Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXII, Panama, 1973–1976

134. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, October 7, 1976, 9:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Secretary’s Meeting with Panama Foreign Minister Boyd

PARTICIPANTS

• PANAMA

  • Foreign Minister Aquilino Boyd
  • Ambassador to the United States Nicolas Gonzalez-Revilla
  • Ambassador to the UN Jorge Enrique Illueca
  • Ambassador to the OAS Nander Pitty

• US

  • The Secretary
  • Ambassador to the UN Governor Scranton
  • Under Secretary Habib
  • Assistant Secretary Harry W. Shlaudeman
  • John P. Becker (Notetaker)

The Secretary: Good Morning, Mr. Minister. Stand here right next to me. I might as well lose a few more votes. (Photographers taking pictures.) We are all for confrontation.

Foreign Minister Boyd: I will never eat peanuts again until Panama achieves complete sovereignty over its territory (photographers depart).

Foreign Minister Boyd: I remember the first time I met you four years ago.

The Secretary: Three years ago.²

Foreign Minister Boyd: We were eyeball to eyeball. Tack was Minister at the time. I made the statement that you had been giving us a hard time.

The Secretary: I can still say that. (laughter)

Foreign Minister Boyd: After signature of the eight points, we wanted to see progress toward an agreement.

The Secretary: I explained to you in Santiago what is possible and what is not.³ Last night you saw the President in the debate.⁴ His opponents throughout this election have been creating a situation which is difficult for him. If an agreement were concluded in this atmosphere it would be impossible to ratify. I have explained to you why it was not possible to proceed now when every opponent is using the Panama issue against him. You saw it last night and you saw it in the Reagan campaign . . . (coffee arrives) . . . every time I sit down somebody descends upon me with something to eat or drink. I have paid a heavy political price for my commitment to these negotiations. To bring pressure this month is senseless. We cannot achieve anything. We discussed this in Santiago in a constructive spirit . . . You have behaved . . . To say Panama has been destabilized by the United States is senseless. In Chile we did not try to destabilize and indeed no one at the time said that we did. That has become part of the political rhetoric after the fact. Allende was overthrown by elements with which we had no contact. What we did try to do was to support parties which would have run against him in 1976. So we are a bit sensitive about these charges.

Foreign Minister Boyd: On the other hand since May we have not sat at the negotiating table. It would be constructive to go back to the table before the election.

The Secretary: I agree, if you will allow me to talk for thirty seconds. The more pressure you bring the less happily we return to the negotiating table. The President has told me to tell you that we can begin negotiations again. We cannot discuss duration before the election.

Foreign Minister Boyd: When will Bunker be ready to go?

The Secretary: Next week sometime.

Mr. Shlaudeman: Ambassador Bunker will be ready to go back next week.

The Secretary: That is right. We will send Bunker back next week.

Foreign Minister Boyd: I talked to Torrijos last night. He issued a statement which he asked me to read to you. Everyone at home is upset by the debate.

The Secretary: Everyone here is upset too. I am in complete agreement with you.

Foreign Minister Boyd: (Reading a quotation from Torrijos statement) We are concerned about the light manner in which the candidates discussed Latin American relations. President Ford said that no American boys are losing their lives in war. But 20,000 American troops are sleeping lightly in the Panama Canal Zone while Latin America awaits an opportunity to exercise sovereignty there. Let me also remind Mr. Carter that never was erased from the political lexicon after the liberation struggles. (End of citation.)⁵

The Secretary: I believe that what Mr. Carter said was totally irresponsible. It is mitigated only by the fact that he has no intention of carrying it out. He went around the world last night in what can only be described as a disgraceful performance. It was political demagoguery in the worst sense. But fortunately we do not conduct foreign policy by television debates.

Foreign Minister Boyd: The negotiations have been underway since Johnson.

The Secretary: I would remind you that what Carter has done is a rerun of what Kennedy did in 1960—charging weakness. The 25% at the UN—that’s his fault (pointing to Governor Scranton).⁶ We will issue a statement on that today (laughter). I think one way not to agree with Panama would be through confrontation. We have said repeatedly that we want to settle this matter as an outstanding issue in our relations with Panama and with Latin America.

Foreign Minister Boyd: Let me speak in all frankness. You signed the Statement of Principles and you have now watched the debate. It comes to our mind that Ford might lose. You will pack your bags and not tell anyone what you have had in mind for these negotiations. The crucial issue will remain. When is the United States ready to relinquish control of the Panama Canal Zone? As a man interested in history and world peace and responsible for U.S. foreign relations you have done a great job in completing the eight points. But when will you let us know what you have in mind for duration? You will be returning to Harvard or writing for the New York Times. But we will still be here.

The Secretary: I will not be at Harvard. After running foreign relations of the U.S. for eight years one is disqualified for teaching international relations at Harvard (laughter). And I will not be writing for the New York Times.

Foreign Minister Boyd: We will be glad to have you in Panama.

The Secretary: More seriously, I think Ford will win. It is unfortunate that he had first an irresponsible Republican challenger and now has an irresponsible Democratic challenger. Whether we like it or not Panama is an issue which can get Americans steamed up. This is a disadvantage for you.

Foreign Minister Boyd: If we sit down now how long will the point of view of Secretary Kissinger prevail particularly with respect to point two which calls for a treaty of fixed duration? The Panamanian proposal for the year 2000 is reasonable.

The Secretary: I will raise this with the President to see whether we can give some indication of how he feels about this. But it would be a mistake to throw duration into the campaign. Panama would gain nothing.

Foreign Minister Boyd: I of course do not want to mix in U.S. internal affairs. Carter is saying that here is a man who can be trusted. By the same token, Ford is known to the Panamanian people.

The Secretary: We will be glad to send Bunker down at the end of next week. I have confidence in the ability of the two of you to avoid controversial issues even in an election campaign when Carter is making this an issue. When do you want an answer?

Foreign Minister Boyd: Today would do a lot of good. We have scheduled a demonstration October 11 right up against the Canal Zone.

Ambassador Gonzalez-Revilla: There are two issues: resumption of the negotiations and instructions on duration. Which one are you talking about?

Mr. Shlaudeman: What should the announcement say about the talks?

The Secretary: It should talk about the negotiations—about resuming the negotiations, not what the negotiations are about. Each side is free to raise what it wishes. We don’t have to say what the issues are now.

Foreign Minister Boyd: Fair enough.

Ambassador Gonzalez-Revilla: But . . .

The Secretary: We should not say anything about this. We want you to know that Bunker will be able to go back to Panama. All we want to say is that Bunker will be going back to resume the negotiations.

Foreign Minister Boyd: There will be an open agenda. Each can present his point of view.

The Secretary: The President has authorized the trip. But we do not want to be hit with an announcement which is negative. Let me call the White House. (on the phone) Get me Scowcroft. After I leave, I will only be fit to be a keeper of dangerous patients (laughter). I have tried to bring about a new framework for our relations with Panama. It is important for the White House. Panama has been a symbol for the rest of the world. We do not want to make Panama a focal point for our relations with everybody else.

Foreign Minister Boyd: But how about your commitments?

The Secretary: We generally carry out our international obligations. We have always done what we said we would do.

Governor Scranton: The major problem is not the next three weeks and not in signing an agreement. Rather it is with the ratification process. And frankly Minister Boyd you could help by getting across to the leadership of Panama—I know that your President understands but I mean the press—that our problem does not revolve around the issues, even duration. What it really revolves around is ratification.

The Secretary: (on the phone, presumably with Hyland) We have told Bunker to get back to Panama.⁷ It will be announced. We do not want our friends on the plane to have heart attacks. (Secretary returns to conversation) The real key is to say that we are resuming negotiations which go back to 1964. We should not tie the resumption to any specific event. There was a recess for the summer. We have always said that we would resume in October. I think especially since the debate . . . Or do you think I should go out? It might be very challenging for the press if I go out.

Governor Scranton: They (the Panamanians) know what to say.

The Secretary: Should I go out?

Governor Scranton: No but they should use the correct words. You know that a year ago if I had made a list of 50 foreign policy issues I would have put the Panama Canal as number 49. Today I have put it first or second. We have handled it well but the situation has not been easy.

The Secretary: When was the last session?

Foreign Minister Boyd: May 4.

The Secretary: How long did it last?

Foreign Minister Boyd: Four days. It was not a real round. Ambassador Bunker called it an evaluation, a review of the issues.⁸

Ambassador Gonzalez-Revilla: As far as the negotiation goes from what we saw last night, Governor Carter could not reject everything.

The Secretary: He could not fail to negotiate. He addressed the sovereignty issue. I trust they would not seek confrontation with Panama when in office. They will probably raise some hell now and get people upset. I want to keep the negotiations on the track. But on reflection, rather than having you announce this immediately after a meeting with me today, perhaps it would be better to make the announcement tomorrow.

Foreign Minister Boyd: It would be difficult for us to keep quiet. It would be practically impossible.

The Secretary: Okay, let us not make difficulties. Let us make it less of a challenge for the press, less dramatic. We have been discussing resumption for weeks. I will inform the press that we have decided today to resume the negotiations after a summer recess and to send Ambassador Bunker back to Panama within the next two weeks. There has been no new event which has occurred.

Governor Scranton: I know Minister Boyd well and trust and respect him. But let us be practical. This is an important and an emotional issue for Panama. If you don’t go, Henry, there will be questions which he can only answer in his own interest.

The Secretary: Okay, each can say what he wants. I will say that there have been exchanges in the last weeks. I told the Foreign Minister that the President has decided to send Bunker down to resume negotiations within the next two weeks. We have agreed on this mutually.

Foreign Minister Boyd: But you said at the end of next week.

The Secretary: Within the next two weeks. It is better for us. And that includes the end of next week. We can announce a precise date later after it has been discussed and arranged in usual diplomatic channels.

Governor Scranton: This gives the announcement a vagueness which is better in the United States. The second announcement of the precise date will have impact in Panama but will hardly be noticed here.

The Secretary: This is the normal thing. It will be a bit imprecise. There was a summer recess and we have now decided to renew the negotiations. If it is dramatic it will be an invitation to the Democratic side and there will be hell to pay. Each side will be free to raise issues it wants. On duration, we cannot settle it now. We need to keep it in the right framework. (At this point the meeting broke and the two principals went out to meet the press. Since no press representatives were on hand, the Secretary told Boyd that he (Boyd) could make the announcement alone, keeping in mind the framework discussed during the meeting. The Secretary requested that Ambassador Scranton remain behind for a brief discussion following the meeting with the Minister.)

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P860084–2311. Secret. Drafted on October 8 by Becker; approved on October 22 by Collums. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s suite at the Waldorf-Astoria. Kissinger was in New York for the United Nations General Assembly.
2. See Document 21.
3. See Document 126.
4. For the exchange on Panama in the October 6 debate, see Public Papers: Ford, 1976–77, Book III, pp. 2430–2431.
5. During his debate with President Ford on October 6, Carter vowed to “never” give up complete or practical control of the Canal.
6. During the debate, Carter stressed that the influence of the United States was waning, citing the fact that the United States often failed to get 20 percent of nations to vote with it at the United Nations. (Public Papers: Ford, 1976–77, Book III, pp. 2421–2422)
7. In telegram 251246 to Panama City, October 8, the Department informed the Embassy that the U.S. negotiating team would be returning to Panama on October 15. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760381–0512)
8. See Document 123.