proceed. A retired senior statesman (e.g.,
Lester Pearson) or an
internationally-renowned legal expert (e.g., Edward Hambro of Norway
or Pierre Laline of Switzerland) would be preferable to a currently
active “super star.” The latter might raise hopes too high with the
danger that the failure of his mission would bring increased
tension.
Variant B. Archbishop Makarios could unilaterally
request U Thant either to
undertake a mediation effort on the basis of the March 4, 1964
Resolution or to activate his good offices under the December 22,
1967 Resolution.6 The problem
here would be that the Turks might reject the concept of mediation
because it was a Makarios
proposal. In any case, were the Archbishop to take a UN initiative, the US would be forced to support the
effort.
Variant C. It is possible that U Thant or his Special
Representative on the island, Mr. Osorio-Tafall, might take the initiative to
regenerate the SYGʼs good offices. The local talks were convened by
Osorio-Tafall, acting
under the SYGʼs good offices mandate, and he then withdrew stating
that he would be available for mediation should the sides reach a
deadlock. U Thantʼs next
report to the SC on Cyprus will be in
December in connection with renewal of UNFICYPʼs mandate. He could choose to move in this
framework.
Mediation Option II: US
The argument for US mediation is that
our position as NATO leader and
primary ally of Greece and Turkey, as well as our active mediatory
roles via the Ball and Vance
Missions to defuse crises, give us the primary responsibility for
the Cyprus problem. Since the US is
the repository of a great deal of experience with the Cyprus problem
and the country most able to influence all the parties, it is
incumbent upon us to shape the Cyprus situation in a positive way
before there is a crisis and before we are compelled to intervene
under the worst possible conditions. Theoretically, this position
has much merit. However, as a practical matter in the present
circumstances there should be no direct
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US mediation. The reasons are that
such an effort would immediately put the US in the middle of a three-cornered struggle of
Greeks, Turks, and Cypriots and expose us to criticism from all
sides. In addition, our influence would be wasted too early in the
game. A direct US intervention should
be preserved as a last ditch option in the case of an uncontainable
outbreak of violence.
Mediation Option III: Independent
A third variant on mediation would be the appointment of a neutral,
non-political third party (preferably European) as mediator. This
option would probably not emerge spontaneously, but could be
stimulated by the US, acting in
concert with the UK, or within the
NATO framework. For example,
Italy, with its interest in playing a significant role in
“Mediterranean” diplomacy, might be stimulated to perform the
mediatory function. Also, Italy has outstanding candidates such as
elder statesman Manlio Brosio
or legal expert Roberto Ago. Independent mediation, like a UN effort, has the advantage of placing
someone else out in front. Another positive factor is that lack of
direct involvement with the UN would
make an independent mediator more palatable to the Turks. The main
problems would be the difficulty of finding a willing candidate and
again the inevitable dilution of US
inputs and lack of influence on the countries concerned.
US Diplomatic Strategy
Given the dangers inherent in the situation on the ground, the need
for the US to keep the Cyprus problem
in a negotiating context and the considerations involved in
mediation, it would be best for the US quietly to reactivate its diplomacy vis-à-vis
Cyprus. In general terms, our goal should be to insure that in the
case of a real stalemate in the intercommunal talks and increasing
violence on the Island a mediation effort can be quickly and
efficiently mounted. The ideal kind of mediation would be that
outlined in Option I A, i.e., a UN-sponsored effort stimulated by the parties and involving
a mediator and guidelines previously agreed upon. The next most
feasible approach would be Option III. In either case the US role should be that of an amicus
curiae providing behind the scenes ideas and support.
At the very minimum, if we are successful in proceeding with
mediation, the negotiating process will be spun out and time will be
gained. At the maximum, breakthroughs might be achieved which would
either solve the Cyprus problem or provide for a more stable modus
vivendi.
Next Steps:
- 1.
- We believe Assistant Secretary Sisco should call in the Turkish, Greece, and
Cypriot Ambassadors (with supporting actions in the cap
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itals) and ask them to
clarify their positions as reflected in the latest documents
exchanged in the local talks. In addition, he should discuss
with them where we go from here on the Cyprus problem,
emphasizing the U.S. desire for
diplomacy and negotiation, and probing reactions to UNSYG good offices (which
Makarios has already
floated in the press).
- 2.
- The next step would be determined by events in the coming
weeks. The Foreign Ministers of all the parties will be in New
York for the UNGA and, if
stalemate and crisis seem imminent, Secretary Rogers will consider exploring
with the Foreign Ministers (particularly Olcay of Turkey) some form of
mediation as generally outlined in Option I A.
Tab B7
CYPRUS: CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR VIOLENT INCIDENTS
The historical record shows that serious intercommunal violence has
often erupted in Cyprus. An action-reaction escalation of violence
could bring Greece and Turkey into confrontation as in 1964, 1965,
and 1967. With the local talks between Greek Cypriot and Turk
Cypriot negotiators now approaching deadlock and with frustration
and uncertainty increasing, the coming weeks and months will be
particularly delicate.
Our contingency plans are based on past Cyprus crisis management and
are geared for quick reaction to contain violence. U.S. responses vary depending on the
kind and scale of the incident, which side initiated the violence
and for what reason.
Procedure in Case of Accidental Incidents: In
the case of an accidental shooting incident, a small scale
provocation, or a loss of control by the Greek or Turk Cypriot
leadership of a sizeable portion of its military forces or civilian
population, initial US responses
would appropriately focus on Cyprus itself.
- 1.
- The United Nations force on the ground (UNFICYP) has in the past, and
could today, successfully interpose its troops between the local
opposing groups.
- 2.
- Our Embassy in Nicosia would encourage rapid UNFICYP interposition and would
make strong representations (probably in conjunction with other
Embassies and U Thantʼs
Special Representative) calling for either the GOC and/or the Turk Cypriot
leadership to restore discipline and order within their
ranks.
- 3.
- On the international diplomatic level we would encourage joint
US, UK, UN diplomatic
démarches in London, Washington, New York, Athens and Ankara in
support of efforts on the Island to contain the violence.
Procedure in Case of Premeditated Violence on a
Small Scale: Premeditated violence, by either the GOC or the Turk Cypriots, is always a
possibility. Because the vast majority of the mainland Greek troops
on Cyprus were withdrawn in the wake of the 1967 crisis, Cyprus is
today virtually defenseless relative to Turkey. For this reason
Makarios would surely
not go so far as to generate incidents which might invite mainland
Turkish intervention. However, it is conceivable that His Beatitude
might stimulate incidents simply to get the UN more involved by obtaining an increase in the size
of UNFICYP and/or diplomatic
intervention by the Secretary General or the Security Council. In
such an event, the scale of violence would probably be kept as small
as possible and U.S. reaction would
be as described in steps 1, 2, and 3 in the above paragraph.
Procedure in Case of Large-Scale Violence: By
far the most dangerous contingency would be a decision by the
Turk/Turk Cypriot side to provoke violence as a prelude to Turk
military intervention for the purpose of forcibly partitioning the
Island. In this event our primary task would be to persuade the
GOT that such a violent course
of action would be self-defeating.
- 1.
- We would encourage UNFICYP
to interpose its forces. If the fighting is on a large scale
UNFICYP interposition
might be futile (as in 1967). Certainly in the case of an
invasion from Turkey UNFICYP
would not take preventive action.
- 2.
- In concert with the UK, and
other interested parties, the U.S. would make representations in Ankara,
Washington, and London to convince the Turks that the GOCʼs ability to generate a full
scale international crisis would inevitably bring mainland
Greece into conflict with Turkey, activate the international
community against what would be regarded as stark aggression,
and possibly involve the Soviet Union in a manner inimical to
Turkish interests.
- 3.
- A corollary diplomatic move would be to activate the United
Nations. U Thantʼs Special
Representative on the Island and UNFICYP would no doubt be involved ab initio in
efforts to stop the fighting. In addition, we could consider an
emergency session of the Security Council with a view to
mobilizing support for an immediate cessation of
hostilities.
- 4.
-
NATO would be involved in a
full-blown Cyprus crisis. Since the 1963–1964 period, the
Secretary General has maintained a Watching Brief. If serious
hostilities were to occur, we would activate the NATO Secretary General (as in
1967) to support our diplomatic efforts to counsel moderation
and achieve an end to the fighting.
- 5.
- Finally, our ace in the hole in a crisis on the scale outlined
above remains the Special Presidential Mission. Both were
crucial in stopping the shooting in 1964 and 1967 respectively.
This option should be preserved as a last ditch effort to avoid
or resolve a Greco-Turk confrontation caused by serious fighting
on the Island.
The Soviet Dimension: The attitude of the
Soviet Union in the event of serious intercommunal violence is
difficult to predict. The Soviets appear to have two distinct and
partially conflicting policy goals. On the one hand, a constant in
Russian policy has been preservation of the independence and
territorial integrity, i.e., the “non-NATOization,” of Cyprus. On the other hand, the USSR has courted Turkey fairly
consistently in recent years. The most probable course of Soviet
diplomacy would be to make threatening noises against outside
interventions while attempting to cool off Makarios in order to avoid the
possibility of such interventions. In any UN activity they would probably come down on the side
of a small independent nation but not strongly enough to badly
irritate Turkey. In short, in the case of a Cyprus crisis, I would
anticipate that the Soviet policy would be verbal as indeed it was
in 1967.
Converting a Crisis Into Progress: In the
past, Cyprus has presented opportunity in crisis. If the situation,
either by accident or design, should deteriorate to the point where
there is large scale fighting and the threat of Turk invasion, and
if such a crisis can be defused by diplomacy, then we should give
active consideration to steps which might subsequently by taken to
assist in removing the basic causes of strife between the two
communities. An example of this procedure was the successful US/UK/UN drive to initiate
the local talks in 1968 following the Vance Missionʼs successful
resolution of the 1967 crisis.
