Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXII, Panama, 1973–1976

46. Memorandum From the Director of the Joint Staff (Train) to Secretary of Defense Schlesinger¹

JCSM–272–74

Washington, June 28, 1974.

SUBJECT

• Panama Canal Negotiations (U)

1. (C) Reference is made to:

a. (U) JCSM–46–74, dated 13 February 1974, subject: “Strategic Importance of the Panama Canal,” which advised you of the continuing military importance to the United States of the Panama Canal.²

b. (C) National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 257, dated 14 June 1974, subject: “Latin American Initiatives,” which outlined certain policies toward Latin America, including Panama.³

2. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have noted recent Presidential guidance contained in reference 1b related to Latin America, the signing of the Eight Negotiating Principles, and the continuing progress of US-Panama treaty negotiations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it timely to review and provide an updated position on treaty negotiation issues that impact on US national security.

3. (C) The strategic importance of the canal to the United States has been a consistent position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The ultimate security objectives of the United States in Panama center on an efficiently operated interoceanic waterway freely accessible to US vessels and one which would be denied to US enemies in time of war. The current treaty has served those purposes for 70 years. However, Latin American nationalism and worldwide trends of the post-World War II period have fundamentally altered the means by which the United States can continue to achieve those objectives at reasonable cost. Collective security offers a viable long-term regional path for insuring concerted hemispheric resistance to military incursions by US enemies, to include overt military threats to Panama. Successful negotiations with Panama may be a key element in insuring the continued participation in collective security by the other Latin American states. A new and mutually acceptable treaty will better serve the immediate US security situation in Panama, as well as US security interests throughout the hemisphere.

4. (S) It is imperative to identify clearly for the US negotiators that national security interests indefinitely require the right of US vessels to use the canal. This end requires effective US control of canal defense for the longest possible term and explicit guarantees of use thereafter. Presidential guidance as expressed in NSDM 131 calls for a treaty duration of 50 years as a negotiating objective, during which full essential US rights will be retained.⁴ The concept of expansion of canal capacity, recognized in the Eighth Negotiating Principle, offers additional opportunities for negotiating extended US rights dating from the election of an expansion option by the United States.

5. (S) The negotiating principles acknowledge the transfer of Panama Canal Zone jurisdiction and sovereignty to the Government of Panama. Such a transfer would not jeopardize US security interests as long as the new treaty confers on the United States those rights necessary for the continued operation, maintenance, protection, and defense of the Panama Canal and the transit of ships.

6. (S) In view of the broad security and politico-military implications of the Panama Canal treaty negotiations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff support the current negotiating objective of reaching agreement on a new and mutually acceptable treaty. Further, the Joint Chiefs of Staff affirm the position that the US negotiators should:

a. Seek the longest possible lock canal treaty duration.

b. Seek the longest possible term for the exercise by the United States of canal expansion options.

c. Seek the longest and broadest extension of US control over operations and defense following any expansion.

d. Require a joint US-Panamanian guarantee that upon termination of the new treaty provisions will exist to insure that the canal will be open to all world shipping without discrimination, at reasonable tolls, and that Panama would take no action that would hamper the efficient operation of the waterway.

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files, FRC 330–78–0011, Panama 821 1974. Secret.
2. See Document 33.
3. See footnote 4, Document 43.
4. See footnote 5, Document 18.