43. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Japan0

1028. Pass COMUS Japan for General Burns. For Ambassador. Embtels 1247,1 1248, 12632 and 1302.3

We assume substantive treaty negotiations with GOJ will not be resumed until GOJ takes initiative on this matter and unless in your judgment it is clear that Kishi can obtain substantially unified LDP support on key treaty issues and thus able effectively to conduct and conclude treaty renegotiation. We should also feel reasonably assured he can successfully face Diet where following successful Socialist barrage against police bill there were indications Socialists would seek exploit treaty issue too. When treaty negotiations are resumed, you are authorized at your discretion to take positions on treaty area and Administrative Agreement as set forth below.

Treaty Area. Our strong preference re treaty area continues to be Pacific area. However, we recognize for reasons set forth your tels this [Page 120] not likely be acceptable to GOJ. If GOJ continues to reject firmly Pacific area, treaty area limited to territory under administration of Japan should be proposed as alternative. Treaty area covering Japan and Article III islands not considered desirable or necessary from our viewpoint and we hope Japanese can be discreetly discouraged from making such proposal. Objections mentioned by Japanese (Embtels 9114 and 9485) appear to be most appropriate arguments for us to use against inclusion Article III islands.

Under these circumstances Article V should be rephrased as follows: “Each party recognizes that an armed attack directed against the territory or areas under the administrative control of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.” In addition, while helpful references to Pacific area exist in Preamble and Article IV, in order to provide stronger basis for use of US facilities and areas outside treaty area, following language should be added to Preamble before “having resolved” paragraph: “Recognizing that the maintenance of international peace and security in the Pacific area is a matter of mutual concern.”


Administrative Agreement. (a) As indicated during Washington talks6 we are opposed to any substantive changes in the Administrative Agreement. We are particularly wary of taking any step that will stimulate Japanese pressure for substantive changes, particularly on grounds that these will be necessary to gain Diet approval. In this regard, we are puzzled by Fujiyama’s rationale that a new agreement is required for legal reasons. We agree with Japanese lawyers that present agreement is based on Security Treaty and with latter’s expiration normally would fall. However, Article VI of proposed Treaty specifically designed to breathe continued life into present agreement. Would appreciate your views as to reasoning behind Japanese position. If, in your view this is gambit to force US to negotiate new agreement (with attendant pressures for substantive changes), believe you may wish to press point with Fujiyama.7 We still consider appropriate changes could be made to present [Page 121] agreement by amendments under Article XXVIII conforming it to new treaty. If Fujiyama provides sound legal basis under Japanese law for having new agreement rather than amending present Agreement, you may table changes set forth in next following message.8 If Japanese desire for new agreement based essentially on political grounds, would appreciate their reasoning and your assessment thereof. In any case, you may table changes set forth next message as amendments to present agreement under Article XXVIII.

(b) Article VI draft treaty will require appropriate revision in event of new Administrative Agreement. In addition following changes should be made in Article VI to conform language re “bases” to that of Administrative Agreement: “In furtherance of the objectives of this treaty the US has the use of certain facilities and areas in and about Japan. With respect to the use of these facilities and areas and the status of US forces in Japan, the Administrative Agreement signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1952 as amended shall continue in force.” Negotiating record should indicate that “in and about Japan” includes only territory under administrative control of Japan.

Defense concurs.
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/12–2458. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Sneider, cleared with L and DOD, and approved by Robertson. Repeated to CINCPAC for Admiral Felt and POLAD and Naha for Deming and General Booth.
  2. Document 40.
  3. Telegrams 1248 and 1263, December 17 and 18, transmitted a draft of changes in several articles of the Administrative Agreement proposed by COMUS. (Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/12–1758 and 794.5/12–1858)
  4. Document 42.
  5. In telegram 911, October 29, MacArthur reported that he had a general discussion on the security treaty with Vice Foreign Minister Yamada. The latter stated that the inclusion of Article III islands and U.S. possessions in the Pacific in the treaty area would cause difficulty for the Government of Japan. (Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/10–2959)
  6. In telegram 948, November 3, the Embassy proposed certain changes in the wording of the draft treaty because of reservations expressed by Japanese officials concerning the treaty area. (Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/11–358)
  7. See Document 26.
  8. In telegram 1584, February 9, MacArthur reported that the Japanese did not want extensive substantive changes in the Administrative Agreement. (Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/2–959) See Supplement.
  9. Telegram 1029 to Tokyo, January 24, included some amendments to a COMUS draft of the Administrative Agreement. (Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/12–2458)