Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement

125. Despatch 494 from Guatemala City, March 31¹

Guatemala City, March 31, 1962

REF: Embtel 428; Deptel 344. SUBJECT: U.S. Interests and the Guatemalan Political Scene.

The events of the past fortnight in Guatemala necessitate a reappraisal of the situation in terms of prospects for U.S. policy objectives. It is my belief that these events have significantly weakened the Ydígoras Government, that Ydígoras’ chances to finish his term have been seriously depreciated, and that a major gain has been gratuitously presented to the candidacy of Juan José Arévalo. These events have, in other words, strengthened and encouraged the Communists and those opposed to the United States, and have dimmed the prospects for the success of U.S. policy.

A month ago, I had the impression that the Ydígoras Government, while almost certainly one which was going to be subjected to increasing attack as the weeks and months went by, would be able, as it had so many times before, to weather these storms, pursuing the standard Ydígoras tactics of dividing the enemy by a combination of deals and threats. The major necessities seemed to be to achieve some appreciable progress in social and economic development, to preclude an Ydígoras-Arévalo union, to seek and foster the development of a candidate who could succeed Ydígoras and defeat Arévalo. While I believed these to be difficult of attainment and that their prosecution required urgent and careful application of our skills and energies, they did not appear to be impossible of achievement.

The recent events, I believe, caught us by surprise—not in failing to anticipate the probability of demonstrations such as the students initiated, but in not having foreseen the manner in which Ydígoras would respond to the challenge. I believe that his response was equally surprising to the students, to the Communists, to the non-Communist opposition, to the military, to the public and indeed to members of his own party. The students were undoubtedly egged on by the Communists, ever eager to foment disorder, and by the non-Communist opposition, always willing to attack the Government. These elements may have hoped, for different reasons, that the Government would fall; the Communists doubtless hoped some martyrs could be produced so that further agitation would be abetted; but I do not believe that they expected these results. I believe they expected the President to be able to defeat their efforts and did not anticipate that he would adopt such violent methods as to offer what proved to be a major opportunity to overthrow his Government.

The President argues that the students’ tactics left him no option but the use of force. He points out that they had planned their demonstrations to occur in the crowded downtown area both to effect a maximum disruption of normal activity and to involve large numbers of people not a part of their group. Thus traffic in city streets was to be blocked off and a minority of demonstrators spread throughout the groups of people could give the impression of a much larger protest and render more difficult the problem of policing the area. The President also contends that it was the demonstrators who commenced shooting and that the police were defending themselves. The possibility that non-Governmental forces initiated the shooting certainly exists, but it is equally likely that it began with the hated judicial police. Whatever the facts may be as to the first to shoot, the action of the police in the days that followed was brutal, violent and indiscriminate. It is impossible to conclude anything but that the President personally determined to use full force against the demonstrators (and as an obvious corollary), anyone else in the way, and to take the opportunity to bully his political enemies. I believe this decision was deliberate and I believe it was a basic political mistake.

The President’s public justification for his action, and his private assertions, were that the movement was Communistic, that its participants were not students (except in the first days when there were some student dupes), that the power of the Communists was increasing rapidly by reason of outside support in the form of arms and money, and that the liberty of Guatemala was at stake. The Cuban radio provided him with considerable assistance in this effort by its claims that a “socialist” government was going to get power, its appeals for revolt, its threats of legions led by Arbenz, Paz Tejada, etc. It is noteworthy, however, that his actions did not include jailing Communist leaders.

The general public reaction against the violence of the repressive measures brought the non-Communist opposition to the sudden realization that Ydígoras could be dislodged if the military forces of the country could be persuaded to join in such a movement. While a union of the opposition and the military could have effected such a result at any time, the opportunity which presented itself for such a union was real, immediate and unexpected.

The military, and I must add that a major weakness in this Mission is its scarcity of information as to the attitudes and aspirations of the officer corps—excepting a few of the senior officers, is assumed to be anti-Communist and generally right of center in its political philosophy. Whether this assessment is valid, I do not know. Based on the available evidence, it is my opinion that the senior officers at least are genuinely fearful of and thus opposed to a regime of the left since the events of Cuba have shown that such a regime would be adverse to the interests of the military itself. In all likelihood there are less crass motivations also present among the military, such as devotion to constitutional government, intellectual conviction as to the merits of democracy, and in some cases loyalty to the President.

Whatever the proper political analysis, there can be no doubt on the evidence we have from a variety of sources, including the President, that there was a substantial resistance in the Army to the proposal that the Army replace the police in patrolling the streets of Guatemala City and in maintaining order. As the President himself told me there were quite a few officers who felt that the Army should not be asked “to shoot boys and girls.” It is a fact that there was a long delay between the issuance of the notice that responsibility had been given to the Army and the actual appearance on the streets of any military patrols. There is reason to believe that if the demonstrations had continued and that if substantial numbers of citizens had joined in them during the period after the order for Army control was issued and before the actual initiation of patrols, the Army might not have obeyed the order. The feeling of the officers was that it would not be the enemy at whom they were to fire.

For at least a brief period toward the end of the week of March 11–17 the non-Communist opposition believed it had achieved agreement with military leaders adequate to force the resignation of the President. Why this agreement collapsed or failed to last (if it indeed existed on any firm basis) is not entirely clear. Some believe the President was just a jump or two ahead and succeeded in shifting commanders just in time, others deny the agreement was ever soundly based—that is, that it had not obtained the consent of sufficient or sufficiently influential officers, others feel the President’s warnings of Communist leadership and the Habana broadcasts frightened the officers off. A general feeling is that the spectre of a chaotic situation fertile for the Communists or of a Commie takeover, appeared a worse evil than the continuation of Ydígoras. Certainly the student movement had not been preceded by any really organized plan for or agreement on an anti-Communist succession to the present Government.

From the Communist point of view the events were splendid. The Government had reacted with violence, it had shocked even its own supporters, the division between Ydígoras and the anti-Communist opposition had been deepened and intensified. Current opinion among anti-Communist opposition to Ydígoras is that any union or cooperation between them and Ydígoras is “absolutely impossible.” I don’t think the Communists expected to take over, nor indeed is the situation yet ripe for them. The logical sequence would seem to me to be one of continuous opportunistic exploitation of public antipathy for the Government, exacerbation of the division between the non-Communist forces, capitalizing upon targets of opportunity and paving the way for a government either so extreme (rightist military), so weak (a divided and inept coalition), or so amenable (Arévalo) that an ultimate Communist takeover is facilitated.

The Ydígoras Government has been gaining in unpopularity for some time. It may be true, as the President says, that his regime compares favorably in most respects with all of its predecessors, and that the opposition to him is a combine of envious competitors for power, none of whom he considers to have sufficient strength or conviction to be capable of preserving a democratic state, and of the Communists. However, it is also true that there is a great discontent with the regime which is based upon considerations other than Communism or political opportunism. This discontent stems first and foremost from the general public belief that the Ydígoras Government has overstepped the bounds of permissible graft, that is, that the “take” has been and continues to be greatly excessive. Secondly, the Ydígoras policy of “divide and rule” has left him devoid of much support beyond the sycophants or fellow grafters. No one can feel confident of his position; it is the Old Man and he alone who exercises power. Thirdly, and while this point receives less public attention, it does worry many and it worries me, the President has not really acted vigorously and effectively against the Communists within Guatemala. Some members of the American business community believe that the general public is fed up with Ydígoras’ failure to be a strong man and contend that his handling of the riots was not strong enough rather than too strong. Action against non-Communist political enemies has been more frequent and prompt than against Communists. For example, the Government paper printed pictures and biographies of the four Communist student leaders during the recent events but professed inability “to find” them to arrest. They appeared rather easy to locate in our opinion.

The conclusion that the President has not only “gone easy” on domestic Communists but has found it politically convenient to have such a group seems to me well founded. Efforts made by U.S. representatives to persuade him to establish effective intelligence arrangements have been unsuccessful to date. No effort has been made by him to obtain more effective anti-Communist legislation. Information provided regarding Communist activity has not resulted in effective counteraction. The Old Man is a courageous and stubborn person who has managed to confound and refute those who have prophesied his fall for quite a long time. He knows his advent to power was opposed by the U.S. He has succeeded so far in keeping power by what he calls his tightrope walking, balancing his opposing forces off one against the other. To his mind, I think, the Communists have helped to balance the non-Communist opposition and to keep some of his own conservative supporters in line. He told me he had flirted with Arévalo not because he liked him or intended to support him but to balance off—i.e., counter the “U.S. support of his enemy, Mario Mendez Montenegro.” He exudes confidence, enjoys this sort of political action, and, I expect, believes sincerely in his ability to continue the performance, “handling” the Communists and the opposition, the U.S., and the British (in re British Honduras) without mishap.

There is, of course, some truth in what I have assumed his analysis to be. It is a fact that the opposition lacks unity and if it has strong men capable of effective leadership, their presence is not obvious. It is true that the Arévalo-Arbenz period produced Communists, Communist sympathizers and a degree of indoctrination in Communist ideology which cannot be eradicated by force alone. It is true that to govern at all among the congeries of political forces here is a difficult feat requiring a mastery of political give and take and of the art of balancing competitive forces.

Perhaps the Old Man will prove to be correct in his belief that he can last out his term without either the Communists or the non-Communists being able to upset him. Certainly the non-Communist opposition has so far been frustrated by the Old Man’s success in avoiding overthrow. If it is assumed, for hypothesis, that he can last, it seems to me the likelihood of an Arévalo Government is greatly increased unless he changes his present techniques. If the non-Communist opposition comes to the conclusion, or if a substantial segment of it comes to the conclusion that no existing political leader or group alone can unseat Ydígoras, the temptation to accept Communist support will certainly be much harder to resist. With or without such support (since I assume the Communists would regard Arévalo’s election as a victory) the tendency to look for a charismatic leader will grow and grow. Arévalo’s highly intelligent position of remaining aloof from the present events, of maintaining that government should only change constitutionally, and his statements of rejection of Communist support are all likely, even if not calculated to be, to engender enthusiasm for him among the body, if not the leaders, of the non-Communist opposition as “the man” who can reunite and save the country.

I realize the danger of political prophesy in a scene such as exists here, and I am deeply conscious of my own limited experience in and knowledge of this environment. But I do not believe that Ydígoras will find it as easy to stay in office as he seems to think and I am reluctantly forced to the conclusion that, if he does succeed through the use of his present tactics, we will have lost Guatemala. To continue in power, Ydígoras must keep the military with him, or develop (as he has given many indications of a desire to do) a counter-military force of campesinos along with a part of the military, and he will be able and will be tempted to use them in increasingly harsher measures. If the opposition continues its actions against Ydígoras and provokes such harsher measures, or if it elects to join with the Arévalo camp and wait for 1964, the effect of either of these actions will be to force upon the U.S. a choice between the extremes of right or left.

I am inclined to the view that the opposition is not yet prepared to give in nor to join the Communists nor to support Arévalo. I think their efforts to find a means of getting military support so as to unseat the President will continue and are apt to reach a climax at any time, and possibly in the next two or three months. Their problems are difficult ones, however. They are united now in only one respect—they all desire the departure of Ydígoras. In varying degrees they are appreciative of the dangers inherent in dislodging him if no agreement on a successor exists. Some wish a constitutional change with Ydígoras resigning, the first designate becoming provisional President and elections within four months. Others feel a military junta is the answer, again with early elections. Some advocate a civil-military junta to hold and exercise power for a year or more. (A six man—three civilian and three military—junta with a larger advisory council, was the proposal that almost succeeded.) Their programs for action after they assume charge are somewhat vague. I am told they agree on (1) honesty in government, (2) better administration, and (3) anti-Communism. That these laudable principles or objectives need leadership, organization, discipline and executive capability to accomplish is acknowledged but such acknowledgment is not yet visibly accompanied by any specific plans or programs. No one of the leaders of the various political groups is an obvious good choice; their capacity and/or willingness to work together as a team is of uncertain but doubtful dependability.

None of them, as of this moment, is prepared to entertain cooperation with Ydígoras. They say such cooperation might have been conceivable prior to the recent events but that Ydígoras has made it impossible. Whether this attitude will persist I do not know, but it seems to be pretty firmly held now. Ydígoras has been making efforts to attract the opposition—using different emissaries to different groups—to join with him and has held out the bait of Cabinet changes, etc. They believe (and I expect Ydígoras does too) that this is a question of the spider inviting the flies into the parlor. It seems evident they lack conviction of their ability to deal on equal terms in any union. Thus the theoretical and desirable solution of a negotiated peace between the anti-Communist opposition and Ydígoras does not seem presently practicable. I believe that if the opposition could agree on a specific set of demands for reforms and a program for anti-Communist action and for progress in the social and economic field, that it could secure the backing of the military for these, and that with the backing of the U.S., the President could be forced to accept the terms. But, as long as the opposition includes in its conditions the primary (presently sole) requirement of Ydígoras’ resignation, no such solution appears possible.

Failing the possibility of a genuine cooperative program of this sort, presumably the next best thing for U.S. interests that an Ydígoras Government could do would be on its own to effect reforms, curb the Communists, and push a vigorous development program in a manner which would permit the growth and development not only of a suitable successor to the Office of President but of a political climate which could assure his election against Arévalo. This is a tall order. Whether Ydígoras could take actions which would deflate and satisfy the opposition is problematical. As for honesty in government, he will, of course, as he has before, deny the allegations and attribute them to his enemies. If he were to put an end to the present graft (assuming that he could) the charge of past graft would remain. Some victims for a purge (Alejos, Samayoa) might satisfy the public but the purging might prove hard to do and unless the Old Man felt confident of its effectiveness, he would be unlikely to act. As for anti-Communist action, I am not sanguine of success in persuading him as long as he is convinced of a greater need to counter other opposition elements. He would, I believe, be enthusiastic about development as long as the moneys come from aid and were used to improve his political stature. However, any real mobilization of the people of the country behind a developmental program is probably impossible as long as the larger issues of political conflict continue.

We have embarked on efforts to push him in these directions. I have insisted on the urgent necessity of an effective campaign against Communists here. It is too early to feel the effectiveness of these representations. I have also insisted that a better organization and plan is essential to economic progress. Efforts to produce something here are in motion but caution is the watchword. I have talked to him about the need to develop a candidate to beat Arévalo, but he is not giving an inch so far in terms of fostering any competitive political figures.

The chances of successful prosecution of U.S. objectives cannot therefore be described as bright.

We must, of course, consider other possible alternatives. These fall within the assumption that the Ydígoras Government is overthrown. This may happen with or without our concurrence or support. Obviously, also, the lack or existence of our concurrence or support could increase the chances of one or another of these alternatives. Thus, Ydígoras could be overthrown by a rightist military junta, or by a junta of civilian and military elements. Such juntas might be of either temporary or enduring nature, and might or might not seek to maintain a cover of constitutional change. Again they might or might not be agreed upon a platform and an organization.

If we were to be able to secure a true cooperation between Ydígoras and his non-Communist opposition, I believe such would be the most desirable alternative for U.S. interests. A unilateral Ydígoras effort at reform and improvement of the sort described before would be preferable to a chaotic competition of oppositionists. However, it cannot be denied that if the Ydígoras Government were overthrown under a facade of constitutionality, by a civilian and/or civilian/military group united in direction and purpose to have clean government, rout the Communists and develop the economy, the interests of the U.S. would not necessarily be damaged and in reality might be advanced, especially if the alternative appears to be two more years of business on the same old basis.

In this highly volatile environment the possibility exists that an effort of this latter sort may be made; certainly the possibility of a request for U.S. support is a real one also. The granting or denying of such support by a course of either action or inaction may present us suddenly with a political decision of great importance. I think our judgment in such event must be coldly pragmatic in the light of an assessment of the probabilities and alternatives which are open to us.

John O. Bell

American Ambassador

1. U.S. interests and the Guatemalan political scene following recent demonstrations. Secret. 7 pp. DOS, CF, 714.00/3–3062.