225. Memorandum from Clint E. Smith to the Latin American Policy Committee, September 211
SUBJECT
- VENEZUELA—Plan of Action for Period to March 2, 1964
The attached plan of action for Venezuela during the period from the present until March 2, 1964, the end of the Betancourt Administration’s term of office, was approved by the Latin American Policy Committee on September 13, 1962. Each member of the Committee is requested to integrate these actions into the programs of his respective agency.
A. OBJECTIVES
1. To have the Betancourt Administration complete its term of office democratically and constitutionally on March 2, 1964.
2. To increase the stability of the Betancourt Administration in order to strengthen the prospects for continued democratic civilian government in Venezuela.
3. To encourage the Venezuelan Armed Forces to remain loyal, support the Betancourt Administration and, when called on, suppress insurgencies fomented by opponents of democratic, constitutional government.
4. To assist the Betancourt Administration in rapidly carrying out a sound reform and development program to achieve orderly economic, social and political progress.
5. To support and encourage the orientation of Venezuela’s Government and people toward individual freedom, national independence and economic and social progress under a democratic system.
6. To prevent the growth of Communist strength or influence in Venezuela or the conversion of Venezuela into a beachhead for the propagation of such strength or influence elsewhere in the Hemisphere.
7. To encourage continued Venezuelan cooperation in action to isolate, weaken and promote the downfall of the Cuban Communist Regime.
B. PLAN OF ACTION
I. Political
1. Emphasize United States support for the constitutional, democratic Betancourt Administration in public statements by or messages [Typeset Page 540] from high United States officials on appropriate state occasions or in the event of serious threats against the Betancourt Administration.
[Facsimile Page 2]2. Have our diplomatic and consular officials in Venezuela communicate the foregoing sentiment, as appropriate, to Venezuelan military officers, politicians, businessmen, journalists, and public opinion leaders. Indicate when necessary that the United States would view with grave concern the overthrow of elected constitutional government and its replacement by an unrepresentative authoritarian regime of the Right or Left. We would consider such a development as being contrary to the purposes and principles of the inter-American system and prejudicial to the objectives of the Alliance for Progress; and it would necessitate re-examination of our relations and existing cooperation with Venezuela in this context.
3. Discourage would-be subversives of any kind who seek United States acquiescence in or encouragement of their activities to overthrow the Betancourt Administration.
4. Discourage conspiratorial activities against the Betancourt Administration by dissident Venezuelans residing in or visiting the United States. Undertake legal action against such persons if we have reason to believe they have violated United States laws by engaging in anti-Betancourt activities.
5. Identify and encourage democratically-oriented and socially conscious leadership, which may be politically dormant, to take an active and constructive part in the political life of Venezuela as a means of broadening the political base of forces which can effectively carry out Venezuela’s economic and social progress under a democratic system.
6. In the event Venezuelan democratic political leaders seek our intercession in Venezuelan internal political problems, we should express our interest in the cooperation of all responsible elements, who adhere to representative democracy and constitutionality, in making the democratic system operate effectively to achieve political stability and social and economic progress in which we are prepared to assist. In responding, we should avoid even an appearance of intervening in Venezuelan internal political conflicts or becoming too closely identified with any political party or faction, not excluding that of President Betancourt.
[text not declassified]
[Facsimile Page 3] [Facsimile Page 4]III. Labor
(Several of the following are general statements largely complementing the more detailed presentation in a separate AID/LA Policy Consideration Paper.)
1. Assist Venezuela in maintaining a free labor force in support of the present government and resisting left extremist attempts at creating parallel organizations to the CTV.
[Typeset Page 541]2. Assist Venezuela in preparing its labor force in various skills, trades and professions to facilitate optimum development of human resources.
3. Assist Venezuela in training government labor officials to provide effective government labor services and strengthen labor-management-government relations.
[Facsimile Page 5]4. Assist the democratic leadership of the Venezuelan labor movement through leader grants and worker education programs to strengthen its internal trade union administration so that it may be more effective in Venezuelan economic and social programs.
5. Encourage the Venezuelan Confederation of Labor and its affiliates to enlarge their contacts with ORIT and the International Trade Secretariats (ITS) to augment the possibilities of establishing trade union leadership training programs, improving collective bargaining techniques, etc.
IV. Economic and Social
(Several of the following are general statements largely complementing the more detailed presentation in a separate AID/LA Policy Consideration Paper.)
1. Join our AID, Food for Peace and Peace Corps programs, as appropriate, with other free world sources of assistance in the Alliance for Progress, to help the Venezuelan Government to strengthen the Venezuelan economy as rapidly as possible and continue progressive social development efforts in direct impact projects in the fields of housing, education, agrarian reform, health and community services.
2. Intensify our efforts to work with the Venezuelan Government to improve its reform projects and to institute other self-help measures such as a unified exchange rate, further tax reforms, liberalization of the central government’s borrowing authority, further reduction of government operating costs, and improvement of public administration.
3. Assist Venezuela in developing and implementing a sound program which will stimulate a maximum use of private funds and enterprise to induce economic recovery.
4. Assist Venezuela in developing an effective cadre of public administrators and instructors to train lower and middle echelon public servants in specialized fields.
5. Assist Venezuela in stabilizing the rural population through more effective implementation of its agrarian reform program, including: supervised agricultural credit; commercial agricultural development; and rural health, welfare and community services.
6. Assist Venezuela in increasing industrial production by encouraging private capital and initiative; and in implementing sound, [Facsimile Page 6] labor- [Typeset Page 542] intensive programs, such as private and public housing, which will create employment opportunities in the cities.
7. Assist Venezuela in setting up and carrying out a savings and loan system for middle class housing; and in developing and initiating a long-range housing program for urban centers to clear slums and provide decent, hygienic, low-cost housing units.
8. Utilize the Peace Corps to:
a. help expand the programs of the non-denominational Venezuelan YMCA to help urban youth to develop socially and to become better citizens;
b. assist the Venezuelan Government’s efforts to make its newly established University of the East a model of social responsibility and scholarship;
c. supplement the efforts of the Venezuelan 4–H (5–V Clubs) organizations to increase agricultural production and improve the rural standard of living in the Western Andean region.
9. Encourage the Venezuelan Government to foster a climate of security for beneficial foreign private capital investment by clearly enunciating and pursuing policies which will dispel fears of nationalization, discrimination or unfair competition from public corporations.
10. Encourage and, if possible, assist the GOV to obtain sound private management for its government-owned industries and other enterprises, demonstrating thereby that competent private management of government-owned industries may be a politically feasible means of improving the administration and operations of presently unprofitable state enterprises.
11. Encourage the function of sound joint ventures in which United States and Venezuelan capital join forces and utilize United States “know-how” in developing economically rational industrial enterprises.
12. Within limits of United States national security interests, avoid undue restriction of imports and off-shore purchases of Venezuelan petroleum products. Explore ways to open new possibilities for petroleum and other exports to the United States.
[Facsimile Page 7]13. Encourage Venezuela to do away with trade and exchange restrictions as soon as possible and to follow a trade and tariff policy that will allow a maximum freedom of trade without uneconomic protective provisions.
14. Do not oppose Venezuelan trade restrictions which limit selected imports for the protection of developing industries contributing to the diversification of Venezuela’s economy; but support credit assistance for the initiation or expansion of enterprises only when they appear to offer a reasonable net contribution to that economy.
15. Oppose discriminatory or unreasonable restrictions on United States shipping or air carriers, with due consideration for legitimate [Typeset Page 543] Venezuelan interest in developing and protecting Venezuelan national carriers.
16. Undertake civil aviation consultation, whenever appropriate, to establish agreed interpretations and modifications of the bilateral air transport services agreement of 1953.
V. Military Security
1. Assist Venezuela in developing its military capability to maintain internal security, counter guerrilla and other insurgent activities and protect Venezuelan oil fields, iron mines and ancillary installations. Facilitate training for Venezuelan military personnel in Venezuelan and/or at U.S. installations; and expedite the delivery of equipment under our bilateral military credit program.
2. Maintain close liaison with the Venezuelan Government on contingency planning to prevent another Communist-dominated regime from coming to power in the Caribbean region.
3. Discourage conspiratorial or undemocratic sentiments from flourishing among Venezuelan military personnel by using personal contacts to good advantage.
4. Encourage the employment of Venezuelan military forces, as practicable and without detriment to their primary security mission, on projects which contribute to economic and social development.
VI. Civilian Security Forces
(See also AID/LA Policy Consideration Paper)
1. Assist the Venezuelan civil police forces to improve their capability for maintaining law and order, rendering needed police services and controlling civil disturbances.
[Facsimile Page 8]2. Assist the Venezuelan civil security forces to improve their capability in counter-subversive techniques.
3. Expedite delivery of equipment and ammunition urgently required by the civilian security forces.
VII. Public Affairs
(Several of the following are general statements largely complementing the more detailed presentation in USIS-Caracas Country Plan for FY 1963 contained in USIS message 113 of 6/21/62, as amended).
1. Help to strengthen the confidence of Venezuelans in their present system of constitutional, democratic government.
2. Convince Venezuelans that their aspirations for economic development with social justice can be achieved most effectively by applying Western democratic concepts rather than those of Communist totalitarianism, with the Alliance for Progress the positive do-it-yourself means of achieving their desired objectives.
3. Emphasize U.S.-Venezuelan cooperation in the Alliance for Progress.
[Typeset Page 544]4. Enhance Venezuelan knowledge about the United States and its foreign policy; and respect and appreciation for United States cultural, social and scientific achievements as developed by a free society for the general welfare.
5. Exploit the Cuban Communist Regime as an example of Communist imperialism which seeks to destroy Venezuela’s political independence and to impose a system which flouts the dignity of the individual and human rights, impedes economic and social progress and retards the general welfare.
VIII. Youth/Students
1. Encourage, through cooperation with the Government [1 line not declassified], the orientation of Venezuela’s youth and students toward the support of Venezuelan democratic institutions and the pursuit of serious academic programs in the national institutions of higher learning.
- Plan of action for Venezuela to March 2, 1964. Secret. 8 pp. DOS, CF, 611.31/9–2162.↩