13. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger1
- Your Meeting with Dobrynin, August 15, 1974
Attached is a checklist of various issues currently in play with the Soviets.
If you have not already done so, you should bring Dobrynin up to date on the negotiations with Senator Jackson. A copy of the latest draft of the letter is at Tab E.2 You wanted to check the point on individuals holding security clearances—that they will be informed when they can expect to be eligible for emigration. You may also wish to note that there will probably be no reference to numbers, but that there will have to be a substantial increase in the rate if the guillotine is not to fall within a matter of months. You could also mention that Jackson et al. will be looking for an annual rate of at least 45,000 fairly soon.
In regard to the Jackson problem, you may want to note the opening of the Polsky trial on August 15 (he is a leading dissident, applicant for emigration since 1968 who is being tried for reckless driving) and the helpful effect of lenient treatment and permission to emigrate in his case.[Page 30]
On SALT, there have recently been intelligence reports of alleged Soviet second thoughts regarding their summit position. One report, probably stemming from Arbatov, has it that the Soviets now feel they should have been more flexible. Another, on the contrary, has it that the Soviets are undertaking a major study of US MIRVs; if they find they cannot catch up soon, they will make a reasonable proposal; if they judge they can catch up, they will stay rigid.
Whatever the case, you should tell Dobrynin that we are busy trying to put substance into the concept of a 1985 agreement. We think it essential to get overall ceilings in an agreement so that there is at least a sense of limitation. If launcher/bomber ceilings are equal, it might require us to add to our forces, since Soviet levels are running so high. We prefer not to do this and to go no higher than presently projected levels (2250). Then, if the Soviets insist on playing out their own projected levels (ca 2500), we will have to have disparity in MIRVed launchers. We remain greatly concerned about the SS–18; what would it take to limit or stop it altogether? We think it important to make a start on reductions: what about a trade of Polaris and Y Class boats (maybe 10 each)?
You should try out the idea of concentrating in Geneva on elements of an agreement and concepts: overall levels, MIRV levels, special limitations on new heavy weapons, reductions. I think it is premature to talk about the FBS/MBFR link via the nuclear package.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 8, Soviet Union, Aug–Sept 1974. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. No record of the conversation between Kissinger and Dobrynin on August 15 has been found.↩
- Attached but not printed.↩
- Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Kissinger wrote on the top of the first page of Tab 1: “Sonnenfeldt” and “Ratification of ABM.”↩
- A copy of the August 13 memorandum is attached but not printed. On the original memorandum, Kissinger initialed his approval of delaying resumption of SALT II talks in Geneva until the week of September 16. Sonnenfeldt notified Johnson on August 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 6, SALT, June–September 1974)↩
- Attached but not printed at Tab B is a copy of a letter from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, dated August 6. The original letter, including the attached Soviet draft convention, is ibid., Box 8, Soviet Union, Aug–Sept 1974.↩
- David Elliott and Michael Guhin of the National Security Council staff analyzed the Soviet draft convention in a memorandum to Kissinger on August 22. A copy is attached to a September 5 memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger. (Ibid.)↩
- Kissinger underlined “in October” and wrote “Moscow” in the margin.↩
- Attached but not printed at Tab C is telegram 2752 from USUN, August 8.↩
- Kissinger wrote and underscored twice “Yes” in the margin after this sentence.↩
- Kissinger wrote “NPT paper” in the margin by this point, but then crossed out the “T” in “NPT.” The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was signed by the United States, Soviet Union, and United Kingdom on July 1, 1968. (21 UST 483; TIAS 6839) The Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, also known as the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, was signed at Moscow on July 3, 1974. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, July 29, 1974, pp. 216–218.↩
- Attached but not printed at Tab D is an August 14 memorandum from Wells Stabler, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, to Sonnenfeldt on follow-up to the June–July summit in Moscow, including a proposed schedule of talks on an energy agreement, housing and other construction, a long-term economic agreement, an artificial heart agreement, an electro-transport project, biosphere reserves, and consulates general.↩
- Reference is to the nine members of the European Community: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, and United Kingdom.↩
- In late July and early August, East Germany, supported by the Soviet Union, disrupted ground access to and from West Berlin for one week to protest the establishment there of the West German Federal Environmental Agency.↩