277. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower0
OTHERS PRESENT
- Prime Minister Caramanlis
- Deputy Prime Minister Canellopoulos
- Acting Foreign Minister Tsatsos
- Ambassador Briggs
- Mr. Murphy
- Mr. Bitsios
- Mr. Berger
- Major Eisenhower
The President opened by inviting the Prime Minister to present any subjects he would like.
Mr. Caramanlis expressed his gratitude and that of the Greek people for the President’s visit and said it comes at an opportune time, since [Page 690] there are some matters on which the Greeks are anxious. He admires the President’s seizing the initiative from Khrushchev to relax tensions in the world.1 Furthermore, the trip gives the nations of the free world an opportunity to show their sentiments for the United States and the President.
Mr. Caramanlis said that we should define what we mean by relaxation of tensions. In particular, we should secure guarantees from the Communists to indicate good faith before we let our guard down. One such indication of Communist good faith would be the restoration of democracy in the satellites. Another would be cessation of support for local Communist parties. In all these matters we must keep the unity of the free world. If we do so, we will be all right.
Mr. Caramanlis discussed the significance of U.S. deployments overseas as an indication of the true interest of the United States.
The Prime Minister then discussed the special position of Greece in the world. Greece has a long history of difficulties with the Slavs and the Communists. Greece is willing to overlook the past and is attempting to establish normal relations with these countries. However, Slavs and Communists are still annoyed by Greece as a stronghold of freedom south of the Balkans, and maintain Greece as a primary target for the cold war. Mr. Caramanlis went to some length to support this contention. Specifically he mentioned (1) Bulgarian refusal to comply with the peace treaty between the countries as regards reparations and force levels,2 and (2) Khrushchev’s threats to Greece at Koritza,3 and (3) Khrushchev’s attitude toward the conviction of Glezos as a communist spy in Greek court.4 Primarily the Communists are attempting to infiltrate and demoralize Greece. For this reason he asks personal interest of the President in Greece, and for protection against the Communists. Without U.S. help he feels in some years the Greeks will have to give up.
The U.S. has given generously to Greece, but most of its aid has gone into reconstruction of war damage. The Greeks have not been able [Page 691] to make the progress that the countries of Western Europe have enjoyed.
Mr. Caramanlis summarized by hailing the President’s initiative and pointing out the need for positive guarantees for the future if the President’s peace offensive fails. He asked that larger considerations, although he cannot advise on them, be not allowed to snuff out our interest in Greece entirely. The Greeks are always under the gun, and pressure to join a Balkan Pact is proposed nearly every day. Proposals for disarmament, neutral zones, etc., are also made, with an objective of cutting Greece from the West.
The President responded by saying he must talk in general terms only because he does not always get his way with the Congress. As an illustration, he asked for $3.9 billion of mutual security funds for FY 1960 and received only 3.2. To exacerbate the situation, much of the 3.2 billion was naturally earmarked for Korea and Formosa, and other areas where we support their economies. (Mr. Caramanlis here hastily injected that his request for support does not apply primarily to money, but rather to political and moral support.)
The President said that he has only 13 months to go in office, but no matter who takes over, Republican or Democrat, regardless of the false slogans which might be used in a political campaign, America will, of necessity, stay behind Greece. He had tried to point this up in his speech in Parliament in the morning.
The President said that Khrushchev is tired of bearing the cost of weapons of war. He had attempted to use the threat of force as a weapon, but had become discouraged with this. He therefore desires disarmament, so long as any agreement remains without controls. This does not mean for a moment that he has abandoned his basic purpose to dominate Greece and the world. It merely means that he has changed his approach from threat of force to subversion. The President said he has no fear of a global war unless we, particularly the United States, become weak in our retaliatory forces. But in the realm of subversion, Khrushchev will use everything he has, to include even members of Greek Parliament sympathetic to his cause. He realizes that Greece needs support, and suggests that every year we re-examine the kind of support which should be provided. Certainly Greece should remain militarily strong, at least sufficiently so to withstand assaults from Communist satellites. But more than that, Greece needs to maintain her spiritual, moral and educational strength.
Regarding the economic picture, the President explained the influence of pressure groups in the U.S. Government. Unfortunately, no pressure group exists which is interested in supporting foreign aid. This is supported merely by the logic and good sense of the great mass of Americans. The 700 million dollar cut in foreign aid last year was extremely [Page 692] bad. Of this, Greece received $20 million in economic aid, but the President would like to send more than that in Fiscal 1961. The President mentioned the Development Loan Fund and the International Monetary Fund as other means of providing economic aid. He added that he is now planning to approach Germany, France and Britain to get their help in providing aid around the world. (Mr. Caramanlis injected here that Europe will not listen to such pleas; that they are busy building such devices as the restrictive common market. He understands the difficulties the President faces in the United States. Regarding the Europeans, he said their mentality is not adjusted to his idea of extending foreign aid.) The President said he is going to tell Western Europe they are going to have to do what the United States has done. He admitted that some European nations have ready-made excuses, such as the French with their community and the British with their Commonwealth. Only Germany and the United States have no such excuses. He emphasized that the greatest need for support and security lies in those lands which border the Sino-Soviet bloc. The Middle East oil, which means billions of dollars a year to these nations, will be lost if Greece and Turkey are lost. The President promised to voice this most strongly to the Western European nations. Mr. Caramanlis said that Western European nations have a pre-war mentality and do not understand the necessity to give some in order to keep the rest. The President said that Britain recognizes the problem well, and has continuously showed her awareness of the Mediterranean life line to her economy. Since the United States got into the Marshall Plan, Britain, while aware of the problem, expects the United States to carry the load.
The President then reiterated that he does not fear global war; but he rhetorically asked who provides the West with the deterrent [to] global war. Obviously it is the United States which maintains almost an excess of atomic stockpile. In contrast to this, and in contrast to their own pre-war activities, the Europeans are maintaining “rag-tags.” He himself must awaken Europeans, not only to its capacity, but to its duty. He mentioned Holland as the one nation maintaining more forces than they can really afford. Mr. Caramanlis said this is the weakness of an alliance and of democracy. The President noted that democracy is the most inefficient form of government, but the only one the people will stand for.
The President said he had preached the same line everywhere in the world with the exception of Afghanistan which, while it considers itself neutral, is existing, in his opinion, only at the sufferance of Khrushchev. He urged patience with India, who is too poor to arm itself and who is too big to be armed by others. He hopes to keep India “neutral on our side.”
Mr. Caramanlis pointed out that there are two types of countries in the free world, those exposed to Communism directly, and those who [Page 693] are not. The President asked whether any respected citizens had joined the Communists in Greece. Mr. Canellopoulos answered affirmatively. The Prime Minister explained that such persons were spoiled and ambitious. The Greeks poll from 12–15% Communists and these persons feel their futures are best tied up with them. He pointed out that the Communist party had achieved some respectability since it supported Greeks in their conflicts with Turkey and Britain.5 He said that stability is pretty good right now, however. The President said he had mentioned Russian support of Communist parties to Khrushchev,6 who denied any knowledge.
Mr. Caramanlis then mentioned rumors that the Sixth Fleet would be recalled from the Mediterranean. This would be extremely bad for the morale of Greece and Turkey. The President said it is not the method of the United States to do things suddenly and pull the rug out from under our allies. Therefore it is not in our immediate plans to withdraw the Sixth Fleet. However, the world is changing every day, with the emphasis now turning from military to economic conflict. Fleets are expensive and it would be desirable if we could afford to divert some of the money now used in their maintenance to economic support for our friends. The President said he continually warns his staff to avoid rigidity in thinking. He cited as an example that he himself had set up a pattern in NATO in 1951 and this pattern has not been changed in the last 8 years. He reemphasized he has no present intention of withdrawing the Sixth Fleet. He merely exhorts all to reexamine our resources and our requirements every year with an open mind. He mentioned in passing his opinion that the carrier is no longer a useful weapon for general war, but is still highly useful for small actions. Mr. Canellopoulos with a smile expressed appreciation for the very useful and “nice lecture.” Mr. Caramanlis asked the President to give the same lecture in NATO.
Mr. Caramanlis asked if there are differences among the four Western powers regarding Khrushchev’s peace offensive. The President stated basically there are none; technically the British and Americans are close but De Gaulle is preoccupied by Algeria. De Gaulle and Adenauer favor a rigid refusal to Khrushchev’s demands.7
The President said he is willing to listen to Soviet proposals but will never surrender Berlin as a symbol of Western unity.
The Prime Minister then said that Greece has some severe economic problems. In particular, they have undergone an economic recession [Page 694] this last year. He asked the President if he would make a study of the Greek economic situation with a view of seeing what the U.S. can do to help. The President said that he had not been aware of this recession in Greece and certainly would direct that it be studied.
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International Meetings. Secret. Drafted by John Eisenhower on December 24.↩
- In a televised statement on the night of his departure from Washington (December 3), Eisenhower stressed that his mission abroad was part of his search for peace. For text of the speech, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959, pp. 795–799.↩
- Reference is to the 1947 Treaty of Paris. The Bulgarian Government had refused to pay Greece $50 million in reparations required by the treaty and had created an army in excess of the 50,000 limit imposed by the treaty.↩
- See Document 258.↩
- On July 22, Manlios Glezos, former Executive Secretary of EDA and editor of the daily newspaper Augi, was convicted of espionage and sentenced to 5 years imprisonment, 4 years exile on an island, and the loss of his civil rights for 8 years. The Soviet press criticized the trial and the Soviet Government issued a postage stamp commemorating Glezos as a fighter for freedom.↩
- Reference is to the Cyprus dispute.↩
- During Khrushchev’s September 15–27 visit to the United States.↩
- Reference is to the discussions at the Heads of Government meeting in Paris, December 19–21.↩