262. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson1
Washington, December 14, 1965, 11:30
a.m.
Here is the inventory of interim things we could do for the Paks if we were so disposed:
- 1.
- The safest thing would be to go ahead with the $39 million worth of loans already authorized during FY 1965. There are six of them—all relatively important. We could indicate that this was a parallel action to the $30 million in fertilizer for India.
- 2.
- We could make a new interim PL 480 agreement, which the Paks are requesting. It would be relatively small as Pakistan’s current food picture is pretty good.
- 3.
- Military aid is much trickier, for the simple reason that it
would be hardest for the Indians to understand at a time when
the cease-fire and withdrawal on which we hinged such resumption
have not yet firmed up.
- a.
- As Ball suggests, we could allow commercial sales to both India and Pakistan. This would help the Paks more because they could buy urgently needed spare parts.2
- b.
- We could quietly allow the Paks to buy from third countries (at present we are blocking US-origin sales).
- c.
- More important and, in my view, more desirable would be simply to indicate that if a good US/Pak relation can be restored, we [Page 501] would be prepared to discuss Pakistan’s future security needs, including MAP and sales. I really don’t think Ayub expects more.
- d.
- Finally, the question of reassurances against India. Arthur Dean and I feel that reiteration of the fact that if Pakistan is allied to us, we would simply not stand by and let India take over Pakistan would be highly valuable to Ayub, given his present acute fear that the Indians have the upper hand. On the other hand, it would be imperative that you avoid the sins of yesteryear by making clear that our assurances simply could not be operative in a situation of other than unprovoked aggression. Ayub knows full well how cloudy the last case was.
R. W. Komer
3