249. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia0
1025. Tokyo for Harriman. Dutch confirmed to us today Cabinet decision had been taken to send two destroyers and two submarines through Panama Canal to visit ports on West Coast North America, possibly Vancouver, and a Mexican port. We are not yet sure whether they will wish visit U.S. ports.
Dutch Cabinet over past four or five days has been considering sending these ships to West New Guinea. We understand there was 12-hour Cabinet session in which lines were sharply drawn. Decision not to send vessels to WNG was obtained by opponents of such move only through compromise of movement to West Coast North America. We are convinced that Luns talks in Washington with President and Secretary1 and later discussion here with Van Roijen played major part in final decision not to send vessels to WNG. While we regret Dutch decision, it must be viewed as compromise much less distasteful to Indonesians than original plan which had strong backing in Cabinet. We have absolutely no doubts as to genuine Dutch desire to negotiate in good faith. Visit of vessels to West Coast North America designed in part to allay growing concern in Netherlands for safety of their people in WNG. Dutch Govt view this as obligation which they could not ignore.
In your conversation with Subandrio reported your 16192 he told you that “No one could give binding assurance his Government would [Page 559] not make necessary preparations for its defense whenever these became necessary. By the same token, he said, he would not ask the Dutch to promise not to reinforce West Irian, although if they did so reaction would be most severe.”
Your 1610 of March 83 states that Subandrio agreed with your point that question of Dutch reinforcement WNG and its antipode, Dutch fear of military buildup, were “offsets” and the two parties should reach understanding during secret talks on maintenance of status quo.
We believe restraint which GOI exercised following January 15 naval incident was most constructive and very strongly urge same constructive attitude this development.
We will exert every effort prevent despatch of these vessels any further in direction of WNG while talks are under way. We are in fact convinced that once talks get started, Dutch will not make move of nature which could be interpreted by Indonesia as provocative.
You should see Subandrio soonest, drawing on foregoing and using all persuasive powers necessary prevent violent or otherwise ill-advised GOI reaction.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/3–862. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Bell; cleared by Lindquist, Tyler, and in draft by Rice; and approved by McGhee. Repeated to The Hague, USUN, Geneva for Rusk, and priority to Tokyo.↩
- See Documents 244 and 245.↩
- Dated March 12. (Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/3–1262)↩
- Not printed. (Ibid., 656.9813/3–862)↩