Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

340. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, November 27, 1962, 4 p.m.

SUBJECT

• The Congo

PARTICIPANTS

• Belgium:
  • Paul-Henri Spaak, Belgian Foreign Minister
  • Robert Rothschild, Chef de Cabinet to Mr. Spaak
  • Vicomte Etienne Davignon, Private Secretary to Mr. Spaak
  • Count Jean d’Ursel, Minister, Belgian Embassy
• U.S.:
  • The President
  • George C. McGhee
  • Amb. Adlai Stevenson
  • Arthur Schlesinger
  • Ralph Dungan
  • Gov. G.M. Williams
  • Harlan Cleveland
  • Amb. Douglas MacArthur
  • William C. Burdett

After welcoming Mr. Spaak, the President said that there were two or three points he wished to discuss, some concerning the Atlantic Community and some concerning the Congo. In the Congo time was running out. The Indian troops would leave shortly, the UN was almost out of money, and the government was unstable. We should see what could be done in concert to be helpful.

The Foreign Minister said that he had already discussed the Congo in the State Department.² The situation was confused and difficult—the Secretary General’s Plan had certainly not met with the full success. Mr. Tshombe did not respond clearly to U Thant’s letter by the November 15 deadline.

There are two possibilities at present, Mr. Spaak continued:

The first one is to request the Secretary General to give the Western Powers a delay of ten days to two weeks, during which conversations would take place with the Léopoldville and Elizabethville authorities. High ranking representatives from the US and Belgium, accompanied by representatives of the UMHK, would go to Léopoldville and seek a meeting with Prime Minister Adoula. They would say that the moment has come when the UMHK ought to pay to the Central Government taxes on its income and to place at the Government’s disposal its foreign currency reserves. Naturally it would be necessary to obtain agreement from Mr. Adoula to receive such a delegation and his agreement is by no means certain. The delegation would urge that Mr. Adoula show himself less obstinate on the constitutional question and agree to consider amendments suggested by Tshombe. He would be asked to issue the amnesty. If agreement is obtained from Adoula, the Mission would then proceed to Elizabethville and state to Tshombe that the solution arrived at in Léopoldville was reasonable. Tshombe would be told that if he rejects the proposal Belgium would have to reconsider its policy toward Katanga and in particular to order the UMHK strongly to pay its taxes to the Central Government. Furthermore, the US would state its readiness fully to support the UN, including the imposition of sanctions. Of course the chances of such a mission would be increased if the UK were to participate. The question of such participation has not yet been resolved.

The second possibility, Mr. Spaak continued, is to propose to U Thant that he call a meeting in New York. In calling this meeting he would say that the first phase of his plan has not met with success and that he would have to pass on to the second and third phases. Before doing so, however, he wished to make one last effort. Accordingly, he was inviting representatives of countries concerned with the Congo, i.e. the US and Belgium, to meet with Mr. Adoula under his auspices in New York. As a second step, Mr. Tshombe would be called upon to appear before the meeting. Mr. Spaak expressed a preference for the second course of action. The difficulty is that the Secretary General might seem to be merely implementing a Western policy. It is, however, necessary to do something. If no action is taken now, the UN would be obliged to move on to sanctions. This would be dangerous. No one could predict Tshombe’s reactions. They could go quite far and lead to military action which could go on for months. We could try out on the Secretary General first the idea of a high-level mission. If that did not work, we could fall back on the second proposal.

The President said that he saw a number of difficulties in having a mission go first to Léopoldville and then to Elizabethville. This might give the impression that the mission is asking for concessions from Prime Minister Adoula, thereby further weakening his position at a time when he may not be strong enough politically to make concessions on the constitution and the amnesty. The President asked what sanctions would be available to make Tshombe decide he must make the necessary arrangements.

The Foreign Minister replied that Mr. Tshombe’s tactics are clear: he wishes to gain time. In consequence his answer would probably be neither yes nor no. He knows that the UN would find it exceedingly difficult to carry its operations into next year. He is no longer afraid of the UN. However, a firm US position might be effective. The Foreign Minister said that if Mr. Tshombe is presented at the meeting in New York with the solution described strongly backed by the US, the UK and Belgium, he may say yes. Belgium would tell him that it is ready to reconsider its policy in regard to Katanga, which means, first of all, a cessation of technical aid, and, secondly, pressure on the UMHK to pay its revenues to the Central Government. The US would say that a refusal on Tshombe’s part would mean full backing on the part of the US for UN sanctions. The UK would have to say that it is not going to oppose such sanctions. There is, therefore, a possibility of acceptance on Tshombe’s part. We must not be naive and we must anticipate that even acceptance may amount only to a device to gain time. An attempt should be made, however; otherwise the UN will pass immediately to sanctions and the consequences are difficult to see. We cannot be sure sanctions will bring Tshombe down quickly. He could hold out for weeks and even months. In fact, sanctions are not a solution. If all the parties concerned speak very firmly to Tshombe, a solution might be obtained. The question now is to choose between the two manners of approach.

The President said that a conference appeared preferable to sending a mission to the Congo. There have been other missions to the Congo but they have produced no results. A conference in New York would bring Adoula, and especially Tshombe, into a new environment; this might be conducive to new ideas. Of course, there are difficulties. The visitors might say that they cannot take any binding decisions without going back to their governments. The President added that it seemed to him that coming to New York would strengthen Adoula, and moving Tshombe out of Elizabethville might bring some realism to him. Tshombe is being assured by his representative in New York, Struelens, that US public opinion is divided.

The Foreign Minister said that he also would prefer a conference. If there is agreement on this point, a joint proposal to this effect might be presented the following morning to U Thant. Both procedures could be mentioned to the Secretary General with the statement that the US and Belgium prefer the second one. It is of course hard to foresee the answer of the Secretary General. There still would be difficulties if U Thant approves. Mr. Bomboko, in his meeting with Spaak the previous day, took a very tough line. Mr. Bomboko said Adoula does not wish to meet with Tshombe on a footing of equality. However, asking Adoula to meet with representatives of the US, the UK and Belgium, and then summoning Mr. Tshombe to appear, should resolve this particular difficulty.

Ambassador Stevenson said he preferred the meeting in New York. Obtaining Adoula’s consent depended on convincing him of the unanimity of our determination to apply sanctions. The British were weak on sanctions. He questioned whether they should be included. If U Thant were not prepared to call a meeting, perhaps it could be held in Brussels. This would be less satisfactory.

The President supported the New York meeting and enquired about sending messages to U Thant immediately.

The Foreign Minister suggested calling on the Secretary General the next morning. He pointed out that any appearance of acting outside of the Secretary General’s plan should be avoided, as it might bring about unfavorable reactions from members of the Congo Advisory Committee, among others. Even the fact that the two countries—the US and Belgium—are making a proposal to the Secretary General places them in an exposed position. Although everyone knows that the Secretary General’s plan was drawn up by the Western powers, there has been no great opposition to it and, in particular, the Soviets have said little. If, however, this policy is openly described as Western, there might be a strong reaction.

The President observed that an invitation on the part of the Secretary General to the Prime Minister of the Congo and the Belgian and US Governments would raise the question of why precisely those parties were invited. Mr. McGhee proposed adding two African members of the CAC.

Governor Williams raised three difficulties:

1) Adoula’s position is shaky and he might fear to leave Léopoldville;

2) Adoula’s aversion to meeting Tshombe, especially outside the Congo;

3) The conference might appear to be just one more meeting.

Mr. McGhee said that this plan offers the inducement of important sums of money paid to the Central Government and also makes clear that sanctions will be seriously considered in the case of failure.

The Foreign Minister commented that it is true that Prime Minister Adoula’s situation is difficult, but he was not sure he would be further weakened if he were to come to New York on the Secretary General’s invitation. He would probably come if it were made quite clear that he would not be on a footing of equality with Tshombe.

The President remarked that the problems raised by Governor Williams were severe but would exist even if a mission were sent to the Congo.

Mr. Spaak said that U Thant should be asked tomorrow what he would do if the proposal failed. We should be able to get a list of the sanctions he had in mind.

The President emphasized that the proposal must be put forward as the Secretary General’s, to which we would respond. The Secretary General in fact would have no alternative but to accept the proposal, since he cannot carry out his own plan without Belgian and American backing. The President asked when should we get in contact with the UK. Perhaps after we have U Thant’s agreement we should say to the UK you are welcome to take part. He noted the need for the UK to go on record and say that it will not oppose sanctions. If U Thant does not agree, we can consider whether to go ahead with a meeting in New York or Brussels.

The Foreign Minister observed that a meeting without the Secretary General would be dangerous since it would create strong opposition within the UN.

Mr. Cleveland explained that after December the Secretary General could not legally pay the approximately $10 million monthly the Congo operation costs without a new resolution of the General Assembly.

The press release was then discussed and agreed upon.³

1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Belgium. Secret. Drafted by Burdett and Glenn. Briefing material for the meeting, enclosed with a November 25 memorandum from Brubeck to Bundy, is in Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11–2562.
2. Spaak met with Rusk and other Department officials at 10:30 that morning and again from noon to 1:20 p.m. Memoranda of the conversations are ibid., 770G.00/11–2762.
3. A joint statement issued that day by Kennedy and Spaak reaffirmed U.S. and Belgian support for the U.N. plan and concluded with the statement that unless there was “substantial progress within a very short period of time,” it would be “necessary to execute further phases” under the plan, including “severe economic measures.” (American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, p. 909) A draft of the statement and related material is in the Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Belgium Security. Telegram 774 to Léopoldville, November 27, called Gullion’s attention to the concluding sentence of the joint statement as a “major step.” (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11–2762)