198. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense’s Deputy Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale) to the Regional Director, Far East (O’Donnell) in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs1
SUBJECT
- State Message, Saigon 6242
At your suggestion, I have read the subject message and have some comments which might be useful to you. I will key them in to the message.
“Frank and Friendly Talk.”
The concept of proposing to President Diem a series of constructive moves is a sound one for the United States. It can be accomplished successfully if done in the spirit of a powerful friend who sincerely desires to help, and who will back up the suggested improvements with some tangible aid to make the improvements work.
However, in view of our spotty record of understanding past problems in Vietnam and of Ambassador Durbrow’s past expressed emotions which caused mistrust by top leaders in Vietnam, I am most dubious that Durbrow will be able to achieve the “frank and friendly talk” he proposes to hold with President Diem. I certainly hope that he can play this role, for the benefit of both the U.S. and Vietnam, but we must be honest and admit to ourselves that we will be using an instrument for this delicate task who was insulting misinformed and unfriendly within the recent memory of those with whom he would not be “frank and friendly” Maybe Durbrow can now convince Diem that he is sincere, but the U.S. should not pin too much hope on this—nor condemn Diem if he is still skeptical.
Since President Diem, like other Asians, is adept at sizing up U.S. officials, it would be wise if the U.S. now acted to make Ambassador Durbrow a more effective instrument than he is at present. It is suggested that this might be done by making Durbrow’s “actions speak louder than words.” Specifically, prior to Ambassador Durbrow telling President Diem how to change the Vietnamese government all around to meet a contingency, we should let Durbrow give evidence that he is now acting in good faith. The best evidence would be for Durbrow to change his opposition to something which Diem has long desired, and strongly support Diem on the point. Diem would then start re-evaluating Durbrow as maybe a friend after all, and be far more inclined to accept suggestions from him. ISA and State might review some of Durbrow’s opposition, such as the Civil Guard, with the view of changing it to a plus in Durbrow–Diem relations, well ahead of the “frank and friendly” talk.
Tho as Minister of Interior.
Transfer of Vice President Tho to the Ministry of the Interior makes sense, if Diem shows willingness to do this. The Vice President is unusually well-informed about provincial affairs in the Military Regions where the main thrust of the Viet Cong attack now is. He has intimate knowledge of the political and military personalities in the religious sects, as well as detailed knowledge of what goes on [Page 581] below surface in the rubber plantations, the agrovilles, and urban areas.
National Defense.
If President Diem agrees to appoint Thuan as Minister of National Defense, it would be a most beneficial move for the U.S. Defense effort in Vietnam. Thuan is perhaps the most capable administrator Diem has, knows the Vietnamese Armed Forces and their problems in depth, and has shown skill in team-work with MAAG officers for some years now. He is hard-working, thorough, and “clicks” with Americans. The causes underlying the recent expression of some disaffection by a capable military leader such as “Big Minh” are more complex than those reported, just as an example. The Vietnamese Armed Forces are subject to some skillful operations by trained agents of the Communists, by French-oriented former officers, and by Vietnamese political factions other than the Can Lao. Admittedly, this is hardly a healthy situation. But, it is one which required skillful curing. Thus, it is suggested that a sound start towards a cure would be for General McGarr to discuss this whole problem in intimate detail with Thuan, first, and then with responsible officers—with the thought that General McGarr would then propose a carefully thought-out solution. In the interim, it would be highly useful to obtain the views of General Williams on the subject, since he has given it considerable thought after long first-hand experience with the officers and men involved.
Transfer of Mr. and Mrs. Nhu.
The proposal to transfer Mr. and Mrs. Nhu involves the traumatic surgery of removing President Diem’s “right arm.” Whatever the psychological-political beneficial effects on the Saigon intellectuals and foreign elements this would have, the U.S. should consider also the detrimental effects this loss would have on President Diem as the strong leader required to carry out the constructive programs envisaged by the U.S. Country Team.
In other words, the proposal is to cut off the President’s “right arm.” What is proposed as a substitute? This is the key second half to any constructive move, and it is missing from the proposal. Is the thought then that the filling of this place be left to chance or be guided? Would an American be used to fill this vacancy, partially? (Neither Ladejinsky nor Fishel, who have acted as American advisors to Diem, are aware of all the many tasks performed by Nhu for Diem, nor do they have the ability, training, or experience to advise in most of Nhu’s fields.) Would another brother be used to fill this vacancy? (Deep consideration should be given to the effects of moving Luyen into the Nhu spot, since this might well be the impulse [Page 582] of both Diem and Nhu; it is possible that such a move would make the British Ambassador more influential in Saigon than the U.S. Ambassador.) Would someone outside the family move in? (This is possible; however, the best choice is Thuan, and if he is given the Defense Ministry, he is going to be too busy to be with the President for many hours daily.)
Transfer of Tran Kim Tuyen.
Since Dr. Tuyen is a Vietnamese Intelligence Chief, in a position of great trust, the proposal to remove him from his present duties should receive thorough consideration and recommendation by responsible U.S. Intelligence officials prior to any U.S. political recommendation.
The proposal admits that Tuyen is a symbol of public rumors about secret police repressions and control. Thus, it is suggested that the best solution might well be to get to the roots of the problem and solve the causes of the rumors. If there is any basis of fact, why don’t the American officials in Saigon who advise and support these “secret police” either clean up the bad practices or if they don’t exist, then undertake measures to make the public fully aware of the falsity of the rumors?
New Cabinet Ministers from Opposition.
The proposal to appoint “one or two” cabinet ministers from the opposition is a very shop-worn American proposal which was adopted originally from some French influence-peddlers in Saigon. It appears reasonable until put to the acid test of these questions:
- a.
- Does the “opposition” man have sufficient following (numbers, not adjectives count here) to give any validity to the political usefullness of such a move?
- b.
- Is the “opposition” man competent enough to be the highly capable executive demanded by today’s situation in Vietnam?
- c.
- Since the ultimate responsibility lies with President Diem, can he trust such an “opposition” man to be loyal and obedient when the chips are down—and the chips are surely down in the high stakes of the current game in Vietnam?
Surfacing the Can Lao Party.
The suggestion of surfacing the Can Lao, and every other political party in Vietnam, is an ideal objective for U.S. political work in Vietnam. It is highly doubtful that President Diem would be willing, or able to accomplish the surfacing of the Can Lao just on the verbal request of the U.S. Ambassador. He needs a carefully thought-out plan, and lots of strong U.S. support, in accomplishing this. U.S. support might well necessitate some public statements by the U.S. Ambassador, addressed to all political parties and not the Can Lao alone. [Page 583] The U.S. Ambassador, in turn, would need some official U.S. protection from charges of “meddling” in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. However, this can be done with skill, honor, and dignity by the U.S. if well-planned before hand. Thus, it is suggested that thorough consideration be given to sound planning prior to this being proposed.
Assembly Debate and Investigations.
The suggestion of promoting public debate and legislative investigations of the government by the National Assembly is another ideal objective for U.S. political work in Vietnam. Yet, again, this requires much more thorough planning than is indicated in the proposal.
Any professional political operator should readily recognize that Pandora’s Box is being opened when an inexperienced legislature is permitted to take the initiative in public criticism of the executive branch of government. (The Foreign Service officers who would like to see the National Assembly sound off against Diem’s government seem to have forgotten their own feelings about Senator McCarthy not long ago).
Thoughtful planning should be done on just how to introduce the National Assembly to a healthy, constructive role in relation to the Executive Branch. How can this best be done so that President Diem and his key executives are not distracted by legislative clamor from pressing and demanding duties in an emergency situation? Who are the really responsible legislative members who could be entrusted with a constructive mission for the public good? How best might we educate both the Executive and Legislative Branches to one of the trickiest operations known to democracy? All of this should be thought out carefully before presenting such a proposal to the Vietnamese-otherwise, they will think Pandora’s Box has been opened by the U.S. and we will have really been guilty of causing mischief at the very time we are desperate to bring about coordinated action.
Public Declaration of Property.
The principle involved in having officials publicly declare their property and financial holdings, and be subject to National Assembly investigation, is attractive as a psychological-political measure. However, to put the brakes on “witch-hunting” by legislators, this task should be given to Assemblymen who are noted for personal integrity and public-service—and the U.S. shouldn’t duck the moral responsibility of quietly, skillfully bringing this about when it initiates such an innovation. It would be wise to include public statements of the holdings of Assemblymen and make them subject to the same type of scrutiny, as well, as a sobering thought to investigators.
[Page 584]In all of these proposals, the thought should be kept clearly in mind that the Vietnamese still have much to learn in the art of self-government and that the United States has the gravest sort of responsibility to ensure the successful introduction and use of political mechanisms when it proposes such ideas. This is no place for the political dilettante, nor for haste.
Free Press.
The ideal of a freer press, again, is a worthy objective for the U.S. in Vietnam. As a practical matter, this too needs careful U.S. planning prior to the proposal. Such planning must recognize that Vietnam is in a state of emergency, with even more need for the press not to give aid and comfort to the enemy than in the more stable United States during a national emergency such as World War II. The Free Vietnamese have their lives, fortunes, and futures at stake in the current struggle now going on. Are publishers and editors loyal to Saigon or to Hanoi? Who subsidizes or controls some of the press? The U.S. needs thorough knowledge, based on hard facts, before it proposes ways and means to have public opinions expressed in a nation fighting for its life. If there are Americans now present in Saigon with deep knowledge of Vietnamese public media loyalties and connections, Americans with full appreciation of both the needs for expression and needs for public safety, plus an ability to attest to the loyalty of journalists who would impose and police their own “canon” of press conduct—then these Americans should be the ones to plan the freeing of the Vietnamese press and should be extended for further duty in Vietnam until this freedom-with-responsibility is firmly established, say at least a year after the plan is initiated, at which time the plan should be carefully evaluated in the light of experience.
Propaganda Effort
Publicizing the 3-Year Plan with the people is a worthy thought. Since there is a major psychological operation being conducted by the Armed Forces in many provincial areas, the Armed Forces should be brought into this action for a major role in it.
Economic Measures.
It is to be hoped that able U.S. economists, with morals, will give careful thought to the proposal of large-scale subsidies accomplished through deficit financing. Is this the wisest way, economically (completely apart from political attractions), during a war-time national emergency?
[Page 585]President Eisenhower Message.
A strong statement of U.S. support of Vietnam by President Eisenhower would be of great value. Its value would be enhanced by an expression of U.S. firmness in holding the borders of this new state inviolable. Its value would be diminished if the U.S. has permitted Laos to go down the drain to the Communist Pathet Lao prior to the issuance of such a Presidential statement, since Vietnamese and other Asians are acutely aware of the U.S. role in Laos and have believed we let our friends down in their hour of need. Good words cannot replace weak deeds, even when they come from the leader of the world’s foremost nation.
Conclusion.
It is noted that Ambassador Durbrow concludes his proposals by saying, substantially, that if President Diem doesn’t undertake effective measures (and it is presumed that these are much the same measures as Durbrow proposes), then the U.S. should look around for another leader. While this is a rather obvious insurance policy for the U.S. Country Team to take out, it is to be hoped that neither the Ambassador nor the Country Team nor responsible U.S. officials in Washington believe that the list of proposals are anything more, so far, than some bare-boned ideas—and include some with content worthy of much more mature consideration. They hardly, as yet, constitute a serious forward step for U.S. sponsorship.