Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

221. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State¹

New Delhi, September 21, 1965, 1800Z.

734. L.K. Jha called tonight (1) to describe Indian position in regard to cease fire resolution and (2) to inquire urgently how US would react to an Indian acceptance in principle of Soviet proposal for mediation.

In regard to Security Council resolution Jha described Indian attitude in following terms:

1. India is worried about Chinese, wants nothing from Paks and is anxious to stop present fighting. Therefore it will agree to an immediate cease fire if the Paks will stop shooting at same time.

2. Although India has no desire to hold Pak territory, return to Aug 5 cease fire line without some safeguards creates serious problems. For one thing there should be an agreement in regard to infiltrators, two thousand of whom are still on Indian side of the line.

Moreover India is reluctant to give up positions it has won on Pak side of C.F.L. that cut off infiltration routes and prevent Paks from dominating key roads that are essential to supply Indian troops facing Chinese in Ladakh until some assurances can be provided that further Pak aggression will be prevented.

Jha believes these questions could be negotiated out either directly through Security Council or through General Nimmo working with reps of the two nations on the ground.

Jha did not take an inflexible position. The GOI he said felt that while the issues involved were manageable, in view of recent developments they could not be ignored.

On the second point, i.e. Soviet proposal for direct negotiations in Tashkent between Ayub Khan and Shastri with Kosygin acting as mediator, Jha requested at earliest possible moment reactions of USG since it was necessary to give Soviets answer on Wednesday² well before Chinese deadline expires.

What, he asked, would we think of such a meeting? Would we consider it helpful, or would it seem to bring Soviets into a role that would not be in US interests? Shastri would appreciate getting our views on highly confidential basis soonest.

Jha added that Kosygin was pushing India hard for a favorable answer. There was a strong view within GOI that it would be advantageous to accept proposal on Wednesday in order to draw the USSR into a more favorable position vis-à-vis threatened Chinese attack.

However Shastri was hesitant to go the whole way. Just as we have shunned summit meetings for which there has been inadequate preparation so he feels confrontation with Ayub Khan in his present mood could not be expected to produce much. Nonetheless Shastri would like to say to the Soviets tomorrow (a) that he accepts in principle but that (b) he would like to carry discussions with Security Council in regard to a settlement somewhat further (c) reserving Kosygin’s proposal for a later stage if needed.

I told Jha that although we could not take responsibility for his government’s decisions on such a crucial question, we appreciated the Prime Minister’s sensitivity for our views and interests, and I would ask my government to provide its informal and confidential evaluation as soon as possible, hopefully by the opening of business Wednesday morning in New Delhi. If you can give me your reactions by then I will be grateful.³

Comment: Although difficult assess Soviet objectives, this gambit has advantage of bringing USSR into a constructive position vis-à-vis ChiComs. Since Paks likely to refuse, I judge proposal to be dead-end street. Nevertheless exercise demonstrates Indian willingness to negotiate.

Bowles

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Flash; Limdis. Repeated to USUN, Karachi, London, Moscow, Hong Kong, and CINCMEAFSA, and passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, and USIA.
2. September 22.
3. The Department authorized Bowles to respond to Jha’s questions concerning the Soviet offer to mediate by expressing appreciation for being consulted, and by indicating that the U.S. Government still considered that the best hope for solution to the conflict lay in action through the United Nations. (Telegram 535 to New Delhi, September 21; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27 INDIA–PAK)