93. Despatch 673 from Quito, May 91
REF: DepTel 624, May 3, 1961. SUBJECT: U.S. Military Relationship with Ecuador.
[Typeset Page 233]A number of recent developments have led to my giving considerable thought to the question of the United States relationship with Ecuador on military matters, particularly involving sales or grants of military equipment to this country.
There have been numerous well-based reports that the Ecuadoreans particularly following the enlivening of the boundary issue, intend to buy arms from the U.S., from friendly Western European sources, or possibly from the bloc. The Department’s recent statement of position on purchases of arms by Ecuador is contained in its Telegram 602 of April 25. It is the Embassy’s belief that, in view of the various considerations which make it probable that the Ecuadoreans will make arms purchases in any event, following the position set out in DepTel 602 will tend to leave a vacuum which makes it likely that Ecuador will make purchases from Czechoslovakia or another bloc source. Furthermore, this puts the United States in the position of appearing opposed to Ecuadorean determination to provide for self-defense, a course the GOE is most likely to follow in any event. Difficult as that situation is, it is aggravated by the related question of the extent to which the United States sells military equipment to Peru. The Quito press on May 1 carried a story that the Peruvian Air Force had announced the purchase of ten C–46 aircraft which were said to be used for supplying jungle units. The story continued that in June the first ten of 25 T–33 jet trainers which had been purchased in the United States would arrive in Peru. Such accounts are, of course, followed closely by the Ecuadorean military establishment and indicate to them that we favor Peru over Ecuador. The Embassy would appreciate verification of the details of this story about Peruvian acquisition of aircraft in the United States.
[Facsimile Page 2]Because of the difficulties of our position the Embassy welcomed the receipt of the Department’s telegram 624 of May 3 relating to an examination with the Ecuadoreans of “realistic requirements”, keeping in mind the objective of minimizing arms purchases. It seems to the Embassy that we should work with the Ecuadoreans to do what we can to influence them along the lines of our own thinking and assist in acquiring those “realistic requirements”, rather than being frozen out and providing a favorable situation for bloc suppliers. This is particularly important since bloc technicians accompany bloc arms.
This suggested approach is intended to maximize U.S. military influence in Ecuador which is now at the low point of recent years and which would doubtless fall considerably lower should we attempt a different approach. A related matter is the future of the military assistance program in Ecuador. The Chief of MAAG recently submitted to me his FY 63–67 plan for MAP in Ecuador. He informed me that shortly after it was submitted he learned informally that a decision [Typeset Page 234] had been made in Washington that funds for force improvement would not be available commencing FY 1962, which would limit the MAP program solely to follow-on support, replacements and spares. This will cause termination of force improvement projects only recently programmed for introduction with deliveries extending over several years. If this decision is maintained, it seems to me that the timing could not have come at a worse time in the light of the present situation in Ecuador.
In summary, the Embassy welcomed DepTel 624 and will work closely with the Chief of MAAG in discussing with the Ecuadorean military the matter of “realistic requirements”. I have already discussed the matter with Foreign Minister Chiriboga (see EmbTel 599, May 8) who will initiate discussions with the Ministry of Defense as a basis for later joint discussions with Chief of MAAG.
cc: AmGenGen—GUAYAQUIL
Ecuador Desk Officer, ARA.
CINCARIB
- U.S. military relationship with Ecuador. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 722.5–MSP/5–961.↩