Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XIX, Part 2, Japan, 1969-1972

137. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 18, 1972, 10 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Masayoshi Ohira, Foreign Minister of Japan
• Nobuhiko Ushiba, Ambassador of Japan
• Sadaaki Numata, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)
• The President
• General Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
• James J. Wickel, Department of State (Interpreter)

SUBJECT

• Foreign Minister Ohira Call on The President
• 1. Japan-PRC Normalization
• 2. Korea
• 3. Economic Relations with the EC
• 4. Vietnam Peace Prospects
• 5. US–USSR Relations

The President welcomed the Foreign Minister and after they were seated press photographers entered for a photo opportunity.

1. Japan-PRC Normalization

After the photographers had left, Minister Ohira said that he appreciated and felt honored to have this opportunity to meet the President despite his extremely busy schedule. He realized that he should have come to Washington immediately after returning to Tokyo from Peking,² but explained that the Japan-Australia Joint Cabinet Committee Meeting had caused a delay. He expressed deep appreciation for the thoughtful hospitality and warm welcome the President extended Prime Minister Tanaka and his party during the recent summit talks in Hawaii.³ Having already reported in detail through Ambassador Ingersoll on the substance and results of the recent Japan-PRC talks in Peking, he did not believe it necessary to discuss the matter in depth today.⁴

The President thanked him for the full briefing we had received, and expressed the hope that this kind of consultation would continue to take place whenever either of our two Governments planned to announce important decisions.

Minister Ohira said that Japan’s negotiations with the PRC in Peking were concluded successfully because of the understanding expressed by the United States and because the President himself had already broken the trail with his discussions in Peking earlier this year. Moreover, he explained, the President’s visit had worked effectively to shape domestic public opinion in Japan to make possible Prime Minister Tanaka’s decision. He expressed full agreement with the statement attributed to Assistant Secretary Marshall Green, that the reconciliation between Japan and China took place, not in spite of the Japan-US Mutual Security Treaty, but because of it.

The President asked whether the PRC leaders gave the Japanese any difficulties on the Security Treaty.

Minister Ohira replied “not at all.”

The President characterized this as a significant shift in attitude. He recalled that he talked to the Chinese leaders in categorical terms on this point, stating that the Security Treaty serves the interests of the PRC as well as the United States in maintaining peace in the Pacific. He noted rhetorically that the Chinese had not asked Japan to abrogate the Security Treaty.

Minister Ohira observed that the Chinese indicated the Security Treaty is a matter between Japan and the United States, and that they understood that Japan feels that it needs the Security Treaty. While the Chinese feel some anxiety about the Security Treaty, he said, they did not wish to discuss it during Prime Minister Tanaka’s visit to Peking because it is a bilateral matter between Japan and the United States. He added that the realistic understanding shown by the Chinese had been a great help to the Japanese side.

However, Minister Ohira continued, the success of the Japan-China negotiations in resolving the long-pending issue between them only established diplomatic relations, with the big problems still to come. As for Japan, he said, it would take up the various problems between itself and China in an attitude of sincerity, after having decided for itself what it should do, and what it should not do to maintain peace in Asia.

Minister Ohira then noted that he had already visited Australia and New Zealand and planned to visit Moscow after leaving Washington, to explain the conciliation between Japan and China. Three other special envoys had been sent to Korea and Southeast Asia to make similar explanations. Up to now, he noted, these various nations have indicated a general understanding, but some, he admitted, feel a certain anxiety. His own duty, he believed, is to endeavor to remove this sense of anxiety.

With respect to Taiwan, Minister Ohira was pleased to note that the situation in Taiwan, following Japan’s reconciliation with the PRC, has remained peaceful, and no unfortunate situation has arisen. Japan is prepared to create the non-governmental “contact point” that it should to maintain non-governmental relations with Taiwan, he said, and noted that civil aircraft and merchant shipping have continued to operate as scheduled. He also noted that the GOJ has taken steps to continue to provide Taiwan preferential tariff treatment, even though diplomatic relations have ended. Finally, he explained that the PRC was informed in advance that Japan planned to establish a “contact point” in Taiwan, and that its Embassy and Consulate there would be closed when the “contact point” is ready to function, to which the PRC showed its understanding by not saying “no.”

2. Korea

The President asked how the Foreign Minister evaluated the current developments in Korea.⁵

Minister Ohira replied that he was surprised by the big news he heard on landing in Los Angeles, that President Park had declared martial law in the ROK. Shortly after the Hawaii Summit talks at Kuilima, he said, he attended the Japan-ROK Ministerial Conference in Seoul but saw no indications whatsoever of a trend toward martial law. Therefore, he did not feel qualified to make an accurate response since he lacked adequate information.

The President stated that he had observed one reason cited by President Park for imposing martial law was the uncertainty about international diplomatic moves, and assumed that by this he meant the United States meeting with Peking, and Japan’s meeting with Peking. He found it difficult, however, to concede that these meetings would affect Korea in any detrimental manner.

Minister Ohira agreed with him. When Special Envoy Toshio Kimura visited the ROK just recently to explain the Japan-China reconciliation, ROK officials indicated an understanding but had indicated concern about any possible sudden expansion of Japan’s interchanges with North Korea. Japan, however, responded that it had no plans to do so. Accordingly, he found it difficult to believe that Japan’s reconciliation with China had triggered events in the ROK.

The President stressed the importance of keeping the ROK in as stable a condition as possible. While we welcome contacts between the ROK and North Korea, he cautioned that we did not wish to give the ROK any reason to feel that it has been deserted. If Korea should blow up, he warned, the interests of Japan and the United States would be seriously affected. He knew that the Foreign Minister would agree, on the basis of his long experience in international affairs, that we tend sometimes to keep our eyes only on the big game, such as Japan’s new relations with the PRC, the United States new relations with the PRC, Japan’s relations with the Soviet Union, or new developments among the European nations. He cautioned, however, that wars often come about when we fail to handle small problems, such as Vietnam and Korea, which could have an extremely adverse effect on our interests. He hoped, therefore, to keep in closest touch with Japan in the interest of cooling down the situation and reassuring the ROK that it is not being abandoned. We do not want, he declared firmly to have Korea explode again.

Minister Ohira said that the ROK seems to be making steady progress on its third 5-year Plan, begun this year, which stresses energy and rural development. When it ends, the ROK Government and people both hope that their nation will have acquired a self-sufficient economy. In his view, the ROK appears at last to be getting on the track politically as well, and he felt that this present step to impose martial law might be a positive step to firm up the ROK financial and economic foundations. He understood the President’s statement about the need to keep an eye on the “small game” as well as the “big game;” the GOJ also understands this need and would, he said, make an effort to help stabilize the ROK.

3. Economic Relations with the EC

The President then raised the good conversation he had with Foreign Minister Home during his recent visit,⁶ explaining that he had re-emphasized (to Home) the necessity for the great economic powers, the EC (including Britain), Japan and the United States and Canada to engage in the closest consultation in the interest of developing a more stable international monetary system and programs to reduce trade barriers. He recalled saying in Hawaii that we consider it most important that Japan and the United States not be cut out of the great developments in Europe, and that it would be detrimental to increased trade and better relations if the EC became a bloc, with Japan and the United States left outside to confront it. Now, he stressed, is the time to take steps to avoid that, through frank discussions among the United States, Japan and the European nations, as equals.

Minister Ohira said that he shared this view, and explained that Prime Minister Tanaka and Prime Minister Heath reached an understanding along this line during the latter’s visit to Tokyo in mid-September. He did not foresee any change in Japan’s confidence that it would proceed in this direction.

4. Vietnam Peace Prospects

Minister Ohira, changing the subject, noted the recent flurry of activity related to Vietnam and asked whether the President could tell him about the present situation and the prospects for peace there.

The President obliged, stating that recently for the first time the North Vietnamese have begun to negotiate seriously. In Dr. Kissinger’s twenty secret meetings in Paris all the North Vietnamese did was talk, but they did not negotiate seriously until the most recent meeting in which General Haig also participated. He cautioned that there are major differences between us, and pointed out that these negotiations involve not two parties (the United States and North Vietnam) but three (including the South Vietnamese), for which reason Dr. Kissinger, General Abrahms and Ambassador Bunker were today talking to President Thieu in Saigon, to make certain that he is fully aware of developments and to give him the opportunity to participate.

The President called attention to one point of great interest, which he asked the Minister to convey to Prime Minister Tanaka; he noted the broad speculation that with the elections only three weeks off the United States wishes to bring these negotiations to an early conclusion, but denied emphatically that this has any basis. The situation this year is totally different from 1968, he explained, when the announcement of the bombing halt had a positive effect in building up the candidacy of Hubert Humphrey, and this year Vietnam is not a negative issue. Therefore, he said, he had directed Dr. Kissinger in all negotiations not to think about the election, but to do what is right. If the right kind of agreement can be reached now we will reach it, but if it can not be reached now he said that we will wait until after the elections. This, he emphasized, is sound policy. In that connection, he added, there will be no bombing halt before the election without a settlement. Thus, he said, there is no pressure on our negotiators to reach even a bad settlement now because of the election.

The President said he wanted the Foreign Minister and Prime Minister to know also that the speculation we would agree to impose a coalition government on South Vietnam is totally false. We do want peace, he said, but peace with honor, and would not impose a settlement on the people of South Vietnam against their wishes.

Finally, the President explained, without making a prediction, there comes a time when war should end. The ideal course was not to start a war in the first place, he commented, but we feel that this is the time for the war to end, on an honorable basis for both sides. He observed that we have some reason to believe the other side also shares this view. While we are still far apart in some critical areas, an extraordinary effort is being made to negotiate seriously. He hoped that the war would come to an end, and if the other side continued to negotiate seriously he felt that there is a “chance,” not a “certainty,” that it would end within a reasonable period of time. However, he cautioned, the American elections would not be the primary factor.

5. US–USSR Relations

In conclusion, Minister Ohira in preparation for his own visit to Moscow noted the recent development of broad areas of agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, including progress toward negotiating a trade agreement, and asked whether the President could advise him with respect to the development of US–USSR relations.

The President said that our relations with the Soviet Union are positive, in trade, arms control and other areas. While there are some differences between both countries, positive discussions are taking place. He felt that there was no need to advise an experienced diplomat like Minister Ohira, but simply wished to observe that in working out the new relations between the United States and the USSR, as well as the United States and the PRC, we did not rely on sentimentality or emotions, but consulted our own interests, which the Communist leaders understand and respect. In Moscow, he believed the Minister would find that the Soviet leaders would show respect for Japan and its great people as a great economic power. Japan, he said, is in a good bargaining position, not a weak one, just as the Soviets are in a good bargaining position.

In conclusion, the President hoped that the Soviet leaders would be as fair in their discussions of the Northern Territories with Japan as the United States was about Okinawa. However, he added, he doubted they would be.

Minister Ohira thanked the President for sparing time for this discussion, and wished him good health and best luck for a resounding success in the election.

The President asked the Minister to convey his best wishes to Prime Minister Tanaka, and his colleagues in the Cabinet, and to his old personal friends, Messrs. Kishi and Sato, who are always welcome in his home.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 538, Country Files, Japan, Vol. VIII, May-December 1972. Secret. On October 20, Holdridge sent this memorandum of conversation to Haig for approval. Haig approved it with no further distribution. (Ibid.) Nixon had rejected an earlier request to meet with Ohira, but Holdridge, citing support from Rogers, appealed this decision in an October 17 memorandum sent under Kissinger’s name but signed by Haig. According to an attached routing slip, Haig and Nixon discussed this matter by telephone, and Haig approved the memorandum on behalf of the President. (Ibid.) Ericson produced a briefing paper for Nixon’s meeting with Ohira. (Memorandum from Mueller to Kissinger, October 17; ibid., RG 59, POL 7 JAPAN)
2. Foreign Minister Ohira and Prime Minister Tanaka visited the People’s Republic of China September 25–30.
3. The Nixon-Tanaka summit in Hawaii occurred on August 31-September 1, see Documents 131–134.
4. During a 1-hour meeting on October 3, Ohira debriefed Ingersoll on the Sino-Japanese normalization talks. (Telegram 10544 from Tokyo, October 3; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 538, Country Files, Japan, Vol. VIII, May-December 1972)
5. On October 17, South Korean President Chung Hee Park declared martial law throughout South Korea.
6. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, met with Nixon from 4:04 until 5:15 p.m. on September 29. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Daily Diary)