Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

168. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, September 19, 1966, 1835Z.

3362. Subject: General Klein on Erhard’s current mood.

1. General Julius Klein, who is currently visiting in Germany and apparently still has close contacts with the Chancellor and his personal assistant Hohmann (he says he has seen Erhard three times in the past week), has provided us with an account of his various conversations.

2. Klein reported that never before had he seen the Chancellor in such a shaken condition. He is fighting for his political life, and knows that many of his party colleagues are sharpening their knives to take advantage of the first opportunity to finish him off. During his initial meeting with Klein, Erhard seemed scared stiff at the prospect of his impending visit to the United States. He asked Klein what the reaction would be in the United States if he were suddenly to develop a diplomatic illness causing cancellation of the trip. Klein said he responded that no one would believe this, and that he would be finished both in the United States and in Germany. The Chancellor commented this was exactly the way he felt. Klein said the Chancellor had undoubtedly been receiving advice that he should call off the trip from a number of CDU politicians, and probably also from Westrick.²

3. Klein observed that the Chancellor had asked him a number of questions of a kind which he had never raised before. For example, he could not believe that the Mansfield resolution³ had not been put forward without the Executive’s secret blessing. Despite his difficulties with Barzel, the Chancellor went on, he could not imagine the CDU majority leader putting forward a resolution of this kind contrary to his own policies. Klein said he tried to explain to Erhard how our legislative system works in relation to the Executive, and he had hoped he had made some impression on the Chancellor.

4. In their two subsequent conversations, according to Klein, the Chancellor had seemed slightly more relaxed about the prospects for his Washington visit but was still very much a harassed and anxious man. The majority of his advisers are still counselling calling the trip off, and if that is not possible, are telling him that he must come back with some success or he will be politically finished. Since the prospects for a success on the offset are considered dim, the only idea which the Chancellor has so far had would be to obtain the consent of the President for a visit here to show his interest in Europe.

5. Klein said that the Chancellor was suspicious of most of the CDU politicians who were giving him advice. He was afraid that they would gang up against him even during his short absence in the United States, and was trying to gain assurance from party leaders such as Barzel that they would sit on the lid during his trip. Pressure was developing to have the Chancellor take Westrick along, and Erhard at least today seemed to be moving in this direction since it would enable him to prove publicly that he and Westrick are still friends despite the latter’s resignation. On the other hand, it is quite clear, according to Klein, that Westrick would actually be intended to serve as a watchdog over the Chancellor in order to make sure that he made no concessions to the President.

6. The problem of succession to Westrick continues at fever pitch, according to Klein. Party leaders are pressing strongly for designation of the CDU whip, Will Rasner, as State Secretary, although Erhard’s preference is decidely for Hohmann. If Rasner must enter the Chancellor’s office, then Erhard wants two State Secretaries to be designated, one of whom would be Hohmann, but this has run into strong resistance.

7. In the prevailing atmosphere, Klein believes, the Chancellor tends to interpret everything in the light of the immediate effects it will have on his personal political position. This will certainly be true of his visit to the United States. For this reason, the Chancellor will be in no position to make any concessions on such matters as nuclear non-proliferation.

8. Comment: While the foregoing may seem highly colored, allowing for some possible exaggerations, it probably reflects with reasonable accuracy the Chancellor’s current mood. The ebbing of his political position has been so rapid, and the prospect of restoring it must seem so bleak at this juncture, that he has become highly sensitized to the political maneuvering which is normal in Bonn and interprets it—probably with some justification—as directed against him personally. Whether his supicion of individuals is justified is difficult to say at this point, since the Bonn political scene is overheated with rumors and speculation the order of the day.

McGhee

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL 15–1 GER W. Secret; Limdis.
2. McGhee discussed the background to the Erhard visit in At the Creation of a New Germany, pp. 188–189.
3. See footnote 2, Document 165.