Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement

301. Telegram 77871 from McCone, September 18¹

September 18, 1962, 2104Z

Opim [less than 1 line not declassified]. Eyes Only [less than 1 line not declassified] from [less than 1 line not declassified].*

Re: [less than 1 line not declassified] (In 23209).**

1. No doubt that Cuban economic resources capable of substantial development given better management and sufficient capital investment. SNIE 85–3, before USIB tomorrow, recognizes this as a probable Soviet intention and that the objective is to stimulate communist political action elsewhere in Latin America. As noted in 85–2 (1 Aug), however, present state of Cuban economy is very bad and substantial upturn will be delayed until after 1963.

2. SNIE 85–3 discusses in detail possibility of introduction of MRBMs into Cuba, but judges this to be unlikely because of risk of U.S. intervention involved unless there is a radical change in Soviet policy not presently indicated. Such a change would have implications extending far beyond Cuba. We know from our briefing that government top level realizes possibility of developments shielded from our detection once SA–2’s operative. SNIE 85–3 stresses that there is a middle ground in which defensive or offensive character of buildup is a matter of interpretation. Various alternatives explored. Again we know ambiguities of offensive-defensive distinction brought to top level attention before public statements formulated.

C/S comment: *Dissemination same as referenced cable.

**Cable from [less than 1 line not declassified] to [less than 1 line not declassified] concerning the Soviet buildup of Cuba.

1. Review of SNIE 85–3 regarding Soviet buildup in Cuba. Secret. 2 pp. CIA Files: Job 80B1676R, Box 17, Mongoose, Cuban Reconnaissance/Overflights.