Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

337. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State¹

Léopoldville, November 26, 1962, 8 p.m.

1204. While Adoula continues to express confidence he will surmount Parliamentary crisis, his opponents and some of supposed supporters do not think he has the votes. (Embtels 1195 and 1187)²

Adoula is maneuvering to prevent no confidence measure from being introduced but thinks it would fail if presented. This is not view of Kamitatu, Mobutu, Nendaka, Bolikango or Ndele.

Adoula has not made final choice of tactics but while saying he will not yield he yields all the same. He has resisted idea of Parliamentary recess but is ready to sacrifice some of his ministers. He tells me he expects individual censure motions against Bomboko, Weregemere, Massa, Dericoyard, Kamitatu, et al. He says he will probably not defend Weregemere, Minister of Justice who made poor show in defending government action in imposing emergency regime in Léopoldville and arresting Parliamentarians for plotting secession. (This measure proved very successful in curbing extraordinary wave of crime in Léopoldville but Parliamentarians claim it aimed at them.) He will stand up for Bomboko and Nendaka but latter’s job may be changed. He will no longer be “Military Governor” but hopefully could stay at Surete.

Adoula will also extend some kind of amnesty but by Presidential Proclamation rather than Legislation. He will not apply it to Gizenga but he cannot resist pressure to spring Gbenye.

Last night Adoula had no plans to lift emergency regime imposed on Léopoldville. He may do so, however, explaining it had accomplished its purpose.

Adoula told me he planning call on non-Parliamentarians and provincial figures to fill gaps which might be created in his government.

This in spite of encouragement he claims to have received from Kasavubu to stand firm, Adoula plans meet crisis by series of compromises and personnel changes. Principal danger at this point is that he will let into government dangerous and undesirable figures.

I took occasion to tell Adoula that we wanted him to continue but not as front for people who would work against us, e.g., Gizenga or his nominees. I told him it would be better for him in that case to resist to end and then resign, in order to conserve his influence and integrity.

Adoula received this in good part. Said he had warned US repeatedly that this might happen. I rejoined that he must be aware all support we had given him to prevent its happening and that only just recently we had stepped up our material aid. Adoula acknowledged our support but said that what survival of his policies required was commitment and visible proof that US and UN were going to end Katanga secession or let him do it. Even though it might be too late. If what we were now doing had been done a year ago or if Kitona had not intervened, everything would have succeeded. He was now “used up” physically and influence. [sic]

As for quitting and fighting from the outside, this was all very well but he would probably land in jail instead. I urged him not to abandon his Congolese collaborators. He replied he could not part with his arms and hers. [sic] I said Bomboko was carrying out delicate work for him at critical time. Adoula answered that when “they” attacked Bomboko “they” were attacking him.

Adoula has been giving UN and Western Ambassadors more optimistic picture than foregoing. He said he might call in several and bring them up to date. I urged that he make same pledge to them that he has repeatedly made to prominent Americans: i.e. that whatever his successors might do he would never turn to Casablanca group nor the Soviet bloc. Adoula appeared to give this deep consideration but made no commitment.

I told Adoula that I had heard reports that Parliament might be recessed for 30 days. Speaking without instruction I said Adoula should not assume US support of his government would be affected if such a decision were taken. It might be best thing at this time when irresponsible Parliament had taken the bit in its teeth. Adoula said Parliamentarians themselves had spread this rumor perhaps because they feared such a decree. Kasavubu had not, however, taken any such decision.

Kasavubu had told him to stand firm but Adoula was not sure of firmness of Kasavubu’s support.

I said that I planned to see Kasavubu and would welcome Adoula’s suggestions. I planned to ask why Kasavubu’s Abako party was launching action which threatened not GOC but also Kasavubu’s own policies and even his political survival. Adoula urged that I take just this line. He said Abako and Moanda Vital³ were being subverted by Tshombe and some elements of new [apparent omission] were profiting by difficulties of government to revive their own pre-independence separatism. He thought, however, that they were too divided to be consistently effective.

Adoula repeatedly declared that the real issue was Katanga and not “military government” in Léopoldville. No government could survive failure to solve Katanga problem.

I then attempted to tell Adoula that USG still firm in wishing to see secession ended and were taking new steps to help. In the absence of requested instructions I was handicapped by being unable to tell him of any firm new decisions by US Government. Best cards I had to play were Under Secretary McGhee’s latest letter to Tshombe⁴ and information obtained from Godley telecon that delivery of rockets approved in principle.⁵ Adoula particularly pleased at McGhee letter which he said would have “shock value” since Tshombe would not have “expected it from McGhee”. I said I hoped we would be in position to make public some statements expressing the views and recommendations made in letter to Tshombe.

Adoula asked repeatedly about US intentions with respect to U Thant plan and effect upon it of recent consultations in Brussels and New York.

I gave Adoula a positive version of the proposed scheme of payment of taxes and revenues to central government by UMHK (which he knew about from press and radio) omitting for sake of his depressed morale references to its highly conditional aspect and any doubts that it could really cut into Tshombe’s combat and secessionist potential. I did tell him that it was in no way a substitute for the plan. He asked whether UMHK had brought him settlement he had made with diamond companies. I affirmed that they had and this played important part. Adoula expressed keen interest in payment scheme but expressed hope that it would not delay application of U Thant plan. He then asked about ability of UN to persevere in Congo. In answer I did not refer to SYG’s statements on financial crisis but did allude to well known problem of Indian withdrawals.

Comment: Adoula keeps up bold front but is unconvincing. In a way he is pleased to see matters come to a head even if it means personal reverse.

I must say that settlement he contemplates will be a heavier defeat than he is ready to recognize. If he releases people he has jailed for treason (and with cause), and if character of his new government is strongly influenced by them, it is difficult to see where Adoula can dig in his heels. Not only will his influence in his own government be reduced, but also Parliament having found way to lick him will do so again and again.

If Mobutu and Nendaka still support him they, together with his own perseverance and relatively superior intelligence, may hold things nominally together. But this influence will have been sadly reduced. Failure to solve Katanga will mean the end of an Adoula authority which is already becoming shadowy. Mobutu’s authority in Army is already endangered.

Recommendations: (A) If I am able to learn that the composition of any new government (whether headed by Adoula or other) would be Gizengist or Commie-lining [leaning?], I believe US should favor proroguing Parliament for 30 days during which maximum effort would be made to settle Katanga issue. This would be legal measure and would check spread in Parliament which is bad for us and bad for Congo.

Mobutu would back this one although he claims he could not back a coup d’etat. I shall sound Kasavubu on it tomorrow.⁶ (B) A variant would be to dissolve Parliament definitely [indefinitely?], proceed to consultations on new government and call meanwhile for Constituent Assembly to which members would be named by Assemblies of new provincial Parliaments. This would be still more adaptable to requirement of U Thant plan and would appease Belgian and Western opinion at same time it gives chance to turn back leftists. It does some violence to Loi Fondamentale but there may be merit in recognizing its demise. (C) During next three days U Thant plan should be applied integrally including pressure stages. Any propositions of British or Belgians which tend to delay it should be rejected. Even if 30 days recess is not called, US should press for execution of plan.

It may already be too late for above. As this is written I learned that a decree has been signed releasing Gbenye and the other Parliamentarians imprisoned with him. Pressures will build up for release of Gizenga.

Would welcome Department’s views soonest.

Gullion

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11–2662. Confidential; Niact. Received at 5:30 p.m. and repeated to USUN, Brussels, Elisabethville, London, and New Delhi.
2. Dated November 25 and 24, respectively. (Ibid., 770G.00/11–2562 and 770G.00/ 11–2462)
3. One of the leaders of the Abako (Alliance des Ba-Kongo) Party.
4. The message, transmitted in telegram 445 to Elisabethville, November 24, declared that “additional and decisive steps” were necessary, without delay, to bring about a peaceful solution of the Katanga issue. McGhee referred to recent reported Katangan air operations in north Katanga and stated, “If these air operations continue, they can easily bring retaliation against your aircraft—or resumption of widespread hostilities.” He further stated, “There is, I am afraid, little time to make forward movement under the Plan on the basis of voluntary actions and negotiations—before the UN will come under increasing pressure to take more positive measures.” (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11–2462)
5. Telegram 764 to Léopoldville, November 25, confirmed the information that Godley had given Gullion that a “reasonable quantity rockets for Harvards” would be supplied as evidence of U.S. support and that three aircraft capable of lifting vehicles would be made available to the U.N. forces for internal airlift. (Ibid., 332.70G/11–2562) On November 11, Adoula had requested U.S. assistance in procuring rockets for Congolese Harvard aircraft to counter Katangan air attacks in north Katanga. (Telegram 1113 from Léopoldville, November 12; ibid., 770G.5/11–1262)
6. Telegram 1225 from Léopoldville, November 27, which reported Gullion’s conversation that day with Kasavubu, reads in part as follows: “I then told Kasavubu, making clear I spoke without instructions, that if government seemed headed for defeat, one way out might be to adjourn the parliament for thirty days or even to call a constituent assembly to replace present parliament. I did not think these measures would affect the attitude of my government toward his. Kasavubu appeared to appreciate this hint. He did, however, say he wished to stick to legality and Loi Fondamentale was considerably better than people claimed. It reposed powers in the Chief of State which enabled him to deal with cabinet crisis.” (Ibid., 770G.00/11–2762)