Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement

137. Memorandum from Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy, April 24¹

April 24, 1963

SUBJECT

• Review Guatemalan Developments Since Coup d’Etat

There is enclosed herewith a memorandum summarizing developments during the first three weeks of the new Peralta regime in Guatemala. This summary has been prepared in reply to a verbal request made to the Department by Mr. Bromley Smith.

/s/ B.H. Read
for
William H. Brubeck

Executive Secretary

Enclosure

undated

THE NEW GUATEMALAN REGIME: ITS FIRST THREE WEEKS

Summary

The Guatemalan regime, headed by Col. Enrique Peralta, which took power through a coup d’état near midnight on March 30 completed three weeks in office on April 21. In that time it has accomplished its basic administrative organization, has announced and begun to implement its program of government, has received the recognition of a majority of the American Republics, and has continued to enjoy a wide base of political support within the country. There has been no challenge to the authority of the new government and no violence except for small-scale action taken at the initiative of the government itself against small guerrilla groups already in existence prior to the coup. While active opposition will undoubtedly soon emerge, the new Peralta regime has enjoyed a period of political calm enabling it to consolidate its position. The future success of the new regime will depend in large measure on the wisdom with which it wields its absolute power and its success in instilling a sense of urgency for social and economic improvement and the reestablishment of a constitutional democracy through free elections.

Consolidation of New Regime. Within twenty-four hours after the coup, most of the major political parties, including the center and moderate left, had approved the coup and indicated their support of the Peralta regime, at least for the emergency. This wide support was motivated as much by anti-Ydigoras sentiment as it was by anti-Arevalo feelings. Wide sectors were simply “fed-up” with the mal-administration, corruption, political anarchy, and lack of positive leadership by Ydigoras. The new regime’s first decree-law continued the Labor Code in effect and thus confirmed the rights of labor. The new cabinet named on April 1 contrasted with that of Ydigoras in that it was largely composed of civilians and its members had a much higher decree of professional and technical competence. Though it had not yet been recognized by any of the participating countries, Guatemala sent delegates to the Managua security and Alianza conferences, in order not to break the continuity of purpose achieved so recently at San Jose.

Recognition. From information now available, some eleven Latin American and some sixteen or more other countries (including nearly all major Western powers) have thus far recognized the Peralta Government. At the time the United States extended recognition on April 17, eight Latin American and eight other countries had done so. Eventual recognition by all the Latin American republics seems assured except for Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, and possibly Costa Rica. Costa Rican leaders (including ex-President Figueres) have expressed approval of Peralta to United States officials and Costa Rica may seek some formula to extend recognition without offending their understanding with Betancourt on non-recognition of military coup governments.

Before recognizing the Peralta regime, the United States consulted closely with other Hemisphere governments and determined that there was a consensus favoring eventual recognition. Special note was taken that Mexico and three of the four Central American countries had by then extended recognition. Also, it was fully evident that there was wide support in Guatemala for the new regime in spite of its unconstitutional inception. Despite strenuous efforts we were not able to extract an official public statement fixing a specific timetable for elections. However, Peralta did give Ambassador Bell verbal assurances that hopefully elections would be held within a period of not more than two years. Also, on April 4 Peralta had been quoted in a Miami Herald story as stating: “It will take Guatemala about two years to get ready for free elections.” He claimed that this was a public statement. In delivering our note of recognition on April 17, Ambassador Bell reminded the Foreign Minister of our acceptance of these assurances and our hope that elections would be held within the shortest possible time. We intend to keep reminding the regime of this point.

Program of the New Government. To date the Peralta Government has issued some fourteen decree laws. Among the more important were the Fundamental Charter of Government (No. 8 of April 10) and the Law for the Defense of Democracy (No. 9 of April 10). The Charter stated that public power would reside in the Army and be exercised by the Minister of Defense (i.e. Peralta) as the Chief of Government. It provided that the Chief of Government would exercise all executive and legislative functions acting with the assistance of the Council of Ministers (the cabinet) and the advice of an appointive Council of State. The courts were to function in an independent and exclusive manner. With the sole exception of the University of San Carlos, appointments of all officials in the country would be made by the Chief of Government. Rigid control and drastic penalties for communist and other subversive action was established by the “Law for the Defense of Democracy” and in a companion decree-law (No. 10) to protect public order and prevent crimes of violence. A significant aspect of Decree Laws 9 and 10 is that violations of these decrees on subversion and crimes of violence will be tried in military and not civilian courts. This seems to contradict the “independent and exclusive” jurisdiction supposedly given the civil courts.

An important pronouncement was issued by the new government on April 19 which outlined its program. Besides pledging special attention to the poorer classes, its intention to honor its international obligations, and its support for the Declaration of Central America signed at San Jose on March 19, the government specifically announced an eight point program to implement its “full and enthusiastic support” of the Alliance for Progress. These eight points were: (1) reorganization of the public administration as an instrument to promote social and economic development, (2) institutional reorganization to provide more social benefits, (3) agrarian development, including rational land distribution, supervised credit and marketing services, (4) accelerated Central American economic integration, (5) industrial development using both public and private resources, (6) fiscal reform and effective administration, (7) coordination of government fiscal and monetary policy with public investment policy designed to secure an equitable redistribution of the national income, and (8) reinforcement of the National Planning Council in developing rational development plans.

U.S. Assistance to the New Government. No basic changes will be required in our AID assistance strategy in order to assist the implementation of the above program. Our programmed assistance was designed specifically for such purposes but was unable to work effectively with the previous Ydigoras administration. It is not anticipated that large additional amounts of aid will be needed or could be effectively used at this time. At the moment there is some $30 million in unexpended funds, mostly loans from U.S. sources, which have not been used due to the inability of the Ydigoras Government to provide matching funds or otherwise take effective action. Should the present government prove effective in devising and implementing development plans then it can be anticipated that our assistance could be much accelerated and with only minimum requirements for grant assistance. This prediction is based on the present satisfactory economic situation in Guatemala and the prospects of greatly accelerated progress, provided the economic community can look forward to a more stable political atmosphere and the support of an efficient and effective public administration. The unwholesome domestic climate, administrative disarray and fiscal mismanagement have constituted more of a deterent to the Guatemalan economy in the past three years than have low coffee prices.

1. Transmits memorandum summarizing the first 3 weeks of the Peralta regime in Guatemala. Confidential. 4 pp. DOS, CF, POL 2 GUAT.