215. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to Secretary of State Dulles0

SUBJECT

  • Recommended Course of Action for Countering Recent Communist Statements Regarding Korea

Background

In our view the propaganda initiative which the Communists gained by the north Korean statement of February 5,1 the Chinese Communist statement of February 7,2 the joint Chinese Communist-north Korean announcement3 that Chinese Communist troops will be withdrawn from north Korea and the endorsement of the various proposals in an official statement by the Government of the Soviet Union on February 20 can be turned to the advantage of the free world with proper action on our part.

We should reply to the Communist statements and, in doing so, seize the initiative by taking positive action on the Korean problem. Our reply must be made with the objective of forcing the Communists to accept a satisfactory settlement in Korea or, if they continue to oppose this, to make it clear to the world that the responsibility for an impasse in reaching a solution continues to lie with the Communists.

Recommended Position

The basic thesis of the United States position should be that, now that the Chinese Communists have finally announced their intention to withdraw their forces from Korea, the Communists should also cease to impede unification of the Korean peninsula in accordance with United Nations objectives as set forth in the October 7, 1950 resolution4 of the General Assembly and numerous other United Nations resolutions which have received overwhelming endorsement. In this connection, the unification of the Korean peninsula through free elections under [Page 441] United Nations supervision, a principle first contained in the United Nations resolution of November 14, 1947,5 and reiterated in the October 7, 1950 and subsequent resolutions, should be forcefully impressed upon the Communist world and the world in general by all means at our disposal. We should, however, concentrate our efforts on action through the United Nations.

(Comment: In this connection it will be necessary to convince President Rhee that free elections supervised by the United Nations should be held throughout the Korean peninsula in the interests of unification. He has persistently held the position that, since the National Assembly in the Republic of Korea has been elected under United Nations supervision, all that is necessary is to add to the existing Republic of Korea National Assembly representatives from north Korea in proportion to the population.)

In connection with this action, pressure will be put upon the United States by the Communists and perhaps neutral nations to remove our forces from the Republic of Korea. Our position should be that United Nations forces should remain in the Korean peninsula until such time as the peninsula has been unified in accordance with the United Nations proposals and resolutions. We should emphasize in this context the reasons why it is impossible to equate the presence (or withdrawal) of aggressive Chinese Communist troops with that of United Nations troops. There are, of course, other reasons why we must maintain our forces in Korea until a satisfactory settlement is achieved. Our own security interests require it and it is important that we retain operational control over Republic of Korea armed forces. There is also the danger, as a result of Communist capabilities and the level of south Korean detection and enforcement techniques, that Communist efforts of subversion would be more effective were our troops not there.

Possible Courses of Action

To implement the above position, it is desirable that the sixteen nations who fought in Korea provide a short response to the Chinese Communist statement which was delivered by the Government of the United Kingdom to the Sixteen at the request of the Chinese Communists. The answer to this statement should be short and include the following elements:

(1)
The sixteen nations are pleased to observe that the Chinese Communist regime has now stated its intention to withdraw its troops which have been illegally occupying the northern portion of the Korean peninsula since October 1950, as it was called upon to do by one part of the United Nations resolution of February 1, 1951.6
(2)
The note should further state that, now that the Chinese Communists have finally announced their intention to withdraw their troops illegally stationed in north Korea, the Communist authorities concerned should likewise cease to impede the realization of the United Nations objectives set forth in the resolution of October 7, 1950 and other United Nations resolutions calling for the achievement by peaceful means under United Nations auspices of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government, to be initiated by planning and holding free elections under United Nations supervision, and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area.

An early meeting of representatives of the Sixteen should be held to discuss and approve an agreed reply to the Chinese Communists along the above lines.7 Some modifications in the language with which we present our proposed position may become necessary as a result of this meeting and the views of our Allies.

In order to seize the initiative, however, some further positive action is necessary. In this respect urgent consideration is being given to what we might do in the United Nations, possibly through the Security Council, to achieve our objective of countering the Communist propaganda campaign and wresting the initiative from the Communists. The results of our study on other possible actions will be the subject of a separate memorandum.8

Recommendation9

That, in an early meeting which I will call with representatives of the Sixteen, you approve our seeking to obtain their concurrence in an agreed reply to the Chinese Communists generally along the lines of the attached draft statement. (Tab A)10

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/2–2858. Confidential. Drafted by Douglas N. Forman in CA and Barbis, Parsons, and Lane in NA and cleared with EUR, L, IO, CA, and FE.
  2. See footnote 2, Document 213.
  3. See footnote 3, Document 213.
  4. On February 19 Chinese Premier Chou En-lai and North Korean Premier Kim Il-Sung announced that the Chinese Communist troops present in North Korea would be withdrawn by the end of 1958, with the first stage of the withdrawal completed prior to April 30.
  5. See Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. VII, pp. 904906.
  6. See ibid., 1947, vol. VI, pp. 857859.
  7. Ibid., 1951, vol. VII, pp. 150–151.
  8. Extensive discussions concerning the Chinese initiatives had already taken place with French, British, Australian, New Zealand, Canadian, and Dutch representatives from the Sixteen; Japanese representatives and Andrei Ledovski, Counselor of the Soviet Embassy, also came to the Department to press the case for accepting the Chinese proposal. Memoranda of these conversations are in Department of State, Central File 795.00; see Supplement.
  9. Not found.
  10. In addition to initialing his approval, Dulled added: “Should we note the larger % UN forces already withdrawn?”
  11. Not found attached; for text of the draft reply, see Document 218.