116. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk1

SUBJECT

  • Laos Contingency Actions: For Your Luncheon Meeting with the President

With Operation Triangle now underway (in its own fashion), we have three outstanding proposals for action. We have discussed these with Defense, and believe they should not be undertaken or authorized at this moment. However, the situation could develop fast, and I should think it might be wise for us to discuss them with the President at the luncheon.

With respect to Vietnam, Ambassador Taylor seems to have got Khanh cooled off for the moment, and the latest reading on military morale (Saigon 235)2 is somewhat reassuring—at least if one assumes that we can ever read the Vietnamese mind clearly. Thus, we are in a “wait-and-see” period on Vietnam, although I think we must recognize that the nerves of Khanh and others have frayed to a greater extent than ever before and are likely to do so again over the next 2–3 months.

Lao Contingency Actions

The status of these is:

a.
Unger has asked for standing authority to use the Air America pilots in T–28’s at any time. He argues that an emergency may arise very rapidly and not permit him to appeal to Washington. His arguments (Vientiane 165)3 are based on annoying but possibly inescapable facts about the use of Lao [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] pilots. Possibly we could place greater pressure on the Lao to use their transport pilots in T–28’s, and we should try this out on Unger. Assuming it does not work, I would agree with Defense that we should be negative on any standing authority—but at the same time the situation may compel us to give this authority rapidly if the situation becomes serious.
b.
Operation Against Route 7. Unger has been urging this for some time, with a proposal for Air America pilots using the A1H’s out of Vietnam. Although the JCS came out for this (in what was reported to be a lukewarm fashion), we have all felt that the better way to do this would be through the Air America pilots in T–28’s. Latest photography shows [Page 243] substantial anti-aircraft along Route 7, so the operation is a risky one at any time. I have agreed with Defense that we should continue to be negative for the time being. But again should have this one as a possible response if the situation becomes serious. A further alternative way to carry this out would be through a “suppressive” recon strike with our own aircraft: again there would be risks.
c.
Advance guard elements into Thailand. JCS and CINCPAC have urged that this be done at the time Operation Triangle kicks off. Secretary McNamara has gone into it in detail and concluded that any added air deployments are not needed and that greater deployments would convey a stronger signal than is warranted by the saving of 6–24 hours in reaction time if it should become necessary to introduce forces into Thailand. I agree with this judgment—but again I think the President should be aware that a deployment to Thailand may become an urgent issue if the military situation becomes serious. I would myself bet a fairly substantial sum that we will be carrying out a deployment to Thailand before the fall, either to stabilize the Lao situation or because of developments in Vietnam—and John McNaughton tends to agree. I suspect strongly the Thai would go along under present circumstances, and might indeed welcome it at the appropriate time.

Laos Negotiations

Butler has indicated (London 440)4 that the British are going to play their hand in Moscow by proposing invitations to a 14-nation conference with the preconditions written in. I am a little startled at this, as we had urged that a variant of the Polish proposals be the opening gambit. I cannot but suspect Butler is working to weaken the preconditions to meet Soviet objections, and we may have to work fast on this depending on the reports we get of Butler’s first conversations. In the last analysis, we can always block a 14-nation conference by refusing to attend, assuming we can hold Souvanna to this position, but I think we are in for a worrisome period. The Polish proposals are still by far the best bet, but I am not sanguine that Butler and the Soviets will get together on them. This uncertainty about the existence of an acceptable negotiating track underscores the importance of possible measures to stabilize the military situation on the basis of whatever Operation Triangle is able to achieve. Underlyingly, we may be moving willy-nilly toward a partition in Laos, which has advantages and disadvantages.

William P. Bundy 5
  1. Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron, Jul/Dec 1964. Secret. Bundy’s handwritten note on the source text indicates it was probably dated July 28.
  2. Dated July 28. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 15–1 VIET S)
  3. Dated July 26. (Ibid., POL 27 LAOS)
  4. Dated July 27. (Ibid.)
  5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.