68. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China0
237. Please inform President Chiang at the earliest opportunity that his views reported in your 2991 have been conveyed to President Kennedy and sympathetically considered by both President and Secretary.
The President plans to make it clear at his forthcoming press conference on October eleventh that the United States continues to be strongly opposed to the entry of Communist China into the United Nations and continues to give its strong support to the continued representation of the Republic of China in all UN bodies.2
The President has considered the specific suggestions which President Chiang has put forward for supplementary comments and his conclusion is that specific mention of the Security Council in relation to the Chinese Communists or of a possible veto by the United States would be damaging to our common position in the UN at this time.3 We are collecting support on the issue of the “important question,” and mention of the Security Council or of the veto would both weaken that support and suggest some fear that we might lose in our current effort.
The President wishes, however, to extend once more to President Chiang and through him to all appropriate officers of the GRC his assurance that the purposes of the United States, and his own political objective in this matter, are precisely to prevent admission of Communist China and to sustain the position of the Republic of China both in the United Nations and in the international community.[Page 151]
As you know, the Chinese delegation at the United Nations has already begun to seek assurances from the Brazzaville group of support in the event that the GRC withdraws its veto of Outer Mongolia. These soundings have produced wide African support for GRC on ChiRep issue but if after such conversations the veto of Outer Mongolia were to be reasserted, the effect would be most damaging. Thus it may be useful to suggest that GRC, having begun to change its course, can now reassert veto only at a still higher price to itself and to us. This last point should perhaps be made indirectly to others, rather than to President Chiang himself. It should in no way be presented as a threat from USG.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 303/10-661. Top Secret; Niact. Drafted by Bundy; cleared by Johnson, Wallner, Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs Joseph A. Yager, and in substance by Rusk; and approved by McConaughy and the President. Repeated to USUN. According to notes prepared in Rusk's office, Bundy called Rusk on the morning of October 7 and told him that Kennedy had agreed to make a statement at a press conference. In a subsequent call to Johnson, Rusk said he thought “it might be worth it so we don't give him any excuse on question of losing 8-10 votes.” (Ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls)↩
- Document 67.↩
- At this point, the following sentence is crossed out on the source text: “The President will also make clear his conviction that this policy can be successfully sustained in the UN.”↩
- Drumright reported in telegram 307 from Taipei, October 8, that when he conveyed the substance of telegram 237 to Hsu, the latter expressed the view that it would not satisfy President Chiang, who had sent new instructions to Shen and Yeh directing them to press for supplementary assurances. (Department of State, Central Files, 303/10-861) Telegram 239 to Taipei replied that it was considered neither appropriate nor necessary for the President to go beyond the terms used in telegram 237, and telegram 240 to Taipei informed Drumright, “High quarters our Govt near end of their patience over repeated GRC demands on President in connection handling of ChiRep issue.” (Both dated October 8; ibid.)↩