114. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Stump) to the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke)0

S–39. 270722Z. Exclusive for Admiral Burke, Assistant Secretary Robertson. Information Ambassador Jones, Vice Admiral Riley, Rear Admiral Cruise. From Stump. Deliver during working hours. Following [Page 205] receipt of Robertson’s message, passed as CNO 240825Z,1 I fortunately was able to have a further lengthy discussion with Indonesian group consisting of BGen Subroto, Col Sukendro and their excellent translator Maj Sunario. I conveyed to them the points which were authorized for me to make to the group and in order to give them assurance that this was being coordinated in Djakarta as well, I pointed out that this was essentially what Amb Jones would be passing on under instructions in Djakarta.

From this conversation and previous interviews with this group, my best estimate is that they have been impressed with our willingness to assist them in this new approach, that they are honestly determined to carry out their part of the responsibility. This was illustrated by the fact that they requested that their return schedule be altered so that they might reach Djakarta more expeditiously in order to help guide delicate reorientation of attitudes there to one of cooperation.

Delicately tried to suggest certain things which they could do to create a better impression on their anti-Communist Asian neighbors and most of all on US officials and public opinion. Of course the first point that we have always emphasized is that in some manner they must take steps to prove that they are making genuine effort to exclude PKI and Communists from government influence. I further pointed out that if it is humanly possible they must see to it that a muzzle is placed on Sukarno to avoid upsetting the applecart during this delicate period. Thirdly while we did not name names or appear to have too much vested interest in the dissidents, we did point out that insofar as possible their willingness to demonstrate generosity (using the illustration of Magsaysay’s2 extremely successful technique in exhibiting magnanimity in reconverting many of the Huks) would be most effective in influencing international opinion with respect to their sincerity. They seemed to accept all of this philosophy with very good grace, and I believe our association with them here will contribute a great deal to the overall effort being made to getting our relationships back on the track with the right forces in Indonesia.

[Page 206]

The group is now departing Tokyo 2200 local 28 May in company with Gen Arellano,3 will spend one day in Manila at Sangley and return via Singapore thereafter. Incidentally, I believe Gen Arellano’s personal influence on them has been good and trip to Manila in his personal company is fortuitous.

They have not desired any publicity regarding their attendance weapons demonstration and intend to say in Djakarta that they have “been to Tokyo to see Asian games.” So far believe no mention in press of their presence weapons demonstration.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/5–2758. Top Secret; Priority. Also sent to the Department of State, which is the source text, and repeated to Djakarta, CINCPAC ADMIN, and CINCPACREPHIL.
  2. Reference is to the telegram from Robertson to Stump, May 23, repeated to Djakarta as telegram 3403. In this telegram Robertson summarized recent U.S. actions with regard to Indonesia and suggested that it would be useful if Stump could: “1) Review with Indonesians what we have done in last few days as indicative of our attitude toward Indonesian Government; 2) express hope early cessation hostilities; 3) emphasize strongly need for some effective action in Djakarta in curbing the communist threat; and 4) reiterate our willingness to help if action taken urging them to use their influence in seeing that some action is taken. You may wish in this connection to point out that Congressional and public opinion in this country would not tolerate sale of military equipment unless there is some change and that it is in their interest to take action at earliest possible time.” (Ibid., 756D.00/5–2358) See Supplement.
  3. Ramon Magsaysay, President of the Philippines from 1954 to 1957.
  4. Lieutenant General Alfonso Arellano, Chief of Staff of the Philippine Armed Forces.