38. Memorandum of conversation, December 12, among President Allessandri, President Kennedy, and other officials1

[Facsimile Page 1]

SUBJECT

  • Chile and Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

  • CHILE

    • President Alessandri
    • Foreign Minister Martinez
    • Senator Angel Faivovich
    • Finance Minister Mackenna
    • Ambassador Walter Muller
    • Ambassador Sergio Gutierrez
    • Ambassador Manuel Trucco
    • Sr. Alfonso Echeverria (Interpreter)
  • UNITED STATES

    • Acting Secretary Ball
    • Assistant Secretary Edwin Martin
    • Ambassador Charles Cole
    • Mr. Fernando van Reigersberg, LS (Interpreter)
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Mr. Ball started the meeting after the Chilean luncheon by reviewing the current situation in Cuba. The U.S. had determined that the Soviet missiles had been dismantled and removed, and the IL–28 aircraft were being returned to the USSR. While some four or five thousand military technicians had left, some 12,000 still remained. The U.S. does not know whether the latter would also leave, but this would be demanded by the U.S. in negotiations with the USSR. The outcome of those negotiations is uncertain. The continued presence of those forces, equipped with sophisticated weapons and antiaircraft surface-to-air missiles, has to be regarded as a serious danger. While the weapons are defensive, they represent a serious Soviet commitment to Cuba. The cost of Soviet military matériel in Cuba has been estimated at $1 billion, which is a serious commitment indeed.

Mr. Ball continued that the first phase of the Cuban crisis has been overcome, and the U.S. is “substantially satisfied” with the removal of weapons of aggression. But the situation will not be over completely until the [Facsimile Page 2] Soviet forces leave, and Castro ceases to be a threat to the peace and security of this hemisphere. Since the Soviet record is one of deception, U.S. surveillance must continue. While Khrushchev had promised the removal of offensive weapons and adequate safeguards, the latter have not been forthcoming, as the Soviets are adamant in opposition to on-site inspection. The Soviets may have no choice because Castro himself probably has told them that inspection is out of the question. Thus, the U.S. has no choice but to continue systematic surveillance of Cuba, through regular, high-altitude flights. The U.S. hopes that the first phase of the Cuban crisis will be over in a few weeks, when negotiations with the Soviets are completed.

Mr. Martin emphasized that this would still leave the problems of Soviet ground forces and Castro. On the latter, there are no encouraging signs. Recent Cuban radio broadcasts have been as vitriolic as ever, especially against Guatemala, Honduras, Haiti, Venezuela, the Dominican Republic and, interestingly enough, Peru. Minister Guevara’s recent speech clearly indicated his objective is to propagate guerrilla warfare in this hemisphere, and for some reason he singled out Peru.

President Alessandri strongly indicated that the GOC’s position had been well-known, clear and “eminently juridical”. The GOC interpreted recent Cuban developments as a violation of Article 6 of the Rio Treaty and the GOC gave its warmest support to the OAS resolution of October 23. Now it was up to the OAS, and not to any one country, to apply the provisions of the Treaty. He described how he personally had acted at the time of the OAS resolution, to avoid possible harmful delay by the GOC.

Mr. Martin expressed the gratitude of the U.S. for that quick response. He apologized for the speed with which the entire matter [Typeset Page 89] had been handled, but emphasized that no other procedure would have worked so effectively. He said that now Cuba has to be watched very carefully; Castro has collaborated with the Soviets on one risky venture, and there is no reason to believe it could not happen again.

[text not declassified]

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President Alessandri asked Mr. Martin what he should say if questioned by the press on Cuban-Chilean relations. Mr. Martin replied that this was a decision that only the GOC could make. The interests of the Chilean people were paramount, but Chile also should take into consideration its position in the hemisphere and its obligations within the OAS.

President Alessandri replied, somewhat humorously, that he had hoped for a briefer answer, but that he would emphasize that Chile’s position on Cuba has been made very clear and that the issue now has become one which the OAS will have to handle.

Mr. Martin said that if it were thought that a break in relations between Chile and Cuba could be helpful, it should be considered very seriously. The matter also could be discussed in the OAS. The issue is a hemispheric one, and not a dispute between the U.S. alone and Cuba. The U.S. often has stressed the danger of Soviet Embassies in unstable, underdeveloped countries, because of their espionage and subversive activities. By the same token, a Western embassy could play a very useful role in a Communist country such as Cuba. President Alessandri indicated his agreement.

Foreign Minister Martinez said that an example of Chilean-U.S. cooperation was when Chile joined with Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay in requesting the Cuban Government to accede to removal of the IL–28 aircraft. If Chile can play such a valuable role in the future, it would welcome the opportunity to contribute to the security of the hemisphere. It is important that the dialogue between Chile and Cuba remain unhampered, to permit the flow of information of value to the hemisphere.

Mr. Martin agreed, but emphasized that this could not be done publicly and that the utmost secrecy is vital.

President Alessandri asked what the positions of Brazil and Mexico were, regarding Cuba.

Mr. Martin said that Mexico seems to have a position similar to Chile. The U.S. believes that if a general decision regarding Cuba were taken by the [Facsimile Page 4] OAS, the Mexican Government would agree. In Brazil, the situation is not quite as clear. Brazil still thinks that it can help Cuba to re-enter the inter-American community, and build up Castro as a true Latin American revolutionary.

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Mr. Ball commented that Brazil’s position was very ambivalent. President Alessandri agreed with that statement, ending the meeting by saying there could be no doubt as to Chile’s position on this matter.

  1. Chile and Cuba. Secret. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Chile, December 1963.