Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement

444. Debriefing by U. Alexis Johnson, October 28¹

October 28, 1962, 12:45 p.m.

Attended by:

• EUR—Mr. Tyler
• IO—Mr. Cleveland
• S/P—Mr. Rostow
• INR—Mr. Hilsman
• G/PM—Mr. Kitchen
• G/PM—Mr. Weiss
• S/S—Mr. Brubeck
• S/S–S—Miss Moor
• NEA—Mr. Talbot

Mr. Johnson emphasized that there should be no euphoria pointed to Castro’s insistence upon obtaining Guantanimo. Mr. Hilsman added that 24 missiles are now operational, that the defense network inside Cuba is now tied in completely to the Soviet network, there is a [less than 1 line not declassified] to Cuban communications networks, and a single code work, unbroken, [less than 1 line not declassified]. Moreover, we also know that there is tremendous confusion inside the governmental aparatus with no consistent decision yet with regard to firing or not firing, etc. Moreover, feverish work has continued on the missile sites and on various defense arrangements, obviously geared toward a possible invasion. Mr. Johnson said the ExCom had decided that there should be no reconnaissance today. There would, however, be a reconnaissance tomorrow either by the UN or by us. A team has gone to New York (Chryk, Forrestal, Sisco, Cleveland) to work out with the UN a UN reconnaissance mission. Alternatives are:

1. U.S. Aircraft with a UN personnel on board

2. Loaning a plane, pilot, etc with UN insigna (The difficulty here is that there is not time to paint on the insigna. If the paint is not thoroughly dry the friction from the high speed of these plans peels it off.

3. Sell a plane to the UN

4. Have the UN Charter the planes from Fairchild.

5. Use Canadian Planes

Mr. said that after the meeting further discussion led to 3 alternatives at this point; namely, a two step arrangement with the UN. The first few days the UN would in effect hire the U.S. Air Force. The second step would be in the next few days after that to have multilateral teams using U.S. equipment. If it is clear that there will be no retaliatory firing on the reconnaissance planes could be used. The Executive Committee decided to send Rikkye all intelligence data on missiles it is possible to get together.

Guidance was given with regard to a reply to Khrushchev’s letter received this morning. The President at a noon meeting stated that a formal reply will be issued at about 3:00 p.m. Ambassador Thompson will prepare the basic reply. Mr. Johnson will prepare the language with regard to Khrushchev’s complaint about U2 flights. Foster will prepare a language on disarmament. Mr. Johnson said that CIA—Ray Cline—and Defense—Bill Bundy—would see the draft of the letter but not be involved with the drafting.

U Thant is replying to Soviet Union, U.S. and Castro persumably accepting gratefully our willingness to negotiate.

Stevenson called the President this morning giving an account of his conversations with U Thant. McGeorge Bundy is bring a copy over to Mr. Johnson at 1:30 p.m. today. The Secretary will speak to the OAS at 5:00 p.m. today to get agreement to our new moves.

Castro’s subversion was brought up. Our statement in the letter should be similar to our previous statements; namely, that we will not attack the island as long as they behave.

Mr. Johnson also announced that Kuz Nep Sov [Kuznetsov] is arriving at the UN tonight.

Attachment

Carol:

I typed this up in very rough draft since there were several places that I didn’t get or couldn’t read. Sue

1. Current situation in Cuban missile crisis. Top Secret. 4 pp. DOS, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 75 D 265, NSC Debriefings 1962.