63. Instruction From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations1
SUBJECT
- Refusal of Soviet Bloc to Contribute to UNEF
REFERENCE
- USUN Telegram 542 of January 16, 19582
The Department appreciates the Mission’s analysis of the situation created by the refusal of Soviet bloc states to pay UNEF assessments.
The Department recognizes that the Soviet Union has demonstrated frequently its contempt for the UN, its resolutions and for financial obligations of membership. It does not want the Secretariat to become an efficient and effective administrative instrument, and it regularly works to prevent the Security Council and the General Assembly from creating collective security and peaceful settlement arrangements. The United States takes this fact into account and tries to devise ways and means of making the UN work in spite of it.
In the matter of payment of UNEF assessments, however, we are dealing with more than Soviet bloc intransigeance. Twenty-four countries outside the Soviet bloc have made no payments against 1957 assessments and 41 outside the bloc have failed to pay anything against 1958 assessments.
The Department naturally is deeply concerned to promote financial responsibility on the part of all UN members. It wants to prevent any weakening of the ability of the General Assembly to act by the introduction of a kind of item veto on the UN budget.
At the 13th General Assembly, the Soviets assumed an even more uncooperative posture than before. In Committee 5, the Soviet representative said that his country would never contribute anything on any basis to UNEF or any future UN peace force operation.3 At the same time, an uncooperative attitude on the part of other countries became more evident. It is believed these countries will be reluctant to [Page 100] exert unusual pressure for UNEF payments as long as they and their friends are involved, and particularly as long as they are interested in maintaining pressure on the United States to consider alternative means of financing future UN peace force activities. The Department feels in the light of the above it is unlikely that sufficient support could be raised for any real pressure to obtain delinquent payments.
Nevertheless, the Department agrees that a constant, general pressure must be maintained on allUN members to pay UNEF assessments. Probably the most effective way of doing this would be for the Secretary General to utilize his existing authority to draw on the Working Capital Fund for UNEF cash needs. The Fund will then be drawn down and will remain at a dangerously low level because reimbursement from the UNEF Account will be delayed and only partial. If the prospect is that Working Capital will be exhausted at the end of 1959, the General Assembly will be forced again to consider raising the level of the Working Capital Fund. This it always does very reluctantly and only after many complaints against all those who are delinquent in their contributions. This kind of general pressure is difficult to avoid or resist and the payment record as a whole may be improved. Furthermore, the Department doubts that the Soviets would refuse to pay their share of increased advances to the Working Capital Fund. Admittedly raising the Working Capital Fund level will hit the just and the unjust, those who have paid and those who have not, but it serves to get indirectly and in part at the delinquents in a perfectly legal manner.
Action Proposed
The Mission is requested to make known to the Secretary General that the United States realizes he must draw heavily on Working Capital for UNEF and that we would support an increase in that Fund if the UNEF Account is unable to reimburse the Fund.
At the same time, the Mission should make it known:
1) That the United States has no objection to borrowing from the reserve account for the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance for UNEF cash needs whenever sufficient regular Working Capital is not available. In the United States view, such borrowing will further dramatize the delinquency of many nations and may encourage several who are greatly interested in technical assistance to pay their UNEF assessments. This is especially true since TA reserves may need to be drawn upon in order to maintain the TA program at the desired level in 1959.
2) That the United States is aware that the Secretariat has delayed payment of many UNEF bills and that it deplores such payment practices. It recommends that they be improved and brought into line with regular UN practices so far as possible.
[Page 101]Further Action to be Considered
The Department believes that a General Assembly request to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion, as suggested by the Mission, would certainly confirm the Charter obligation to pay UNEF assessments and thereby further dramatize the delinquency of the USSR and others. However, it should not lead us to expect that such an opinion would lead to fulfillment of USSR obligations. This move will be weighed as preparations are made for the 14th Session of the General Assembly.
The next moves in regard to the Soviet percentage in the contributions scale will not likely occur until the Contributions Committee reports in 1960 or 1961 on the basis of a new set of national income statistics. The Soviets are already aware of our views on an increase in their percentage and we may wish to pressure them further at the 14th General Assembly. However, such moves are not likely to be effective in bringing in delinquent UNEF payments.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.5700/2–1059. Confidential. Drafted by IO/OIA; initialed by Cargo; cleared by Nunley and Sisco; and approved by Wilcox who signed for Dillon.↩
- Telegram 542 reported that the Soviet refusal to pay its UNEF assessments had created financial problems for the United Nations and suggested ways to address this problem. (ibid., 320.5700/1–1659)↩
- For a summary of this statement, see U.N. doc. AC.5/SR.697.↩