1. In response to a Presidential requirement levied by Mr. McGeorge Bundy [illegible in the
original], we have collaborated with CIA in a new assessment (attachment) of the status of
Soviet military personnel in Cuba. Prime conclusions follow:
2. Since the October crisis of 1962, the Soviets have been engaged in a
continuing program of withdrawing military personnel from Cuba. Most of
the Soviets still in Cuba are advisers and technicians engaged in
training Cuban personnel in the operation of Soviet weapons, in
supervising the use and maintenance of Soviet equipment turned over to
the Cubans, and in operating and controlling the surface-to-air missile
(SAM) system. We believe that no
organized Soviet ground combat units remain in Cuba and that the only
Soviet ground forces personnel remaining are those advising Cuban
military units. Based on our continuing appraisal of Soviet activity, we
estimate Soviet military strength in Cuba at present to be about five to
seven thousand, although it may be even lower.
Attachment
JOINT CIA–DIA MEMORANDUM
OCI No.
3158/63
October 24,
1963
SUBJECT
- Assessment of Status of Soviet Military Personnel in
Cuba
Summary
1. Since the October crisis of 1962, the Soviets have been engaged in
a continuing program of withdrawing military personnel from Cuba.
Most of the Soviets still in Cuba are advisers and technicians
engaged in training Cuban personnel in the operation of Soviet
weapons, in supervising the use and maintenance of Soviet equipment
turned over to the Cubans, and in operating and controlling the
surface-to-air missile (SAM)
system. We believe that no organized Soviet ground combat units
remain in Cuba and that the only Soviet ground forces personnel
remaining are those advising Cuban military units. Based on our
continuing appraisal of Soviet activity, we estimate Soviet military
strength in Cuba at present to be about five to seven thousand,
although it may be even lower.
2. Of the Soviet weapons introduced into Cuba during the military
buildup last year, all—with the exception of the surface-to-air
missiles, and possibly the coastal defense cruise missiles and
FROGs—have either been withdrawn from the island or transferred to
Cuban control. The present trend involves continuing efforts to
improve Castro’s independent military capabilities. By mid-1964,
Cubans probably will be trained to operate all remaining Soviet
weapons, including the surface-to-air missiles. As Cuban proficiency
increases, additional reductions in Soviet military personnel
probably will take place until only a Soviet military assistance and
technical advisory establishment remains.
Withdrawal of Soviet military personnel
3. Since our last assessment in early October, at least 1,000
probable Soviet military personnel have departed. At least 13,000
and probably closer to 16,000 Soviet military personnel have
departed since October 1962. Most of these have been withdrawn since
February. We continue to lack verifiable evidence of the arrival of
more than a few hundreds of Soviet military personnel since last
October.
[Facsimile Page 3]
Status of Soviet weapons under Cuban
control
4. Cubans are currently being trained in the use of all Soviet weapon
systems remaining on the island. At least [less
than 1 line not declassified]
[Typeset Page 1830]
Cuban pilots have achieved a
limited combat proficiency in the MIG–21 jet fighters, and additional pilots are being
trained. These aircraft were recently transferred to Cuban control
and most of the Soviet personnel associated with the MIGs have been withdrawn. Cuban
personnel assumed control of the 12 Komar guided missile patrol
boats in August, at which time Soviet personnel associated with
these vessels left Cuba except for a small number of advisers and
technicians.
5. Most Soviet ground forces personnel have been withdrawn from Cuba.
Those ground forces personnel remaining—probably between 1,500 and
2,500—are involved in training Cuban units throughout the island.
Available evidence suggests that the [less than 1
line not declassified] armored camps have been transferred
to Cuban control. The Soviet T–54/55 tanks and other equipment at
the camps, with the possible exception of FROGs, have been turned
over to the Cubans and some of the equipment moved to Cuban training
installations and operational units.
6. The Cubans probably began training in cruise missile operations
some months ago and it is possible that the Soviets may have
transferred this weapon system to Cuban control. There are probably
no more than five hundred Soviet personnel remaining in Cuba
associated with the cruise missiles and the number may be
substantially lower if the Cubans have in fact assumed some degree
of responsibility for the system.
The surface-to-air missile and air defense
system
7. The Soviet SAM and air
surveillance system in Cuba is currently manned and controlled by
about three to four thousand personnel. A large number of Cubans are
now receiving classroom training in surface-to-air missile
operations and are scheduled to begin operational field training in
November. By mid-1964, enough Cubans probably will have been trained
to operate the entire SAM system
including all of its radar and communications components.
8. A major reorganization of the air defense system is now in
progress in Cuba. Since mid-September one third of the SAM sites have been relocated. The
pattern of relocations indicates a shift from an island-wide SAM coverage to polar defense of major
Cuban cities and military installations. In the process, the SAM guidance radar previously in use
is being exchanged for older radar equipment, signifying an intent
on the part of the Soviets to transfer the system to Cuban
control.
