Attachment
Although there is no question that we must show flexibility and
willingness to examine any reasonable suggestions, I believe that we
MUST at the same time transmit the
following basic premises at some point. How and in just what
language is obviously a matter of tactics and depends on the way the
session is progressing.
1. Flexibility must be weighed against the past and also against an
important present fact of life. As far as the past is concerned, we
have varied the plan considerably and have also carefully examined a
number of possibilities which were discarded as being inadequate
(e.g. series of small landings, single night landing, taking of Isle
of Pines, trying to capture airfield in Zapata, etc.) Consequently,
there has been history of change and attempts at adjustment.
The applicable present circumstance is the Cuban Strike Force. The
Cubans cannot be ordered to do anything. True
they do not know the present plan but they do know their weapons,
including planes and tanks, and they do know that a landing in full
force is planned. Present plans No. 1 and No. 5 are within the scope
of the action for which they volunteered. Anything else should be
cleared with their leaders and might not be accepted, but surely
should not be accepted until cleared.
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2. The long process of analysis has brought forward two plans. These
have been meticulously cleared with DOD. We are prepared to negotiate in connection with
them any contingencies or conditions, laid down by the DOD. These plans are not necessarily
the last word but they have been determined
to have a good chance, to be effective and there should be some
reasonable alternative put forward, not just a haphazard suggestion,
to require full scale planning of something new. (This assumes that
we have knocked down the Mann “slow build-up” scheme.)
3. There appear to be misconceptions about present plans:
a. Air activity is limited. Straffing of specific targets will be
involved, not indiscriminate bombing and two aircraft is probably
the most that will be seen at any one time. Moreover, there will
probably never be more than four over the whole of Cuba at any one
time.
b. It is NOT a U.S. operation. Surely there are and will be
allegations and evidence of U.S. support. The operation, however, is
by Cuban volunteer patriots, operating
entirely from non-U.S. bases. These Cubans cannot be ordered to do anything (could be if a U.S.
operation). They will be patriotically fighting to install a
Cuban-selected provisional government. The only foreign government with any jurisdiction over them is the
Guatemalan government and it cannot order them to invade, it can
only attempt to [Facsimile Page 4] impose rules or sanctions within Guatemala.
The U.S. need not feel sorry for the governments of Guatemala and
Nicaragua, they know what they are doing and the Ydigoras letter plus the Alejos
trip do not indicate any hesitancy on the parts of the Guats. All equipment being used is easily
purchasable and is in many countries already. Deniability, though
tenuous, will exist. Moreover, any other form of action will be laid
at the U.S. door and in the case of the Mann “slow build-up” approach will involve much more
U.S. participation.
4. Despite foregoing, greater flexibility would be possible if it
were not for the unavoidable time urgency. Cannot change rainy
season, moon phase, post factors bearing on morale or fact that time
generally running against us.
5. Nothing succeeds so much as success. Consequently, the plan most
likely to succeed has many advantages in the long run over one which
modifies this chance in order to gain temporary political benefits.
Such temporary benefits would be of little value against the loss of
the ultimate goal or even at the expense of unduly extending the
conflict which will tend to force U.S. participation and offer
opposition forces and efforts an opportunity to organize and
accentuate their effect.
In conclusion, I believe that we must not undersell what we have
carefully prepared and on which a favorable DOD reaction has been obtained after detailed review.
[Facsimile Page 5] It is
easy for State to throw all sorts of [Typeset Page 609] wild or unanalyzed
possibilities into the hopped on the theory that ANYTHING might
conceivably work and the burden of proving impossibility is on us.
In view of time and history, we should ask to be let out rather than
be forced to review any new plan which doesn’t on its face contain
REAL possibilities and REAL advantages. It must be remembered that
our two plans have been tested and passed as feasible by the
authorities in government having the proper jurisdiction.
