On the courses of action contained in the attached paper, the principals
expressed their general concurrence with them but left to the ARA/IRG to
review and approve them during the course of the Dominican CASP
paper3 on Monday, May 8.
Attachment
COURSES OF ACTION (SHORT-TERM)—DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
I. Background
The attempted assassination of Imbert on March 21 has been the single most
important political event since the last (December) review of
short-term courses of action,5 and
indeed since Balaguerʼs
assumption of office ten months ago.
Prior to March 21, the Balaguer
Government, in spite of several important weaknesses, had made
progress in consolidating itself. While not eliminated, the
polarizing trends giving rise to concern in the last review had not
intensified and in fact had probably weakened. The PRD was continuing its total opposition
to the Government and expressing it in efforts to construct a broad
“anti-Trujillista” movement without regard to ideology. On balance,
however, this attitude was reducing somewhat the support for the
leadership within the Party and in the country as a whole. The
erosion of the Partyʼs position was also attributable in part to
various pressures exerted against it by the Government, which
harbored deep distrust and suspicion of the intentions of the PRD leadership. Moreover, the posture
of strong but “constructive” opposition of the Social Christians
(PRSC), with constitutionalist
credentials as valid as those of the PRD, tended at once to underline the radical stance of
the PRD and to strengthen Balaguerʼs position. The Communists,
engaged in bitter internecine struggles, were weak. The “Civico”
(anti-Trujillista) right was in touch with the PRD but ineffective. The great bulk of
the military accepted or supported Balaguer, with only isolated centers manifesting
low-key discontent. Labor was unhappy but essentially passive. The
general economic atmosphere, although reflecting little progress
toward correction of basic disequilibrium, and affected adversely by
the deflationary tendencies induced by austerity and by
administrative and technical ineptness on the part of the
Government, was improving as business confidence and optimism about
a continuation of stability became almost palpable. This general
picture of uneven, flawed but perceptible progress was marred by
continuing incidents of excesses by the police against the
citizenry, perhaps especially PRD
adherents. These incidents were being considerably exaggerated by
the opposition to the Government, but
[Page 476]
there was sufficient validity in the
opposition charges to create uneasiness about Balaguerʼs willingness or ability to
control the police, and, by extension, to give limited currency to
opposition charges of “neo-Trujillista” tendencies in the
Government.
The incident of March 21 and its aftermath introduced considerable
fluidity into the political environment and weakened the Government.
In the process, the essential and persistent fragility of the
political structure has been clearly demonstrated. The attack on
Imbert has stimulated and
gained adherents for the “anti-Trujillista” forces and placed the
Government at least temporarily on the defensive. The PRD has exploited the situation, but it
has been the “Civico” right which has taken principal advantage of
the new circumstances in an effort to resuscitate itself. Rumors of
plotting have burgeoned, and some “Civicos” are talking of an
“Ongania solution,” with Wessin y Wessin cast in the lead. (This
aggressiveness on the part of the perennially golpe-minded right may
give pause to its potential sympathizer—and former blood enemy—the
PRD.) The PRSC clings to its line of
“constructive” opposition, but within the Party there are pressures,
enhanced by the Imbert attempt
and its aftermath, to abandon that position in favor of flat-out
opposition to the Government. In the military, especially the Air
Force, the persistent opponents of Balaguer are becoming somewhat more vocal, but we
have no evidence yet of firm plotting. In the economic sector, the
effects of the political uneasiness have been direct and swift. The
mood of clear optimism in early March which appeared to override the
effects of austerity has been replaced by one of, at best, caution
and uncertainty.
Despite the clearly negative consequences for Balaguer of the Imbert incident and the period of
political maneuvering it produced, the situation is not critical
but, rather, uneasy. The President almost certainly has the support
of the majority of Dominicans, who still believe in him personally
and who see no alternative to him, even though that support is not
readily organizable or mobilizable because, in part, of the weakness
of the Reformista Party. He still has basic military support. He has
the support of the United States. And he appears confident of his
authority. Against these strengths are set:
- (a)
- his vulnerability, in the absence of more vigorous and
rapid corrective action by him, to the charge that he is
either indifferent to, or incapable of controlling,
arbitrary actions by the security forces, a charge given
substance by the presence of Trujillista throwbacks in the
Palace;
- (b)
- his lack of sensitivity to the need for and profit in a
more forthcoming attitude toward the PRD and the PRSC;
- (c)
- the serious administrative and technical shortcomings of
the Government, including the concentration of even minor
decision-making powers in the President;
- (d)
- the stringent economic situation characterized by a
serious balance of payments problem, a difficult fiscal
picture and a failure thus far of our assistance to
compensate for the deflationary consequences of austerity;
and
- (e)
- the underlying primitivism of political life in the
country.
It is the opinion of the Santo Domingo Country Team that the chances
are still somewhat better than even that the Balaguer Government can maintain
itself in power, without resort to repression, until the mid-1968
municipal elections, the next major political landmark. The results
of those elections will probably be decisive in determining the odds
on his staying his full constitutional course.
Against this background, the following short-term courses of
action—some of which are repeats or modifications from the December
review—are proposed:
- 1.
- Continue to impress upon Balaguer and key leaders of the Government
the necessity of an effective, loyal political organization
as a base of support for the Government now and in the 1968
elections.
- —Assist the PR
(preferably in technical terms) in constructing a
going, grass-roots political organization.
- 2.
- Continue to press Balaguer to enter into reasonable relations
with the non-Communist opposition, especially that on the
left, recognizing that for political and personal reasons
Balaguer will
probably want to move cautiously.
- —Continue to urge Balaguer to assure that basic
political liberties of non-Communist parties and
individuals are respected by security forces and to
take and to publicize disciplinary actions against
violators of this policy.
- —Continue to urge Balaguer to establish an effective and
highly visible mechanism to receive and evaluate
complaints against improper actions by the security
forces.
- —Continue to urge Balaguer to respond effectively to
valid opposition criticisms.
- —Continue to urge Balaguer to respond more positively
and definitively to the PRSC in its “constructive”
opposition.
- —Continue to urge Balaguer to explore honestly the
possibilities of a reasonable modus vivendi with the
PRD.
- 3.
- Continue to encourage the PRSC in its position of constructive
opposition.
- —Encourage the BRUC in its efforts to gain control of
the currently Communist-led Student Federation at
the University.
- —Encourage the PRSC to stand independently in the 1968
elections on a platform of constructive
opposition.
- —Increase our and AIFLD contacts with CASC (Social
Christian Labor Confederation).
- —Intensify exchange programs involving PRSC elements.
- 4.
- Continue to try to moderate the position of the PRD.
- —Continue to assist moderate PRD leaders to increase
their influence on Party affairs and to counter
radical influences.
- —Continue to seek to diminish influence on PRD affairs of radicals
and Communist infiltrators.
- —Continue, through expanded personal contacts,
exchange programs, etc., to try to diminish
radicalism in PRD
youth sector.
- —Continue our efforts to influence PRD labor sector and
expand AIFLD contacts with that sector.
- 5.
- Continue to try to impress upon security forces the need
to distinguish between the Communist and non-Communist left
and between legitimate and illegitimate political activity,
recognizing that we are essentially limited to instruction,
example and moral suasion and that we have no operational
controls.
- 6.
- Assure that all sectors (left,
right, and military) understand clearly that our basic
position is firm support of constitutional government of
Balaguer and of
firm opposition to attempts to replace it by
unconstitutional means.
- —Use appropriate occasions and means (especially
economic) to manifest our support of Balaguer.
- 7.
- Continue to impress upon Balaguer the desirability of getting rid of
negative Trujillista elements in the Government who are
liabilities domestically and internationally.
- 8.
- Continue to press upon Balaguer the urgent necessity to improve
substantially the administrative and technical competence of
the Government, particularly in the economic sector, using
to the extent possible responsible PRD and PRSC
technicians.
- 9.
- Continue to provide Balaguer systematically with reliable,
unbiased information from all available sources on domestic
intrigues and plots affecting his Government and internal
stability.
- 10.
- Try to keep the Government from pursuing a labor policy
which, while designed to reduce Communist influence by
increasing Government influence in unions, will alienate
non-Communist labor elements and force them into association
with extreme left leadership.
